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About The Radicalism and New Media Research Group 
 
Harnessing expertise in the University of Northampton’s School 
of Social Sciences, the Radicalism and New Media Research 
Group is an initiative that generates practitioner-focused 
research projects. Linking academia with the wider world, these 
partnership activities coalesce around the understudied 
connection between radical and extremist political movements 
and their use of new media technologies.  
 
From the English Defence League’s use of Facebook for 
directing activities to Islamist jihadi beheadings filmed for the 
purposes propaganda and global dissemination, this connection 
is both striking and increasingly relevant. 
 
There has been, as yet, no coordinated network to systematically 
undertake research in the crucial connection between new media 
and new forms of radicalism. In taking on this role, the 
Radicalism and New Media Research Group invites academic 
researchers, practitioners and civil servants (particularly the 
police and others concerned with community cohesion) to 
compare experiences and develop collaborative enterprises in 
the analysis of this wide-ranging phenomenon, particularly as it 
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Rt. Hon Michael Ellis, MP 
 
The	University	of	Northampton	is	at	 the	 forefront	
of	 the	 important	 academic	 research	 into	 the	 far‐
right,	 an	area	of	 increasing	 importance	nationally	
and	 internationally.	As	Member	 of	 Parliament	 for	
Northampton	 North,	 I	 am	 very	 pleased	 to	 have	
been	 asked	 to	 write	 this	 Foreword	 because	 I	
applaud	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 University	 in	 the	 town	
where	I	have	lived	and	worked	my	whole	life,	and	
which	 I	 now	have	 the	honour	 to	 represent	 in	 the	
House	of	Commons,	 is	 leading	the	way	in	this	key	
area.	
The	view	of	 the	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 is	 that	we	
should	 cut	 ourselves	 off	 from	 Islam	 and	 other	
religions	and	cultures.	They	believe	we	should	do	
this,	 as	 the	 Prime	Minister	 David	 Cameron	 put	 it	
earlier	 this	 year,	 ‘through	 forced	 repatriation,	
favoured	by	 some	 fascists,	 or	 the	banning	of	new	
mosques,	as	is	suggested	in	some	parts	of	Europe.’	
This	 ideology,	 or	 for	 example	 the	 practice	 of	
burning	the	Koran	–	as	promoted	by	Pastor	Terry	
Jones,	 who	 has	 been	 excluded	 from	 the	 UK	 –	 is	
utterly	abhorrent	and	must	be	robustly	rejected.	
Extremism	 of	 any	 kind	 is	 a	 threat	 to	 our	
country	 and	 to	 our	 way	 of	 life.	 In	 the	 Prime	
Minister’s	 speech	 to	 the	 Munich	 Security	
Conference	on	how	best	to	tackle	this	threat	David	
Cameron	made	 the	 point	 that	 groups	 on	 the	 far‐
right,	 such	 as	 the	 English	 Defence	 League,	 fuel	
Islamophobia	 with	 their	 poisonous	 and	 deeply	
erroneous	 stance	 that	 Islam	and	 the	West	 do	not	
mix.		
No	 one	 can	 doubt	 the	 importance	 and	
relevance	 of	 the	 subject	 at	 hand.	 One	 must	 only	
look	 at	 the	 terrible	 atrocity	 this	 summer	 in	
Norway	at	the	hands	of	a	murderous	terrorist	–	in	
the	name	of	a	crazed	war	against	Islam	–	to	see	the	
relevance	 and	 currency	 of	 the	 subject	 matter	 in	
this	report.	
The	potential	for	this	kind	of	extremism	to	




What	 began	 in	 reaction	 to	 the	 deeply	
offensive	abuse	of	returning	British	soldiers	–	our	
courageous	 servicemen	 and	 women	 that	 have	
made	 such	 sacrifices	 over	 the	 years	 to	 fight	
extremism	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 world	 –	 has	
manifested	 itself,	 through	 the	development	of	 the	
EDL,	 into	 violence	 on	our	 streets	 and	a	 terrifying	
subculture	of	casual	racism.	This	report	presents	a	
very	 useful	 documentation	 of	 the	 EDL’s	
development,	their	use	of	online	and	social	media,	
their	 links	 to	 football	 hooliganism,	 as	well	 as	 the	
development	of	splinter	groups.	
The	advance	of	copy‐cat	organisations	like	
the	 Norwegian	 Defence	 League	 and	 others,	 as	
documented	 by	 the	 authors,	 shows	 not	 only	 the	
urgency	for	action	as	a	society	but	also	shows	the	




local	 politics,	 of	 bin	 collections	 and	 council	
housing	 shortages	 to	 win	 them	 votes.	 But	 as	 a	
fascist	 organisation	 that	 does	 little	 to	 couch	 its	
views,	 it	 is	my	opinion	that	it	will	always	struggle	
to	 garner	 the	 support	 of	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 the	
British	public	who	rejected	 fascism	 in	 the	1930’s,	
and	who	continue	to	do	so	today.	
The	EDL,	however,	by	not	asking	for	votes	
and	 by	 arguing	 that	 they	 do	 really	 only	 oppose	
violent	Islamism	–	though	the	hypocrisies	pointed	
out	 by	 this	 report	 are	 worthy	 of	 note	 –	 could	
potentially	 spearhead	 a	 movement	 that	 would	
have	 damaging	 consequences	 and	 divide	
communities.		
At	the	same	time	as	we	confront	this	new	
far‐right	 politics,	 we	 must	 also	 do	 the	 same	 for	
other	 forms	 of	 extremism	 –	 for	 too	 long,	
Government	 policy	 has	 encouraged	 communities	
to	 merely	 co‐exist	 rather	 than	 co‐operate	 with	
each	 other.	 As	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Home	 Affairs	
Select	Committee	of	 the	House	of	Commons,	 I	am	
particularly	 conscious	 of	 this	 issue	 and	 very	
supportive	 of	 the	 Government’s	 response	 to	
extremism,	namely	the	Prevent	strategy,	which	for	
the	first	time	explicitly	tackles	far‐right	extremism.	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 recent	 Prevent	 policy,	 this	
Government	 is	keenly	aware	of	 the	 importance	of	
fostering	 a	 stronger	 sense	 of	 belonging	 and	
citizenship,	 co‐ordinated	 by	 the	 Department	 for	
Communities	 and	 Local	 Government.	 By	
empowering	 communities	 and	 integrating	 them	
into	 society,	 those	 communities	 become	 much	
more	 resilient	 to	 terrorist	 ideology	 and	
propaganda.		
The	 Prevent	 strategy	 of	 the	 previous	
Government	 failed	 to	 confront	 extremist	 ideology	
and	therefore	failed	to	adequately	tackle	the	threat	
we	face.	If	we	wish	to	combat	the	rise	of	the	 ‘new	
far‐right’	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 ‘lone‐wolf’	
terrorism	 inspired	 by	 such	 thinking,	 we	 must	
vigorously	 pursue	 all	 forms	 of	 radicalisation.	 I	
have	 every	 confidence	 that,	 through	 Prevent,	 the	
current	Government	will	do	this.	





integration.	 The	 Prime	 Minister’s	 speech	 in	
Munich	made	it	clear	that	the	new	Prevent	strategy	
will	be	an	unyielding	fight	against	extremism.	
This	 report	 is	 an	 important	 contribution	
to	 the	 study	 of	 the	 threats	 that	 this	 country	 and	
Europe	 are	 embroiled	 in	 today.	 Rooting	 out	
extremism	from	all	quarters	must	be,	and	is,	a	real	
priority	 for	 the	 Coalition	 Government.	 Twenty‐
First	 Century	 Britain	 is	 about	 integration	 and	
cohesion	between	all	of	our	different	communities.	
That	 both	 Islamist	 extremists	 and	 the	 ‘new	 far‐
right’	extremists	reject	this	belief	is	telling.		
As	Baroness	Sayeeda	Warsi	has	said,	 ‘any	
phobia	 is	 by	 definition	 the	 opposite	 of	 a	
philosophy.	A	phobia	 is	an	irrational	 fear.	 It	 takes	
on	 a	 life	 of	 its	 own	 and	 no	 longer	 needs	 to	 be	
justified.’	 It	 is	 this	that	makes	the	development	of	
the	EDL	and	their	ilk	of	concern.	I	hope	this	report	












Dr Matthew Feldman 
 
For	 some	 thirty	 months,	 the	 English	 Defence	
League	has	brought	disorder,	violence	and	racism	
in	 its	 wake.	 It	 has	 stretched	 police	 budgets	 and	
strained	 cohesion	 amongst,	 and	 between,	 British	
communities.	 Despite	 claiming	 that	 it	 opposes	
jihadi	 Islamism	–	 like,	of	course,	all	 right	thinking	
people	–	the	EDL’s	rhetoric	quickly	turns	into	anti‐
Muslim	 prejudice,	 whether	 at	 demonstrations,	
online	or,	increasingly,	in	court.		
The	 EDL	 and	 other	 Defence	 Leagues	 in	
Wales,	 Scotland	 and	 even	 abroad	 –	 the	 accused	
terrorist	 from	 Norway,	 Anders	 Behring	 Breivk,	
was	 associated	 with	 the	 Norwegian	 Defence	
League	 –	 also	 represent	 a	 new	 form	 of	 far‐right	
politics.	As	described	by	this	report,	this	 ‘new	far‐
right’	 does	 not	 contest	 elections	 like	 yesterday’s	
National	 Front,	 or	 today’s	 British	 National	 Party.		
Instead,	this	is	direct	action	politics,	disseminated	
and	coordinated	via	the	new	media	–	ranging	from	
Facebook	 to	 mobile	 phones,	 and	 digital	 film	 to	
Youtube.		
Yet	for	all	the	novelty,	the	EDL	represents	
at	 the	 same	 time	 an	 age‐old	 phenomenon:	 the	
politics	 of	 hate.	 This	 hatred	 is	 directed	
overwhelmingly	 at	 Asian	 Muslims	 in	 Britain	 –	
although	such	discrimination	is	often	absent,	with	
Sikhs	and	secular	Asians	also	facing	abuse	by	EDL	
supporters	 –	 who	 are	 subjected	 to	 a	 collective	
prejudice	 that	 is	wholly	 alien	 to	 British	 values	 of	
tolerance	 and	 individual	 responsibility.	 For	 all	 its	
rhetoric,	the	EDL	promotes	exclusion,	division,	and	
a	casual	racism	at	street	level.	It	is	a	key	driver	in	
the	 ‘tit‐for’‐tat’	 radicalisation	 which,	 in	 turn,	 has	
been	a	central	area	of	 research	by	 the	Radicalism	
and	New	Media	Research	Group.		
Established	 in	 2009	 by	 an	
interdisciplinary	 team	 at	 the	 University	 of	
Northampton’s	School	of	Social	Sciences,	the	RNM	
Group	(www.radicalism‐new‐media.org)	has	been	
principally	 researching	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 ‘new	 far	
right’	in	Britain	and	Europe	this	century.	A	host	of	
publications,	 media	 interviews	 and	 publicly	
disseminated	 research	 has	 analysed	 the	 various	
‘faces’	of	the	‘new	far‐right’	over	the	last	two	years,	
with	 subjects	 ranging	 from	 populist	 far‐right	
political	parties	in	Europe	to	tiny	racist	networks,	
called	 ‘groupuscules’,	 existing	 largely	 online.	 Of	
these	 public‐facing	 academic	 investigations,	
however,	 this	 report	 on	 the	 English	 Defence	
League	 is	doubtless	of	 greatest	 interest	 to	policy‐
makers	 and	 the	 wider	 public	 alike.	 There	 are	
several	reasons	for	this.	
Following	 Nigel	 Copsey’s	 impressive	
report	 on	 behalf	 of	 Faith	 Matters	 from	 this	 time	
last	 year,	The	English	Defence	League:	Challenging	
our	 country	 and	 our	 values	 of	 Social	 Inclusion,	
Fairness	 and	 Equality,	 the	 present	 analysis,	 The	
EDL:	 Britain’s	 New	 Far‐Right	 Social	 Movement,	
considers	 the	 English	 Defence	 League	 from	 a	
variety	 of	 perspectives.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 report	
represents	the	most	extensive	discussion	available	
to	 date.	 In	 the	 chapters	 to	 ensue,	 the	 English	
Defence	 League	 is	 approached	 as	 a	 social	
movement,	 one	 driven	 by	 a	 unique	 alliance	 of	
football	hooliganism,	 xenophobic	nationalism	and	
street	 politics	 –	 collectively	 organised	 and	
disseminated	 from	 the	 leadership	 to	 grass‐roots	
supporters	 via	 the	new	media.	Ample	 evidence	 is	
adduced,	 troublingly,	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 EDL’s	
signature	anti‐Muslim	politics	–	if	not	its	thuggish	
and	 violent	 means	 of	 expression	 –	 has	 a	 much	
wider	 purchase	 in	 British	 society	 than	 even	 the	
tens	 of	 thousands	 of	 ‘followers’	 registered	 on	
Facebook.		
If	 the	 demonistion	 of	Muslims	 is	 the	 tide	
upon	which	the	EDL	is	carried,	then	its	reputation	
for	violence	remains	the	movement’s	undertow.	As	
made	 clear	 in	 latter	 chapters	 detailing	 the	
leadership,	 chronology	 and	 trajectory	 of	 the	 EDL,	
this	 is	 a	 social	 movement	 that	 thrives	 upon	
confrontation	 and	 community	 tensions.	 An	
outpouring	 of	 mostly	 angry	 –	 and	 often	 drunk	 –	
young	men	 on	 British	 streets	 has	 led,	 in	 turn,	 to	
arrests,	prosecutions	and	even	banning	orders	for	
EDL	 supporters	 engaged	 in	 racial	 hatred	 and	
violence.	As	police,	policy‐makers	and	civil	society	
struggle	to	better	understand	the	characteristics	of	
the	 English	 Defence	 League	 the	 movement	 itself,	
despite	 in‐fighting	 amongst	 leaders	 and	 splits	
amongst	divisions,	shows	little	sign	of	drowning.			
In	response,	the	RNM	Group	believes	that	
a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 English	 Defence	
League	 –	 both	 at	 popular	 and	 policy	 level	 –	 can	
help	 in	 addressing,	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 curtailing,	
the	challenges	posed	by	 this	 ‘new	 far‐right’	 social	
movement.	It	is	for	this	reason,	above	all,	that	this	
report	 has	 been	 compiled	 and	 made	 freely	
available	online:	knowledge	 is	 the	handmaiden	of	
problem‐solving.	 It	does	no	good	 to	 just	 label	 the	
EDL	as	 ‘Nazis’	or	 fascists;	 this	social	movement	 is	
not	 simply	 a	 reprise	 of	 interwar	 history	 but	 is	
instead	 something	 new,	 dynamic	 and	 dangerous.	
As	 a	 leading	 scholar	 of	 the	 new‐far	 right,	 Pierre	
Andre	Taguieff,	has	put	this	point:	‘if	vigilance	was	
only	 a	 game	 of	 recognizing	 something	 already	
well‐known,	 then	 it	 would	 only	 be	 a	 question	 of	


















































































This	 report	 examines	 the	 development	 of	 the	
English	 Defence	 League	 (EDL).	 It	 argues	 that	 the	
EDL	 is	 best	 viewed	 as	 a	 movement	 gravitating	
around	 what	 this	 report	 calls	 ‘new	 far	 right’	
ideology.	This	is	a	very	loose	set	of	views,	yet	one	
that	 presents	 a	 clearly	 politicised	 approach	 to	
social	 issues	 by	 combining	 ultra‐patriotism,	 a	
critique	of	mainstream	politics,	and	an	aggressive,	





central	 organisational	 structure	 (a	 Social	
Movement	 Organisation,	 or	 SMO),	 which	 offers	 a	
level	 of	 coherent	 organisation,	 and	 a	 broad	 party	
line,	 to	 a	 wider	 set	 of	 networked	 followers.	
However,	it	is	also	heavily	reliant	upon	grass‐roots	
networks,	such	as	the	Casuals	United	organisation,	




older	 far	 right	 strategy	 called	 ‘march	 and	 grow’.	
Marches	 and	 protests	 offer	 EDL	 supporters	 a	
series	of	high	profile,	rousing	demonstrations	that	
garner	media	coverage,	allowing	the	movement	to	
gain	 more	 support.	 Attendance	 at	 such	 protests	
can	 also	 boost	 morale	 through	 shows	 of	 unity.	
Arguably,	 the	EDL’s	most	 important	 innovation	 is	
the	introduction	of	new	media	such	as	Facebook	in	
order	articulate	a	‘new	far	right’	ideology.	As	such,	
limiting	 the	 movement’s	 ability	 to	 march	 would	
likely	impact	negatively	on	its	fortunes.		
	
Third:	 The	 English	 Defence	 League’s	 ‘new	 far	
right’	 activism	 is	 largely	 driven	 by	 a	 single	 issue,	
namely	a	potent	anti‐Muslim	agenda.	 In	 the	wake	
of	 9/11	 and	 7/7,	 this	 prejudice	 has	 been	 strong	
within	 British	 culture,	 and	 resonates	 troublingly	
amongst	 elements	within	 the	wider	 public	 today.	
To	a	significant	degree,	this	anti‐Muslim	attitude	is	
dependent	 upon	 negative	 media	 representations.	






Fourth:	 Although	 anti‐Muslim	 sentiment	 is	
commonplace	 within	 the	 EDL,	 emergent	
psychological	research	into	the	movement	stresses	
that	 such	 views	 are	 often	 expressions	 of	 more	
general	 frustration	 with	 society	 amongst	 angry	
young	 men.	 The	 EDL’s	 anti‐Muslim	 rhetoric	
centres	 upon	 a	 scapegoat	 figure,	 a	 target	 to	 air	 a	
more	 generalised	 disconnection	 from	 modern	
Britain.	Responding	to	a	sense	of	powerlessness	by	
‘performing’	an	empowered,	male	identity	through	
street	 protests	 and	 violence,	 however,	 is	 an	
ultimately	 unfulfilling	 channel	 for	 such	
frustrations.	 For	 some	 followers,	 this	 has	 the	
potential	to	develop	into	a	cycle	of	criminality	and	
violence.	 Given	 the	 wider	 social	 movement’s	
ability	 to	give	 licence,	either	actively	or	 tacitly,	 to	
various	 forms	of	extremism,	 tackling	the	EDL	and	
other	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 groups	 needs	 to	 become	 a	
core	component	of	the	Prevent	Strategy.	
	
Fifth:	 Britain’s	 economic	 circumstances	 broadly	
impact	 upon	 the	 fortunes	 of	 domestic	 far	 right	
movements.	 Yet	 this	 needs	 to	 be	 understood	 in	
relation	 to	 specific	 localities,	 not	 only	 nationally.	
Without	 addressing	 underlying	 economic	 and	
social	 tensions	 within	 areas	 identified	 with	 EDL	
and	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 support,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	
movement	will	 continue	 to	 find	 fertile	 conditions	
in	more	deprived	pockets	across	the	country.	This	
has	been	the	tendency	with	the	history	of	the	BNP,	
for	 example,	which	 is	 now	 failing	 largely	 because	
of	 internal	 issues.	 To	 combat	 this,	 a	 relevant	 and	




Sixth:	 The	 English	 Defence	 League	 is	 able	 to	
appeal	to	people	wishing	to	register	more	general	
discontent	with	mainstream	politics.	As	 the	other	
major	 vehicle	 for	 this	 type	of	 protest	 politics,	 the	
BNP,	 continues	 to	decline,	 some	of	 its	 supporters	
may	 look	to	the	EDL	as	an	outlet.	Potentially,	 this	
pressure	 could	 even	 lead	 to	 the	 EDL	 becoming	 a	
political	 party,	 although	 the	 leadership	 continues	
to	 deny	 any	 such	 ambitions.	 As	 a	 vehicle	 for	
populist,	direct‐action	protest,	 the	energies	of	 the	
EDL	 may	 also	 be	 superseded	 by	 a	 more	
respectable	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 party,	 such	 as	 the	
English	 Democrats	 (which	 is	 also	 currently	
accommodating	 former	 BNP	 supporters).	 Such	 a	
party	 could	 offer	 a	 clearly	 non‐violent	 voice	 to	
those	 who	 feel	 disenfranchised	 by	 mainstream	




Seventh:	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 other	 potential	
outcomes	 at	 this	 juncture	 for	 the	 future	 of	 the	
English	 Defence	 League.	 The	 leadership	 could	
continue	 to	maintain	 its	 control	over	 a	 large	part	
of	 the	 movement,	 as	 it	 has	 done	 to	 date.	 This	
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suggests	 that	 the	 EDL	 could	 well	 continue	 in	 its	
current	 form	 for	 some	 time.	 Contrastingly,	 an	
unpredictable	leadership	crisis	could	easily	lead	to	
further	fragmentation	of	the	EDL.	One	risk	here	is	
that	 such	 fragmentation	 will	 also	 lead	 to	 further	
radicalisation	 among	 some	 of	 its	 more	 hardened	
followers,	 as	 is	 already	 evident	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	
‘Infidel’	splinter	groups. 
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Chapter 1: The 
English Defence 
League and the 
‘New Far Fight’ 
 




a	 ‘far	 right’	 movement	 in	 press	 reports	 covering	
the	 organisation’s	 activities.	 Yet	 the	 EDL	 itself	
denies	 this	 characterisation.	 For	 example,	 its	
Mission	Statement	states	that	it	is	a	‘human	rights’	
movement	defending	Britain	from	the	incursion	of	




been	 described	 by	 many	 of	 its	 critics	 as	
‘Islamophobic’.	The	movement	is	keen	to	deny	this	
latter	characterisation	too.		
Yet	 what	 has	 become	 clear	 among	
analysts	of	fascist	and	far	right	movements	is	that	
the	 EDL	 is	 predicated	 on	 both	 a	 new	 type	 of	 far	
right	politics	and	a	potent	anti‐Muslim	sentiment.	
Indeed,	 we	 can	 summarise	 this	 refashioned	 far	
right	 agenda	 as	 the	 ‘new	 far	 right’.	 Before	
examining	 the	 EDL’s	 discourses	 and	 activities	 in	
close	 detail,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 begin	 our	 enquiry	







political	 position	 in	 Britain.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 a	
politically	 motivated	 organisation,	 as	 so	 we	 can	
identify	 within	 it	 an	 underpinning	 ideology.	 The	
June	 2011	 Prevent	 Strategy	 stresses	 that	
understanding	ideology	is	crucial	when	examining	
prejudicial	 groups.2 	Essentially	 a	 direct	 action	
protest	movement,	not	a	political	party,	the	EDL	is	






politicised	 environment	 to	 engage	 its	 supporters.	
As	 later	chapters	will	show,	 this	culture	 is	 largely	
cultivated	 through	 the	 linking	 of	 new	 media	
campaigns	 and	 offline	 actions,	 while	 grass‐roots	
activists	 energise	 each	 other,	 to	 give	 the	
movement	 an	 overarching	 sense	 of	 momentum.	
Only	to	a	limited	extent	is	the	social	movement	led	
by	 a	 centralised	 figure.	 Its	 diverse	 following	




Moreover,	 despite	 its	 claims	 to	 the	
contrary,	 there	 is	 much	 prima	 face	 evidence	 to	
place	 the	 EDL	 on	 the	more	 radical	 fringes	 of	 the	
political	 right.	 This	 ranges	 from	 its	 populist,	
nationalist	 agenda;	 to	 its	 condemnation	 of	 left‐
wing	figures	on	 its	various	blogs	and	websites;	 to	
its	 strong	 associations	 with	 the	 US	 Tea	 Party	
movement;	 to	 its	 support	 for	 international	 far	
right	 figures,	 such	as	Geert	Wilders.	Moreover,	 as	
is	 discussed	 elsewhere	 in	 this	 report,	 key	 EDL	
figures,	 such	 as	 Steven	 Yaxley‐Lennon	 and	 Kevin	
Carroll,	 have	 historic	 links	 with	 the	 British	
National	Party	 (BNP).	Finally,	we	will	 see	 in	 later	







There	 has	 been	 much	 academic	 discussion	 in	
recent	years	over	what	constitutes	the	 ‘far	right’.3	
In	 particular,	 there	 has	 been	 interest	 in	
understanding	the	dynamics	of	a	new	wave	of	non‐
mainstream,	 nationalist	 politics,	 often	 called	 the	
‘populist’	 ‘radical’,	 ‘extreme’,	 or	 ‘far’	 right,	 which	
has	 emerged	 since	 the	 1980s.	 Across	 Europe,	
discrete	 parties	 here	 include:	 the	Dutch	 Freedom	
Party,	 the	 Belgian	 Flemish	 Interest,	 the	 Italian	
Northern	 League,	 and	 perhaps	most	 significantly,	
the	 French	 National	 Front.	 These	 newer	
organisations	 are	 often	 contrasted	with	 older	 far	
right	 movements	 whose	 ideologies	 much	 more	
clearly	 stem	 from	 the	 legacy	 of	 interwar	 fascism,	
postwar	 forms	 of	 neo‐Nazism	 and	 racial	 anti‐
Semitism,	such	as	the	German	National	Democratic	















comparative	 analysis	 has	 led	 to	 a	 good	 deal	 of	
consensus	among	academics.	This	 centres	upon	a	






extremisms,	 and	 so	 figures	 that	may	 start	 out	 as	
less	extreme,	drawn	to	the	common	sense	appeals	





far	 right	 spectrum,	 as	 can	 influential	 figures	 such	
as	 the	 promoter	 of	 neo‐Nazi	 terrorism,	 Colin	
Jordan.5	Relatively	 less	 extreme	 figures	 include	
John	Tyndall,	founder	of	the	British	National	Party,	
who	still	represents	continuity	with	anti‐Semitism	
and	neo‐Nazism.6	So	 too	does	 current	BNP	 leader	
Nick	 Griffin,	 despite	 his	 attempts	 to	 develop	 a	
more	 presentable	 public	 image	 since	 his	 election	
in	 1999.	 Indeed,	 Griffin’s	 attempt	 to	 mask	 his	
earlier	 interest	 in	more	extreme	 far	right	 themes,	







regularly	 condemned	 by	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	
movement.	This	is	important	to	recognise.	As	with	
other	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 movements,	 the	 EDL’s	
leadership	 actively	 wants	 to	 disassociate	 itself	
from	 overt	 ‘extreme	 right‐wing’	 activity.	 As	 such,	
commentators	should	be	wary	of	claiming	the	EDL	
is	 simply	 another	 traditional	 fascist	 or	 even	 neo‐
Nazi	 group,	 as	 is	 often	 the	 case	 with	 anti‐fascist	
protestors.	 Instead,	 the	 evidence	 currently	
available	suggests	that	fringe	elements	of	the	most	
‘extreme	 right	 wing’	 political	 persuasion	 are	
contained	within	the	EDL,	yet	formally	it	aspires	to	













In	 other	 words,	 the	 academic	 literature	
here	argues	there	is	such	a	thing	as	an	openly	anti	
neo‐Nazi	 ‘new	 far	 right’,	 which,	 whatever	 its	
position	 on	 the	 history	 of	 interwar	 fascism,	
nevertheless	 remains	 in	 conflict	 with	 liberal	
democratic	 principles.	 This	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 is	 the	
force	 that	has	been	relatively	 successful	 in	 recent	
years.		
One	 leading	 theorist	 on	 fascist	 and	 far	
right	 ideologies,	 Roger	 Griffin,	 has	 usefully	
characterised	 the	 value	 of	 the	 term	 ‘far’	 in	 such	
contexts	 as	 simply	 signifying	 an	 ideology	 that	
radically	 places	 itself	 outside	 the	 formal	 political	
establishment,	 and	 ultimately	 manifests	 anti‐
liberal	 values.	 ‘By	 definition’,	 argues	 Griffin,	 ‘no‐
one	 on	 the	 Far‐Right	 would	 use	 the	 phrase	 to	
define	 themselves.	 For	 them	 it	 is	 the	 status	 quo	
that	 is	 “extreme”	 in	 its	 decadence	 and	 failure	 to	
safeguard	essential	vales’.7	Thus	the	term	‘far’	in	a	
far	 right	 context	 is	 essentially	 a	 marker	 of	
ideologies	that	view	the	political	establishment	as	
becoming	 dysfunctional	 and	 dangerous,	 a	 theme	
that,	 as	 the	 following	 chapters	 will	 show,	 can	 be	
found	within	the	EDL	worldview.		
So	on	this	understanding,	a	‘new	far	right’	
movement	 is	 not	 necessarily	 defined	 by	 being	
engaged	 in	 illegal	activity,	as	one	promoting	anti‐
Semitism,	or	developing	neo‐Nazi	 themes.	Rather,	
it	 can	be	 seen	 as	 one	 that	 combines	 an	 extremist	
ultra‐patriotism	 with	 a	 tendency	 to	 present	
mainstream	politics	 as	 in	 a	 critical	 state	 of	 decay	
and	 disorder	 –	 themes	 commonly	 found	 in	 the	
EDL’s	materials.	Moreover,	unlike,	say,	 the	United	
Kingdom	 Independence	 Party,	 the	 ‘new	 far	 right’	
promotes	a	coded,	ethnic	sense	of	nationalism	that	







According	 to	 another	 leading	 expert	 here,	 Jens	
Rydgren,	 the	origins	of	 this	new	wave	of	 far	right	
populism	 emerged	 with	 Jean	 Marie	 Le	 Pen’s	
National	 Front	 in	 France	 in	 the	 1980s. 8 	For	
Rydgren,	 Le	 Pen’s	 politics	 combined	 an	 ideology	
marked	by	ethnonationalist	xenophobia	(i.e.	racism	
based	on	cultural	markers	of	 identity	 rather	 than	
biology);	 the	 doctrine	 of	 ethnopluralism	 (i.e.	 a	













(i.e.	 strong	 evocations	 of	 the	 theme	 that	 the	
political	elite	have	failed	to	defend	the	nation	from	
attack	by	outsider	 figures,	to	the	detriment	of	the	
nation).	 Rydgren	 called	 this	 combination	 a	 new	




comprise	 the	 ‘new	 far	 right’,	 an	 innovation	 that	
could	 only	 gain	 credibility	 by	 significantly	
distancing	 itself	 from	 the	 destruction	 caused	 by	
interwar	fascism	and	forms	of	neo‐Nazism,	as	well	
as	 limiting	 its	 anti‐liberal	 agenda.	 The	 recently‐
elected	 leader	 of	 the	 French	 National	 Front,	
Marine	 Le	 Pen,	 typifies	 this	 new,	 photogenic	 yet	
xenophobic	 far	 right	 politics.	 Meanwhile,	 Anders	
Behring	Breivik	has	shown	the	extremes	this	new	
type	of	anti‐Muslim	ultra‐nationalism	can	develop.	
In	 one	 of	 the	 most	 comprehensive	
international	 surveys	 of	 far‐right	 politics	 in	
contemporary	 Europe,	 Pierro	 Ignazi	 stresses	 that	
‘new	 far	 right’	 parties	 exhibit	 diverse	




Hans	Georg‐Betz	 stresses	 that	 this	 ‘new	 far	 right’	
can	 appeal	 to	 both	 the	 ‘winners’	 and	 ‘losers’	 of	
social	 and	 economic	modernisation	 following	 the	
emergence	 of	 post‐industrial	 societies,	 especially	
since	the	1980s.10	The	development	of	newer	neo‐
Liberal	 ideas	 in	 post‐industrial	 Europe	 has	 also	
been	 inspirational.	The	 ‘new	 far	right’	 couches	 its	
politics	 in	 the	 language	 of	 radical	 defence	 of	
freedoms	 and	 identity.	 As	 such,	 a	 characteristic	
feature	 is	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 language	 of	
liberalism	 for	 inherently	 anti‐liberal	 agendas.	
Finally,	though	it	will	deny	any	links	with	the	older	
far	right	in	its	public	discourse,	behind	the	scenes	
the	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 is	 often	 intimately	 connected	
with	older	viewpoints,	such	as	neo‐Nazism,	too.	So	








Betz	 also	 highlights	 how	 the	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 has	
been	 keen	 to	 develop	 anti‐Muslim	 rhetoric	 as	 a	







cultural	 racism,	 to	 identify	 the	 cultural,	 yet	
ultimately	 racist,	 prejudices	 expressed	 towards	
Muslims	 by	 the	 ‘new	 far	 right’.11	Indeed,	Muslims	
have	 become	 the	 most	 predominant	 scapegoats	
for	 the	 far	 right	 today,	 as	 anti‐Semitic	 and	 anti‐
Afro	 Caribbean	 prejudices	 have	 become	 more	
unacceptable.	 Contrastingly,	 nativist	 forms	 of	
‘cultural	 racism’	 can	 appear	 more	 tolerant,	 and	
therefore	 command	 greater	 public	 legitimacy.	
They	 function	 by	 systematically	 and	 radically	
stereotyping	 core	 cultural	 features	 of	 a	 target	
group.	 By	 targeting	 cultural	 markers	 of	 identity	
(such	 as	 religious	 faith),	 rather	 than	 physical	
appearances	as	 found	 in	 the	 ‘biological	 racism’	of	
older	 far	 right	 movements,	 such	 sustained,	
negative	 stereotyping	 creates	 a	 xenophobic	
discourse	 of	 exclusion.	 In	 particular,	 it	 is	
recognisable	 by	 its	 presentation	 of	 the	 scapegoat	
community	 as	 having	 a	 culturally	 ‘fixed’	 set	 of	
values.	 These	 values	 are	 held	 to	 be	 diametrically	
opposed	 to	 those	 of	 the	 national	 community,	 as	
well	as	being	inferior	and	dangerous.	In	the	case	of	
‘nativist’	 Islamophobia,	 the	 Koran	 is	 a	 key	
propaganda	tool.	One	of	the	key	recurring	themes	
within	 the	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 is	 the	 argument	 that	
Muslim	 adherence	 to	 the	 Koran	 is	 deemed	
essential	 to	 the	 Islamic	 faith,	 yet	 the	 text	 is	 also	
presented	as	the	antithesis	to	European	values.	In	
sum,	according	to	the	stark	‘new	far	right’	ideology	
either	 one	 rejects	 the	 west,	 or	 one	 rejects	 the	
Koran.		
Following	 this	 ‘nativist’,	 or	 culturally	
racist	 turn,	 Europe’s	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 calls	 for	 the	
removal	 of	 such	 feared	 influences.	 This	 is	 to	 be	
achieved	 via	 compulsory	 assimilation	 to	 a	 pre‐
defined	 national	 identity,	 while	 rejecting	 any	
values	deemed	‘alien’.	In	the	main,	such	ideas	have	
displaced	 those	 of	 compulsory	 deportation	 found	
in	 the	 far	 right	 of	 a	 generation	 ago.	 Removing	 a	
culture	deemed	alien,	rather	than	a	body	of	people,	
is	 often	 now	 the	 core	 goal.	 Through	 a	 discourse	
setting	 a	 constructed,	 ultra‐patriotic	 national	
identity	against	an	alien	‘other’,	the	‘new	far	right’	
both	defines	a	clear,	patriotic	sense	of	‘our	way	of	
life’	 and	 evokes	 a	 sense	 of	 a	 safe	 ‘us’	 and	 a	
dangerous	 ‘them’.	 This	 new	 binary	 between	




the	 core	 building	 block	 of	 any	 form	 of	 racism	 or	
prejudice.	
	 One	 of	 the	 pioneers	 of	 this	 slick	 form	 of	
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This	 checklist	 still	 offers	a	useful	 ‘rough	guide’	 to	
the	 forms	that	anti‐Muslim	sentiments	often	take.	
However	 there	 has	 been	 some	 valid	 criticism	 of	
this	perspective	 as	 being	 at	 times	 too	monolithic,	
and	lacking	in	subtly.	In	particular,	critics	highlight	
that	 it	 can	 allow	 for	 any	 criticism	 of	 Muslim	
societies	to	be	dismissed	as	mere	‘Islamophobia’.	
This	can	become	a	significant	problem	for	
engagement	 with	 extremist	 perspectives.	 The	
Quilliam	 Foundation’s	 report,	 Islamism	 and	
Language,	highlights	how	the	 term	 ‘Islamophobia’	
can	 itself	 easily	 feed	 into	 a	 language	 of	 polarised	
polemics.	 For	 example,	 it	 can	 be	 used	 by	 jihadi	
Islamists	 to	 close	 down	 discussion	 on	 genuine	
areas	of	 criticism	regarding	 threats	or	actual	acts	
of	 violence	 that	 jihadi	 ideologies	 promote.	
Significantly	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 study,	
Quilliam’s	report	also	highlights	that,	 in	turn,	 ‘far‐
right	 groups	 have	 used	 Islamists’	 spurious	
allegations	 of	 “Islamophobia”	 to	 argue	 that	 all	
accusations	 of	 “Islamophobia”	 levelled	 against	
them	 are	 similarly	 spurious’.14	In	 other	 words,	
‘Islamophobia’	has	become	a	key,	emotive	term	in	
the	 ‘tit‐for‐tat’	 radicalisation	 that	 characterises	
both	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 EDL,	 and	 the	 rise	 of	
organisations	 such	 as	 Muslims	 Against	 Crusades	
(previously	Al‐Mujiharoun).	As	a	consequence,	the	
term	 Islamophobia	 is	 at	 risk	 of	 losing	 much	
analytical	value.	





not	 exist;	 while	 ‘the	 Muslim	 community’	 again	
falsely	 implies	 a	 single,	 common	 identity	 among	
British	 Muslims.	 Such	 generalisations	 miss	 the	
need	 to	 stress	 plurality	 and	 cultural	 difference,	
and	 to	 resist	 collapsing	 all	 Muslims	 into	 one,	
essentialist	 category.	 Finally,	 a	 key	 term	 found	 in	
EDL	discourses,	‘Islamic	law’,	implies	that	Shari’ah	
law	 is	an	uncontested	system,	and	a	unitary	body	
of	 thought	 that	 could	 somehow	 literally	 ‘replace’	
British	 law.	 In	 fact,	 its	authors	stress	Shari’ah	 law	
consists	of	‘a	diverse	and	often	contradictory	set	of	
religious	 guidance’,15	and	 such	 assumptions	 are	
radically	misguided.	 Yet	 such	 generalisations	 can	
easily	 be	 deployed	 to	 caricature	 Muslim	
communities	 as	 aggressive	 and	 alien,	 and	 so	 the	
theme	is	often	employed	in	EDL	rhetoric.	
In	 sum,	 then,	 the	 wider	 academic	







the	 reductive	 distinction	 between	 ‘moderate’	 and	
‘extremist’.	 Chris	 Allen	 in	 particular	 highlights	
that,	 if	 followed	 literally,	 the	 Runnymede	
definition	 can	 imply	 the	 existence	 of	 an	 equally	
simplistic,	 idealised	 Muslim	 community,	 one	
lacking	 in	 any	 social	 or	 political	 problems,	 let	
alone	genuine	issues	of	violent	extremism.16	When	
engaging	 with	 the	 prejudiced	 advanced	 by	 the	
‘new	 far	 right’,	 it	 is	 therefore	 important	 to	 be	
aware	 not	 merely	 of	 a	 genuine	 threat	 posed	 by	
jihadi	 Islamism,	 but	 also	 being	 sensitive	 of	 the	
complexity	of	a	faith	shared	by	one	billion	people	








is	 important	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 the	 organisation’s	
‘front	 stage’	 messages,	 as	 well	 as	 its	 more	
aggressive	 ‘back	 stage’	 dynamic,	 which	 is	 hidden	
from	public	 view.	 Indeed,	 one	 leading	 expert,	 Cas	
Mudde,	stresses	that	it	would	be	naive	to	accept	at	
face	 value	 the	 messages	 put	 out	 by	 a	 far	 right	
movement,	 though	 these	 considered,	 ‘front	 stage’	
messages	do	reveal	much	about	an	organisation.17	
We	will	examine	the	EDL’s	variegated	‘back	stage’	
later	 in	 this	 report.	 However,	 to	 conclude	 this	
chapter	 by	 showing	 the	 relevance	of	 the	 ‘new	 far	
right’	ideology	to	the	EDL’s	identity,	we	can	turn	to	
one	 of	 the	 movement’s	 most	 prominent	 ‘front	
stage’	documents,	 its	Mission	Statement.	This	text	
provides	 a	 self‐penned	 description	 of	 the	
movement	that	places	it	squarely	within	this	‘new	
far	right’	populist	politics.18		
To	 begin	 the	 statement	 opens	 with	 a	
quote	 from	 Albert	 Einstein,	 stressing	 he	 was	 ‘a	
refugee	from	Nazi	Germany’.	The	quote	itself	calls	
for	 people	 to	 confront	 evil	 to	 prevent	 it	 from	
dominating	 society.	 This	 is	 an	 emotive	 rhetorical	
device,	 a	 move	 that	 immediately	 attempts	 to	
distance	 the	 EDL	 from	 a	 pro‐Nazi	 or	 fascist	
identity,	 while	 aligning	 the	 movement	 with	 a	
Jewish	figure	vilified	by	the	Nazi	regime	in	calling	
for	 a	 defence	 against	 a	 tyrannous	 ideology.	 The	
wider	allusion,	moreover,	 is	that	Islam	represents	
a	 new	 totalitarian	 ideology	 that	 must	 be	
confronted.	 Already,	 core	 ‘new	 far	 right’	
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Nazism	 and	 identifying	 Muslims	 as	 a	 threat	 are	
being	revealed.	
Drawing	on	the	language	of	liberalism	and	
freedom,	 the	 first	 point	 made	 in	 the	 Mission	
Statement	proper	argues	that	the	EDL	is	a	‘human	
rights	 organisation’,	 founded	 in	 response	 to	
Islamist	extremism.	This	rests	upon	claims	that	the	
EDL	 essentially	 protects	 the	 public’s	 right	 to	
protest	against	 ‘radical	Islam’s	encroachment	into	
the	lives	of	non‐Muslims.’	The	EDL	also	maintains	
that	 it	 is	 protecting	 British	 Muslims	 against	
examples	of	Islam’s	excesses,	while	stressing	that:	
‘the	 onus	 should	 be	 on	 British	 Muslims	 to	
overcome	 the	 problems	 that	 blight	 their	 religion	
and	 achieve	 nothing	 short	 of	 an	 Islamic	
reformation’.	 The	 underlying	 implication	 is	 that	
the	whole	of	Islam	is	in	a	state	of	crisis,	and	so	all	
Muslims	 pose	 a	 more	 general	 threat	 to	 wider	
society.	 An	 enforced	 ‘Islamic	 reformation’	 is	
therefore	deemed	necessary	by	the	EDL	(both	here	
and	elsewhere),	due	to	the	alleged	threat	posed	by	
‘those	 who	 believe	 Islam	 should	 be	 taken	 in	 its	
“original”,	 7th	 century	 form	 [...]	 the	 antithesis	 of	
Western	 democracy’.	 This	 view	 reiterates	 the	
simplistic	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 view	 that	 Islam	 is	
essentially	 anti‐modern	 and	 barbaric,	 with	 the	
EDL	 contrasted	 as	 a	 defender	 of	 modern	 values.	
Moreover,	 violent	 extremism	 is	 presented	 as	 the	
predominant	face	of	Islam	in	Britain	today,	as	the	
Mission	Statement	claims	that	‘radical	Islam’	has	a	
‘stranglehold	 on	 British	 Muslims’.	 By	 selectively	
evoking	 liberal	 ideals	 in	 this	 way,	 the	 EDL’s	
Mission	Statement	calls	on	the	British	government	
to	 repeal	 elements	 of	 free	 speech	 supposedly	
allowing	 the	 anti‐democratic	 views	 of	 Muslim	
extremists	 to	 be	 expressed.	 In	 sum,	 it	 presents	
extremism	 as	 the	 dominant	 characteristic	 within	
Muslim	communities,	a	major	distortion	of	reality.		
The	 Mission	 Statement	 also	 presents	
Shari’ah	 law	 as	 a	 single	 body	 of	 ideas	 to	 be	
imposed	 on	 Western	 society.	 This	 idea,	 actually	
one	 shared	 by	 only	 a	 handful	 of	 Islamists	 in	
Britain,	 is	 vehemently	 opposed	 by	 the	 EDL.	 The	
stress	 on	 confronting	 the	 growth	 of	 Shari’ah	 law	
evokes	 the	 theme	 of	 a	 creeping	 encroachment	 of	
alien,	 Muslim	 ideas	 into	 British	 society.	 Sinister	
plots	 and	 conspiracy	 theories	 can	 easily	 be	 given	
licence	by	such	a	tenor.	In	typically	emotive	terms,	
the	 Mission	 Statement	 claims	 this	 is	 separating	
society	 into	 ‘Muslims	 and	 non‐Muslims,	 and	 the	
EDL	 will	 never	 allow	 this	 sort	 of	 iniquitous	
apartheid	 to	 take	 root	 in	 our	 country.’	 Through	
recourse	to	such	loaded	language	intended	to	style	
the	 movement	 as	 anti‐racist,	 a	 core	 divide	 is	
presented	 here	 between	Muslims	 and	 the	 rest	 of	
Britain.	This	assumption	again	helps	to	frame	and	
legitimise	 the	 confrontational	 ‘us’	 and	 ‘them’	
politics	of	the	EDL.		
The	 third	 point	 of	 the	Mission	 Statement	
states	 that	 the	 EDL	 is	 dedicated	 to	 informing	 the	
public	 about	 the	 threats	 posed	 by	 Islam.	 This	 is	
because	 mainstream	 politicians	 deny	 the	 public	
information.	 This	 theme	 is	 representative	 of	 the	
anti‐establishment	 politics	 of	 the	 ‘new	 far	 right’,	
which	 tries	 to	 develop	 populist,	 ‘common	 sense’	
solutions	to	the	problems	created	by	out‐of‐touch	
political	 elites.	 The	 Mission	 Statement	 again	
develops	 some	 typical,	 anti‐Muslim	 themes	 to	
present	 Islam	 as	 a	 growing	 threat	 to	 British	
society.	 For	 example,	 it	 argues	 that	 Islam	 is	 a	




Islam	 is	 not	 just	 a	 religious	 system,	 but	 a	 political	 and	
social	ideology	that	seeks	to	dominate	all	non‐believers	
and	impose	a	harsh	legal	system	that	rejects	democratic	
accountability	 and	 human	 rights.	 It	 runs	 counter	 to	 all	
that	we	hold	dear	within	our	British	liberal	democracy.	
	
Though	 the	 language	 is	 one	 of	 defending	
liberalism,	 this	 is	 only	 achieved	 by	 collapsing	 the	
diverse	 Muslim	 communities	 in	 Britain	 into	 a	
monolithic	Islamist	threat.	This	‘slippage’	between	
challenging	 Islamic	 extremism	 to	 a	 more	 general	
negative	portrayal	of	Muslim	communities	is	a	key	
characteristic	 of	 the	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 in	 Europe	
today.	
Having	 now	 powerfully	 evoked	 a	
worrying	 Muslim	 ‘other’,	 the	 fourth	 point	 in	 the	
Mission	Statement	discusses	 the	positive	 sense	of	
national	 community	 the	EDL	claims	 to	defend.	As	
is	 typical	 of	 the	 ‘new	 far	 right’,	 here	 the	 divisive	
theme	 of	 ‘us’	 and	 ‘them’	 is	 raised	 entirely	 in	
cultural	 terms.	The	discourse	 connects	 inclusivity	
and	 exclusion	 in	 an	 almost	 seamless	 fashion,	 for	
example	stressing	the	EDL	draws	on	‘people	of	all	
races,	 all	 faiths,	 all	 political	 persuasions,	 and	 all	
lifestyles’.	In	the	next	breath,	however,	this	unified	





Islamisation	 of	 our	 country’	 designed	 to	
‘implement	 an	 undemocratic	 alternative	 to	 our	
cherished	way	of	life:	the	sharia.’		
So,	 to	 summarise,	 the	 discourse	 is	
continually	 slipping	 into	 such	 statements	
presenting	 all	 Muslims	 as	 incompatible	 with	 a	
true,	English	identity,	though	with	regular	caveats	
suggesting	 a	 more	 sympathetic	 attitude	 towards	
some	Muslims.	The	EDL’s	Mission	Statement	puts	
the	movement	into	some	genuinely	fertile	political	
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territory	 surrounding	 anti‐Muslim	 politics,	 one	
that	 currently	 resonates	 across	 Europe.	 In	 doing	
so,	 it	 reveals	 the	 striking	 characteristics	 of	
populist,	 ultra‐patriotic	 and	 anti‐Muslim	 ideology	
that	 characterises	 the	 ‘new	 far	 right’.	 It	 is	 this	
ideology,	 its	development,	expression,	 impact	and	
on‐going	 threat	 that	 subsequent	 chapters	 of	 this	
report	will	analyse.	
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Chapter 2: The Rise 
of the English 
Defence League as 
a Social Movement 
 




Defence	 League	 as	 a	 social	 movement.	 More	
precisely,	 the	 EDL	 is	 best	 seen	 as	 what	 the	
academic	 literature	 sometimes	 calls	 a	 ‘new	 social	
movement’,	 namely	 a	 social	 movement	
unconcerned	with	addressing	issues	of	social	class	
and	 mobility	 –	 as	 found	 in	 the	 labour	 or	 the	
feminist	social	movements	–	but	 instead	develops	
a	 politics	 driven	 by	 the	 desire	 to	 defend	 and	
promote	 a	 shared	 identity.	 Newer	 social	




is	 a	 powerfully	 patriotic	 sense	 of	 English	
nationalism,	 while	 its	 views	 are	 largely	 held	
together	 by	 denigrating	 Islamism,	 and	 often	 the	
Muslim	 faith	 too.	 This	 type	 of	 ethnic	 nationalism	
can	 be	 called	 ultra‐patriotism,	 as	 it	 actively	
excludes	 some	 British	 nationals	 (Muslims)	 from	
the	 patriotic	 community,	 cutting	 against	 historic	
democratic	 principles.	 This	 chapter	 will	 explore	
how	 the	 EDL	 has	 grown	 into	 a	 social	movement,	
and	 how	 it	 subsequently	 developed	 a	 formalised	
structure	 (called	 a	 Social	Movement	Organisation	
in	the	specialist	literature)	to	promote	this	cause.		
The	distinction	between	the	formal	Social	
Movement	 Organisation	 (or	 SMO)	 and	 the	 wider	
grass‐root	 support	 for	 a	 social	 movement	 is	 a	
useful	 one	 to	 make.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	
identify	 a	 number	 of	 stages	 in	 the	 life	 of	 a	 social	
movement:	 initial	 emergence;	 coalescence	 and	
stabilisation;	 formalisation;	and	eventual	decline.2	
The	 English	 Defence	 League	 has	 not	 only	












wider	 social	 movement.	 When	 examining	 the	
origins,	 current	make‐up,	and	 future	 trajectory	of	
the	 EDL,	 however,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 be	 acutely	
aware	 that	 this	 is	 a	 conglomeration	 of	
organisations,	 which	 have	 coalesced	 around	 core	
ideological	 themes	 powerful	 enough	 to	 give	 the	
movement	a	common	cause.	To	date,	coordination	
from	the	central	SMO	has	been	a	key	factor	in	the	
movement’s	 growth,	 currently	 led	 by	 Steven	
Yaxley‐Lennon	 and	 Kevin	 Carroll.	 Yet	 there	 are	
also	 several	 grass‐roots	 initiatives	 that,	 to	 a	
greater	 or	 lesser	 extent,	 move	 beyond	 the	 core	
agenda	promoted	by	the	central	SMO.	 In	practical	
terms,	 this	means	 that	 the	 EDL’s	 success	 lies	 not	
merely	 in	 the	 quality	 of	 leadership	 found	 in	 the	
SMO,	but	also	in	the	continued	innovations	within	










spring	 of	 2009.	 As	 has	 been	 amply	 documented,	
one	 of	 the	key	 catalysts	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	
EDL	 was	 the	 high‐profile	 reaction	 to	 a	
homecoming	 parade	 staged	 by	 the	 Royal	 Anglian	
Regiment	 in	Luton	on	10	March	2009.3	The	event	
was	targeted	by	the	publicity‐seeking	organisation	
Ahlus	 Sunnah	 wal	 Jamaah	 –	 an	 offshoot	 of	 al‐
Muhajiroun,	 a	 since‐banned	 Islamist	 organisation	
with	 close	 links	 to	 Luton	 –	 who	 accused	 the	
soldiers	 of	 being	 ‘child	 killers’	 and	 ‘butchers’.	
Already	 disowned	 by	 Luton’s	 local	 Muslim	
communities,	 this	 small	 Islamist	 protest	 was	




in	 the	 town.4	Locals	 including	 the	 EDL’s	 future	
joint	 leader,	Kevin	Carroll,	 responded	violently	 to	
the	 protest.	 Helping	 to	 disseminate	 a	 wider	
awareness	 of	 the	 EDL’s	 foundation,	 the	 Islamist	
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national	 media,	 and	 was	 near‐universally	
condemned	as	an	affront	to	patriotic	values.	
In	 response,	 local	 activists,	 including	
Carroll,	 began	 to	 develop	 a	 more	 sustained	









who	 sought	 to	 develop	 a	 clear	 rejoinder	 to	 the	
demonstration	 by	 Ahlus	 Sunnah	 wal	 Jamaah.	
Although	 this	 initial	 counter‐demonstration	 was	
called	 off,	 on	 the	 13	April	 2009	 an	 illegal	 protest	
comprising	 150	 activists	 was	 held	 under	 the	
banner	 of	 the	 United	 People	 of	 Luton.	 This	
organisation	 was	 a	 direct	 precursor	 to	 the	 EDL,	
even	 if	 the	 movement’s	 more	 nuanced	 ‘new	 far	
right’	ideology	was	yet	to	be	properly	formed.6	
		 Tellingly,	at	 this	point,	 the	demonstration	
included	 figures	previously	 linked	 to	 the	 extreme	
right‐wing	 group	 Combat‐18,	 symptomatic	 of	 the	
wider	far	right’s	early	interest	in	the	Luton	area	at	
this	 time.	 The	 next	 demonstration	 in	 Luton	 came	
on	 the	 24	 May.	 This	 protest	 developed	 when	
another	nationalist	protesting	organisation,	March	
for	 England	 (MFE),	 began	 to	 organise	 a	 protest	
directed	 primarily	 against	 one	 of	 the	 local	
Islamists	present	at	 the	10	March	demonstration,	
Sayful	Islam.	In	the	lead‐up	to	the	event,	a	mosque	
linked	 to	 Sayful	 Islam	was	 the	 target	 of	 an	 arson	
attack,	 which	 is	 revealing	 of	 the	 growing	 anti‐
Muslim	tensions	within	the	town	during	the	EDL’s	
initial	 year	 of	 formalisation.	 After	 securing	
permission	 to	 hold	 this	 event,	 MFE	 formally	
withdrew,	 although	 the	 march	 still	 went	 ahead	
with	a	smaller,	unofficial	MFE	presence.	The	event	
resulted	 in	 more	 violent	 confrontations:	 a	
breakaway	group	targeted	Muslim	areas	of	Luton,	
which	 itself	 inspired	 a	 counter‐response	 by	
around	150	young	Muslims.7	The	process	of	‘tit	for	
tat’	 radicalisation	 is	 clear	 here:	 one	 local	
community	 develops	 a	 pugnacious	 stance,	 which	
inflames	 the	 other,	 leading	 to	 an	 increase	 in	
violence	and	disorder,	in	this	case,	in	Luton	in	the	
spring	of	2009.	
Resulting	 from	 this	 process	 of	 escalation,	
the	 English	 Defence	 League	 was	 formed	 in	 the	








creating	 a	 Social	 Movement	 Organisation	 was	
nebulous,	yet	the	movement	was	by	this	time	also	
generating	a	wider	profile.	With	the	emergence	of	
a	 level	 of	 centralised	organisation,	 the	movement	
has,	 to	 date,	 guided	 the	 more	 general	 social	
movement	to	relative	success	and	longevity.		
In	June	and	July	2009,	there	was	a	further	
escalation	 in	 anti‐Muslim	 protests	 linked	 to	 the	
EDL	that,	by	this	point,	were	branching	out	beyond	
Luton	 into	 the	wider	country.	On	27	 June	2009,	a	
demonstration	 was	 planned	 for	 a	 mosque	 in	
Whitechapel,	 London,	 clearly	 attempting	 to	
develop	the	reach	of	the	fledgling	movement.	This	
demonstration	 ultimately	 proved	 a	 nonviolent	
event,	 as	 a	 relatively	 small	 number	 of	 protestors	
were	 greeted	 by	 a	 significant	 police	 presence.	
Then,	 4	 July	 2009	 saw	 two	 demonstrations	
develop:	 one	 in	 Birmingham	 to	 protest	 against	
Muslim	 extremism;	 and	 another	 in	 Wood	 Green,	
North	 London,	 focusing	 upon	 an	 event	 organised	
by	 the	 publicity‐seeking	 Islamist	 Anjem	
Choudary.8	For	 many	 in	 these	 initial	 months,	 the	
demonstrations	by	 the	 fledgling	EDL	were	clearly	
linked	 to	 a	 far	 right	 agenda,	 though	 its	 precise	
identity	 was	 –	 like	 the	 identity	 of	 its	 elusive	
masked	 leader,	 ‘Tommy	 Robinson’	 –	 difficult	 to	
discern	at	first.		
Telling	 of	 this	 early	 confusion	 over	 the	
EDL’s	 aspirations,	 in	 August	 2009	 Paul	 Ray	
recorded	 an	 interview	 with	 TalkSport	 where	 he	
described	 the	 movement	 as	 protesting	 against	 a	
militant	 Islam	 which	 he	 felt	 the	 government	 did	
little	 to	 discourage. 9 	As	 this	 suggests,	 the	
aspiration	 to	 develop	 a	 discrete	 political	 identity	
around	 the	 anti‐Muslim	 theme	 was	 being	
developed	by	this	point,	and	was	one	that	wanted	
to	distance	the	movement	from	any	traditional	far	
right	 movements,	 such	 as	 those	 with	 a	 neo‐Nazi	
identity.	The	demonstration	in	Birmingham	on	the	
8	August	2009	was	a	moment	when	the	identity	of	
the	 emergent	 EDL	 was	 also	 being	 tested.	 The	
symbolism	 here	 is	 important	 to	 stress.	 The	
demonstration	 was	 held	 on	 the	 eight	 day	 of	 the	
eighth	 month,	 referring	 numerically	 to	 8	 ‐	 8,	 so	
thus	 designed	 in	 part	 to	 appeal	 to	 the	 extreme	
right	wing.	 In	 far	 right	 circles,	 88	 is	 code	 for	HH:	
Heil	 Hitler.	 The	 tension	 between	 a	 social	
movement	 fuelled	by	anti‐Muslim	sentiments	and	
the	 infusion	 of	more	 traditional	 far	 right	 themes,	
like	 references	 to	 Hitler,	 were	 clearly	 emerging	
within	 the	movement.	 Early	 activist	 Paul	 Ray,	 for	
example,	 distanced	 himself	 from	 the	 Birmingham	
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about	 neo‐Nazism	 knows	 the	 meaning	 of	 8/8,	
which	 is	 why	 I	 pulled	 out	 of	 any	 active	
participation.’	10	
At	 about	 this	 time,	 a	 then‐masked	 figure,	
‘Tommy	 Robinson’,	 emerged	 as	 the	 leader	 of	 the	
new	 movement.	 Meanwhile,	 figures	 from	 the	
extreme	 right‐wing,	 such	 as	 Mike	 Heaton	 of	 the	
British	Freedom	Fighters,	began	taking	an	interest	
in	 the	 early	 EDL,	 as	 did	 the	 National	 Front	 and	
other	 extreme	 right‐wing	 groups.	Moreover,	 BNP	
figures,	 such	as	Chris	Renton,	were	also	attracted	
to	 the	 new,	 street‐protesting	 movement,	 along	
with	 other	 BNP	 related	 figures	 like	 Davy	 Cooling	
and	 Alan	 Spense.	 So	 by	 the	 summer	 of	 2009,	 the	
emergent	EDL	was	turning	heads	within	the	wider	




They	 are	 obviously	 groups	 who	 need	 to	 be	 educated	







Later	 in	 the	 year,	 the	 EDL	made	more	 strenuous	
efforts	to	distance	themselves	from	older	far	right	







The	 EDL’s	 emergence	 and	 initial	 consolidation	
suggest	 that	 the	movement	 grew	 because	 a	 local	
situation	 developed	 in	 Luton	 that	 chimed	 with	 a	
wider	 national	 sentiment.	 It	 also	 highlights	 the	
existing	networks	that	the	emergent	EDL	was	able	
to	cultivate.	Before	turning	to	these	networks,	it	is	
first	 important	 to	 briefly	 examine	 Luton	 itself	 as	
an	 arena	 that	 could	 cultivate	 this	 mix	 of	 anti‐
Muslim	sentiment	and	‘tit‐for‐tat’	radicalisation.		
Luton	 is	 a	 town	 that,	 in	 many	 ways,	 has	
been	 hit	 by	 the	 wider	 social	 forces	 that	 animate	
the	views	of	many	EDL	supporters.	In	particular,	it	
has	 seen:	 declining	 manufacturing	 industry;	
depressing	the	local	economy	while	other	parts	of	
Britain	 thrive;	 postwar	 immigration	 changing	 the	
demographic	of	the	town;	 low	levels	of	affordable	






where	Muslims	 have	 been	 seen	 to	 be	 standoffish	
and	‘closer’	to	terrorism.	
Here,	 key	 social	 factors	 are	 important	 to	
identify.	 Changing	 job	 structures	 are	 central	 to	
understanding	 the	 social	 forces	 found	 in	 Luton	
around	 the	 time	 of	 the	 EDL’s	 emergence.	
Historically,	 the	 town	 had	 prospered	 primarily	
because	of	the	domination	of	the	local	economy	by	
the	 Vauxhall	 car	 factory.	 This	 was	 established	 in	
Luton	at	the	turn	of	the	century,	and	following	the	
Second	World	War	became	increasingly	central	to	
the	 town’s	 prosperity.	 Mass	 slum	 clearances	
resulted	in	council	estates	being	built,	in	the	main	
for	 car	 factory	 workers;	 and	 so	 the	 town	
expanded.	 In	 these	 postwar	 years,	 immigration	
began	 to	 alter	 the	 demographic	 too,	 with	 Afro‐
Caribbean	migrants	moving	to	Luton	in	the	1950s,	
followed	 by	 Pakistani	 workers	 in	 the	 1960s.	
Reaching	its	height	as	a	local	employer	in	the	late	
1960s,	by	 the	1980s	 the	car	plant	was	drastically	
cutting	back	on	 jobs.	The	 factory	 finally	 closed	 in	
2002,	 at	 a	 time	 when	 Luton	 had	 radically	
diminished	 from	 its	 heyday	 as	 a	 postwar	
manufacturing	 town.	 Such	 a	 narrative	 of	 relative	
economic	decline,	growing	competition	for	limited	
state	 resources,	 combined	 with	 growing	 ethnic	




Luton	 stood	 at	 around	 three	 in	 five	 identified	 as	
white,	two	in	five	as	Asian	and	one‐in‐five	as	Afro‐
Caribbean.	 Fifteen	 percent	 of	 Luton’s	 residents	
identified	themselves	as	Muslim.	Many	of	the	latter	
have	been	concentrated	into	several	urban	parts	of	
Luton.	 Moreover,	 the	 formation	 of	 localised	
communities	 has	 become	 a	 central	 problem,	
structuring	 the	 geography	 of	 Luton’s	 recent	
history	 of	 ethnic	 tensions.	 Economically,	 Muslim	
areas	 such	 as	 Biscot	 and	 Dallow	 have	 fared	 very	
poorly,	 placing	 significant	 barriers	 to	 social	
mobility	 among	Muslims	 born	 into	 such	 areas	 of	
acute	 deprivation.	 Meanwhile,	 anti‐Muslim	
sentiment	 among	 the	 wider	 community	 has	
evolved	 too,	 as	 the	 state	 is	 seen	 by	 the	 wider	
community	 to	 disproportionately	 allocate	
resources	to	Muslim	areas.13	
Perhaps	 resulting	 from	 this	 problematic	




the	 town	 following	 a	 series	 of	 high‐profile	 racist	
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remains	 very	 much	 associated	 with	 the	 central	
EDL	 Social	 Movement	 Organisation.	 Casuals	
United	was	 set	 up	 by	 convicted	 football	 hooligan	
Jeff	‘Marshy’	Marsh;	a	career	he	has	glamorised	in	
memoirs	 like	 Soul	 Crew	 Seasiders. 20 	After	 his	
conviction	 and	 imprisonment	 for	 stabbing	 two	
Manchester	 United	 fans,	 Marsh	 has	 been	 able	 to	
develop	networking	skills	that	proved	to	be	crucial	
to	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 Casuals	 United	
organisation	 in	 spring	 2009.	 Marsh	 naturally	
shares	 the	 anti‐Muslim	 agenda	 that	 has	 become	
increasingly	 prevalent	 among	 many	 football	
hooligan	networks	 in	 recent	years.	He	 recognised	
that	 this	 issue	could	help	to	unify	rival	gangs	 in	a	
common,	 ultra‐patriotic	 cause.	 As	 he	 told	
WalesOnline.co.uk,	 ‘Hooligans	 from	 rivals	 clubs	
are	 uniting	 on	 this	 and	 it	 is	 like	 a	 ready‐made	
army.’21	To	no	small	degree	 the	emergence	of	 the	
EDL	 was	 based	 on	 the	 coming	 together	 of	
networks	 such	 as	 Casuals	 United	 and	 March	 For	
England.		
The	 development	 of	 this	 relationship	
between	 an	 anti‐Muslim	 far	 right	 and	 an	 anti‐
Muslim	tendency	among	football	hooligans	should	
come	 as	 no	 surprise.	 Since	 the	 1980s,	 the	 racist	
dynamics	 of	 football	 hooliganism	 has	 been	
changing.	While	the	white	supremacist	ideology	of	
the	National	Front	carried	some	clear	influence	on	
organised	 football	 violence	 in	 the	 1970s	 –	 with	
later	 far	 right	 movements	 such	 as	 Combat‐18	
remained	 heavily	 associated	 with	 the	 Chelsea	
Headhunters	 group	 well	 into	 the	 1990s	 –	 the	
growth	 of	 black	 players	 in	 British	 football	 has	
helped	 to	 undermine	 such	 previous	 racist	
dynamics	 among	 football	 hooligans.	 Moreover,	
black	 hooligans	 are	 now	 an	 accepted	 part	 of	 the	
violent	 counter‐culture,	22	a	 pattern	 we	 can	 see	
developing	abroad	too.		
The	new	turn	in	racist	sentiment	towards	
scapegoating	 Muslims	 among	 football	 firms	 is	
likely	 to	 be	 in	 part	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Muslim	
community	 being	 under‐represented	 among	 both	
football	 players	 and	 its	 supports.	 Moreover,	 in	
recent	years,	one	of	the	most	striking	examples	of	
anti‐Muslim	sentiment	being	generated,	in	part,	by	
organised	 football	 hooliganism	 was	 witnessed	 in	
the	 Oldham	 riots	 of	 2001.	 Here,	 hooligans	
associated	 with	 Stoke	 City,	 Oldham,	 Stockport,	
Shrewsbury	 and	 Huddersfield	 clearly	 influenced	
the	 tensions	 that	 ultimately	 led	 to	 major	 public	









football	 hooliganism	 was	 fertile	 territory	 for	 the	
growth	 of	 anti‐Muslim	 sentiment	 that,	 as	 noted	
earlier,	 had	 become	 a	 growing	 force	 more	
generally	in	Britain	during	this	period.		
In	 fact,	 the	 EDL	 openly	 celebrates	 its	
‘heritage’	 in	 football	 hooliganism.	 The	 clearest	
example	of	this	glorification	of	football	violence	is	
the	 pseudonym	 ‘Tommy	Robinson’	 itself,	 used	 by	
Steven	 Yaxley‐Lennon	 to	 disguise	 his	 previous	
history	 of	 violent	 behaviour	 and	 BNP	 support.	
Indeed,	 until	 2010	 Yaxley‐Lennon’s	 identity	 was	
successfully	 kept	 out	 of	 the	 public	 domain	 until	
being	revealed	by	Searchlight.24	The	name	‘Tommy	
Robinson’	 is	 also	 the	 pseudonym	of	 the	 leader	 of	
Luton’s	notorious	football	firm	Men‐In‐Gear	(MIG).	
This	 firm,	 in	 turn,	 has	 been	 directly	 associated	
with	 anti‐Muslim	 violence	 in	 Luton	 in	 the	 2000s,	
long	 before	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 EDL.	 (Tellingly,	
earlier	 this	 year,	 Yaxley‐Lennon	was	 convicted	of	
leading	football	fans	in	violence	during	an	event	in	
Luton	 in	 August	 2010.25)	 Once	 again,	 these	 and	
many	other	such	connections	demonstrate	a	clear	
connection	 between	 football	 violence	 and	 the	








political	 style,	 the	 common	 approach	 to	
developing	a	profile	 in	 far	right	politics	 in	Britain	
was,	 traditionally,	marching.	 The	 British	 National	
Party,	 and	 earlier	 far	 right	 organisations	 such	 as	
the	 National	 Front,	 often	 used	 coordinated	
marches	 to	 successfully	 develop	 a	 wider	 profile,	
allowing	 such	 movements	 to	 expand	 their	
presence.	The	core	far	right	strategy	of	‘march	and	
grow’	 was	 deemed	 ultimately	 incompatible	 with	
electoral	 politics	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 Nick	
Griffin	 who,	 upon	 taking	 over	 the	 BNP	 in	 1999,	
wanted	to	rebrand	the	racist	party.	The	inevitable	
violent	 clashes	 at	 such	 marches	 proved	 bad	
publicity	for	BNP	election	candidates,	and	the	BNP	
has	 consciously	 tried	 to	 distance	 itself	 from	 this	
more	 confrontational	 strategy	 under	 Griffin.	
Historically,	 the	basic	approach	to	the	 ‘march	and	
grow’	 tactic	 consisted	 of	 holding	 provocative	
marches,	 selected	 on	 themes	 that	 would	 garner	
much‐needed	wider	publicity.	High‐profile	 events	
would	 hopefully	 attract	 new	 people	 to	 extremist	
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to	 the	 morale	 of	 existing	 supporters. 26 	This	
visceral,	street‐based	form	of	far	right	activism	has	
been	 in	 short	 supply	 in	 the	 2000s.	 Yet	 with	 the	
emergence	of	 the	EDL	–	 a	 social	movement	 freed	
from	 the	 constraints	 of	 electoral	 politics	 –	 this	
potentially	 effective	 tactic	 has	 been	 rediscovered	
and	updated.	Fusing	the	old	strategy	of	‘march	and	
grow’,	with	the	‘new	far	right’	cause	of	anti‐Muslim	
sentiment,	 all	 centralised	 through	 internet	
mobilisation	 and	 online	 networking,	 the	 EDL	 has	
rediscovered	 a	 potent	 form	 of	 political	
campaigning.	
Indeed,	 the	 sustained	 use	 of	 new	 media,	
discussed	more	fully	in	the	next	chapter,	has	been	
vital	 to	the	EDL’s	rapid	expansion.	Ultimately	 this	
has	 been	 important	 because	 online	 networking	
has	 helped	 to	 create	 a	 culture	 able	 to	 organise	
offline	 encounters.	 Attendance	 at	 both	 the	 EDL’s	
official	and	 its	 flash	demos	has	been	a	major	part	
of	 the	 attraction	 for	 its	 core	 followers.	 More	
generally,	 social	 movements	 thrive	 on	 such	
demonstrations:	 they	 are	 ‘performances’	 that	 can	
reinforce	 the	 perceived	 senses	 of	 injustice	 and	
being	 ignored	by	mainstream	voices	 to	 followers.	
Indeed,	 the	 theatre	 of	 demonstrations	 can	 act	 as	
arenas	where	such	general	grievances	can	be	lived	
out	 in	 what	 is	 believed	 to	 be	 an	 empowering	
manner,	and	grounded	 in	a	specific	 issue,	 such	as	
opposing	 a	 specific	 mosque.	 It	 also	 creates	 ‘safe’	
environments,	 where	 extremist	 views	 can	 be	
openly	aired.	Tellingly,	some	of	the,	albeit	limited,	
academic	 fieldwork	 to	 date	 has	 recorded	 some	
typical	expressions	found	at	EDL	rallies:	
	
See	 that	 [points	 at	 St.	 George’s	 flag	 flying	 above	 a	
church]	that	makes	me	proud,	it’s	what	being	English	is	
all	 about,	 but	 where	 I	 come	 from	 that	 isn't	 seen	
anymore.	 The	 Pakis	 have	 taken	 over	 the	 churches	 and	
turned	 them	 into	 mosques,	 now	 what	 the	 fuck	 is	 that	
about,	eh?	[sings]	Give	me	bullets	for	my	gun	and	I	will	
shoot	 the	 Muzzie	 scum,	 No	 surrender	 to	 the	 Taliban.	
(Bradford	EDL	Demonstration,	2010.)		
	
I	 am	 sick	 of	 the	 lot	 of	 them	 [Muslims]	 and	 their	
demands,	 all	 take,	 take,	 take.	 They	 take	 the	piss	 out	 of	
us,	bringing	in	hundreds	of	them	over	through	arranged	
marriages	 and	 that,	 looking	 after	 one	 another	 and	
fucking	 us	 over.	 It	 has	 to	 stop;	 this	 is	 England,	 not	
Afghanistan!	(Bradford	EDL	Demonstration,	2010.)		
	
They	 can’t	 live	 like	 us	 cos	 they	 are	 not	 evolved	 for	 it,	
they	 are	 simple,	 made	 for	 backward	 villages	 in	 the	
mountain	 where	 they	 can	 sit	 around	 eating	 stinking	
curries	 and	 raping	 chickens.	 They	 come	 over	 here	 and	








ways	 to	 cultivate	 anti‐Muslim	 sentiment.	 These	
include	 protests	 against	 the	 building	 of	mosques,	
for	 example	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 April	 2010	
demonstration	in	Dudley;28	opposing	controversial	
speakers,	 as	 with	 the	 aborted	 demonstration	 in	
Wembley	 in	 June	2010	against	the	Al‐Khair	Peace	
Convention; 29 	or	 marching	 in	 support	 of	 key	
figures,	as	with	the	March	2010	demonstration	for	
Geert	 Wilders.30	Another	 tactic	 is	 for	 the	 EDL	 to	
develop	 a	 localised	 law	 and	 order	 issue	 through	
the	 lens	 of	 anti‐Muslim	 politics,	 as	 with	 the	 May	
2011	demonstration	‘Justice	for	Charlene	Downes’	
in	 Blackpool.31	Finally,	 protests	 may	 be	 simply	
chosen	 as	 they	 will	 potentially	 impact	 upon	 an	
area	 with	 existing	 tensions	 between	 Muslim	 and	
non‐Muslim	 communities,	 as	 witnessed	 in	 the	




such	 issues	 in	 order	 to	 extend	 the	 social	
movement’s	 cause.	 Given	 the	 flexibility	 found	 in	
the	 EDL’s	 core	 ideology	 here,	 the	 movement	 has	
been	 able	 to	 seize	 upon	 a	wide	 range	 of	 emotive	
issues	 to	 exploit.	 Some	 of	 its	 localised	 protests	
have	 been	 more	 generalising,	 gravitating	 around	




it	 is	 important	 to	 stress	 that	EDL	demonstrations	
highlighting	 a	 particular	 ‘injustice’	 do	 not	
necessarily	 have	 the	 backing	 of	 those	 directly	
connected	 to	 the	 issue.	 For	 example,	 the	 3	 April	




distressing,	 and	 publicly	 distanced	 themselves	
from	the	protests.33	
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division,	 the	 Angels.	 Arguably,	 this	 is	 primarily	
designed	to	highlight	aspects	of	Islam	that	are	seen	
as	 prejudicial	 against	 women,	 including	 dress,	
restrictions	 on	 movement,	 and	 subordination	 to	




Closely	 associated	with	 this	 new	 form	 of	
social	 movement,	 the	 EDL	 has	 created	 an	 online	
merchandising	 operation	 as	 a	 key	 method	 of	
generating	 revenue.	 Here,	 eBay	 has	 been	 the	 key	
website	 for	 selling	 EDL	 hoodies,	 polo	 shirts,	
facemasks,	 badges,	 England	 flags	 and	wristbands.	
This	 operation	 appears	 to	 be	 sophisticated	 and	
well‐run,	 as	 the	 feedback	 at	 the	 time	 of	 writing	
registers	 as	 99%	 positive	 –	 meaning	 the	
satisfaction	 registered	 by	 customers	 –	 an	
impressive	 record	 by	 eBay	 standards.	
Nevertheless,	 the	 online	 auction	 website	 has	 not	
always	allowed	the	EDL	to	use	its	services,	and	the	
movement	 has	 also	 encountered	 problems	 with	
PayPal,	 the	 online	 payment	 system.40	Moreover,	
use	 of	 the	 profits	 from	 this	 merchandising	
operation	 has	 become	 a	 controversial,	 at	 times	
divisive,	 issue	 within	 the	movement.	 Thus,	 while	
the	 merchandising	 operation	 itself	 has	 been	
successful,	 it	 has	 created	 unexpected	
consequences.	Finally,	it	is	important	to	stress	that	
EDL	 clothing	 is	 ubiquitous	 at	 demonstrations,	
helping	to	create	an	informal	uniform	and	sense	of	
common	 identity,	 frequently	 with	 regional	
markers	 used	 by	 local	 divisions.	 Once	 again,	 the	







for	 any	 social	 movement:	 initial	 emergence;	
coalescence	 and	 stabilisation;	 formalisation;	 and	
eventual	 decline.	 While	 the	 events	 in	 Luton	 in	
spring	 2009	 correspond	with	 the	 first	 stage;	 and	
the	subsequent	successes	of	the	‘march	and	grow’	
tactic	 in	 2009	 and	 2010	 –	 as	 well	 as	 developing	
merchandising	 operations	 and	 expanding	 the	
movement’s	 profile	 –	 correspond	 to	 the	 second	
stage;	 a	 series	 of	 events	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 2010	
helped	 to	 bring	 about	 a	 growing	 formalisation	 of	
operations	 within	 the	 central	 Social	 Movement	
Organisation.	 As	 stressed	 above,	 the	 SMO	 is	 not	






the	 EDL,	 also	 has	 many	 related	 components,	
ranging	from	football	hooligan	networks	and	neo‐
Nazi	 hangers	 on,	 to	 special	 interest	 groups,	 and	
regional	 divisions.	 Instead,	 it	 merely	 reflects	 the	
formalised	 structures	 used	 by	 the	 social	
movement’s	 leadership	 to	 attempt	 to	 exercise	
control	 over,	 and	 set	 the	 wider	 agenda	 of,	 the	
wider	movement.	
The	 summer	 of	 2010	 was	 a	 period	 of	
intense	 instability	 at	 the	 top	of	 the	EDL.	The	 July	
2010	 edition	 of	 Searchlight	 unmasked	 ‘Tommy	
Robinson’	 as	 Steven	 Yaxley‐Lennon,	 in	 an	 article	
also	stressing	Lennon’s	connections	with	both	the	
BNP	 and	 football	 violence.	 These	 revelations	
emerged	during	a	period	when	Yaxley‐Lennon	was	
exchanging	threatening	YouTube	videos	with	early	
EDL	 activist	 –	 and	 by	 this	 point	 a	 self‐styled	
‘spiritual	 guru’	 to	 the	movement	 –	Paul	Ray,	 now	
located	 in	Malta.	 In	 these	 videos,	 Ray	 announced	
that	he	would	reclaim	leadership	of	the	movement,	
along	 with	 his	 new	 associates	 Nick	 Gregor,	 a	
‘reformed’	 German	 neo‐Nazi,	 and	 Johnny	 ‘Mad	
Dog’	 Adair,	 a	 Loyalist	 terrorist	 with	 a	 history	 of	
directing	 terrorism,	 and	 who	 has	 subsequently	
been	associated	with	Combat	18.41	In	one	of	these	
exchanges,	 Ray	 posted	 a	 YouTube	 video	
unmasking	Lennon,	heightening	the	sense	of	crisis	
around	the	movement’s	leadership.		
In	 response	 to	 these	 developments,	 the	
EDL’s	 leadership	 initiated	 a	 new,	 more	 formal	
structure,	 which	 allowed	 Lennon	 to	 weather	 the	
storm.	Despite	Paul	Ray’s	internet	protestations	in	
2010,	 he	 was	 unable	 to	 reclaim	 leadership,	 and	
currently	 still	 blogs	 from	 his	 rival	
www.lionheartuk.blogspot.com	site.	The	response	
from	 the	 leadership	 was	 to	 issue	 formal	
statements	explaining	Yaxley‐Lennon’s	temporary	
absence	in	summer	2010,	and	the	need	for	a	more	
formalised	 structure	 to	 restore	 internal	 clarity.		
This	ran	as	follows:	
	
Moving	 forward	 we	 are	 proposing	 that	 divisions	 and	
areas	 continue	 to	 operate	 in	 their	 own	way	 and	 carry	
out	 meetings	 as	 they	 wish.	 What	 we	 are	 proposing	
however	 is	 to	have	an	Regional	organiser	 (RO)	 in	each	
region	 that	 is	 in	 direct	 contact	 with	 the	 division	
administrators.	 These	 RO’s	 will	 report	 direct	 to	 Jack	
Smith	and	will	meet	on	a	monthly	basis	 to	pass	on	any	
suggestions	or	 issues	 that	may	have	been	presented	 to	
them	from	the	ground	level.	
Each	 RO	will	 also	 have	 at	 least	 2	 deputies	 or	
more	 in	 larger	areas	to	assist	 them	with	the	work	they	
will	be	carrying	out.	
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while	 the	pig’s	 head	 itself	was	 covered	 in	 further	
anti‐Muslim	 slogans.	 During	 the	 trial,	 the	 court	
heard	 how	 the	 event	 unfolded:	 after	 Payne	 was	
given	a	pig’s	head	one	evening	in	a	local	pub	by	a	
friend,	 a	 small	 group	 of	 EDL	 supporters	
communicated	 via	 text	 message	 to	 arrange	 a	
meeting.	 Spontaneity	 developed	 through	 new	
media	 communication,	 inspired	 by	 the	 core	 EDL	
attitude	 of	 opposing	 Muslim	 buildings,	 thus	
characterised	 this	 act	 of	 Islamophobic	
criminality.47	
The	 example	 above	 is	 but	 one	 of	 several	
instances	where	 pig’s	 heads	 have	 been	 placed	on	
or	around	sites	clearly	intended	to	cause	offence	to	
Muslims.	 Indeed,	 it	 has	 been	 a	 tactic	 deployed	
across	 Europe	 by	 movements	 developing	 similar	
anti‐Muslim	 agendas.	 Another	 striking	 example	
occurred	in	May	2010,	when	EDL	protestor	Kevin	
Smith	 was	 given	 a	 12	 week	 suspended	 for	




are	 often	 motivated	 by	 the	 need	 to	 ‘perform’	 to	
others	 one’s	 prejudices,	 essentially	 as	 an	 act	 of	
empowerment.	 That	 EDL	members	 use	 Facebook	
to	 develop	 this	 ‘performance’	 should	 not	 be	
surprising,	 even	 if	 it	 does	 incriminate	 them.	 Such	
tactics	 show	 the	 provocative	 nature	 of	 the	 grass‐
roots	activities	within	the	social	movement.	In	fact,	
the	 latter	 example	 came	 ahead	 of	 a	 planned	 EDL	
march	 against	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 so‐called	 ‘super	
mosque’	in	the	Dudley	area.		
As	 well	 as	 pig’s	 heads,	 a	 further	
inflammatory,	 grass‐roots	 tactic	 has	 been	 the	
burning	 of	 the	 Koran.	 The	 EDL	 previously	
supported	 Pastor	 Terry	 Jones,	 who	 has	 been	
associated	 with	 this	 type	 of	 provocative	 act	 in	
Florida.49	This	precedent	apparently	helped	to	give	
license	 to	 local	 EDL	 groupings	 to	 burn	 copies	 of	
the	Koran.	Examples	here	include	the	six	men	from	
Gateshead	who	posted	a	burning	of	 the	Koran	on	
YouTube	 in	 September	 2010,	 at	 the	 height	 of	
Jones’	 own	provocative	declarations	 to	 the	 global	
media.50	More	 recently,	 in	 January	 2011,	 EDL	
supporter	 Andrew	 Ryan	 burned	 a	 copy	 of	 the	
Koran	in	Carlisle	town	centre,	again	showing	how	














convicted	 of	 Racially	 or	 Religiously	 Aggravated	
Intentional	 Harassment,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 theft	 of	 a	
copy	of	 the	Koran	 from	Carlisle	 library.	His	 court	
case	 itself	 became	 a	 focal	 point	 for	 local	 EDL	
supporters	 and,	 as	 detailed	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	




a	 football	 match,	 further	 highlighting	 links	
between	football	racism	and	the	EDL.51	
Aside	 from	 these	 more	 clearly	 criminal	
actions	at	a	grass‐roots	level,	there	are	many	EDL	
flash	 demonstrations	 that	 are	 entirely	 locally	
organised.	 These	 have	 been	 on	 the	 increase,	
especially	 since	 the	 autumn	 of	 2010,	 which	
appears	to	mark	a	turning	point	in	the	promotion	
of	 this	 tactic	 by	 the	 EDL.	 To	 give	 some	 instances	
here	 that	 are	 representative	 of	 nature	 of	 these	
flash	 demos,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 start	 with	 September	
2010.	Building	upon	the	attention	surrounding	the	
9/11	 commemorations,	 which	 included	 an	 EDL	
presence	 in	 New	 York,	 on	 12	 September,	
approximately	120	EDL	members	laid	a	wreath	on	
a	war	memorial	in	Oldham.	Despite	a	smaller	size,	
the	 protest	 became	 violent,	 and	 bottles	 were	
thrown	at	police.	In	total,	eight	EDL	members	were	
arrested.52	The	 following	 day	 saw	 another	 flash	
demo	 in	 Nuneaton,	 initially	 with	 around	 60	 EDL	
protestors	 cheering	 a	 parade	 of	 soldiers.	 The	
protest	then	became	mobile,	and	moved	to	target	a	
local	 Asian	 area.	 Policing	 here	 was	 similarly	
flexible,	 and	 the	protest	was	 successfully	diffused	
with	one	arrest.	53	
It	 is	 important	 to	 highlight	 that	 mobile	
phone	footage	of	such	demos	is	regularly	uploaded	
to	EDL	websites,	along	with	film	from	social	events	
afterwards,	 such	 as	 singing	 in	 pubs	 after	 EDL	
events.	 This	 ‘real	 time’	 element	 of	 social	
networking,	 and	 sharing	 of	 communal	
experiences,	all	adds	to	the	online‐offline	sense	of	
community	generated	by	EDL	divisions	operating	
within	 their	 locality.	 Across	 2011,	 the	 tactic	 has	
continued,	 and	 even	 increased.	 For	 example,	 EDL	
web	pages	are	often	used	to	help	coordinate	these	
flash	demos.	 In	 the	 sample	 taken	 from	May	2011	
studied	 in	 the	 following	 chapter,	 the	 Casuals	
United	 blog	 promoted	 several	 such	 flash	 demos,	














Workers	Party	activists,	 seen	as	opponents	 to	 the	
EDL’s	 politics.	 One	 such	 case	 in	 Newcastle	 in	
September	 of	 2010	 subsequently	 saw	 the	 men	
charged	 with	 the	 attack	 appear	 in	 court	 proudly	
wearing	 EDL	 apparel.54	Another	 attack	 on	 a	 left	
wing	 bookshop	 in	 April	 2011	 is	 glorified	 by	 the	
English	 Defence	 League	 Extra	 blog.	 One	 posting	
claims	 the	 bookshop	 was	 a	 legitimate	 target	
because:		
	
Trotskyists,	 Communists	 and	 left‐liberals	 have	
systematically	and	opportunistically	supported	the	very	
Islamofascists	 the	 EDL	 is	 against.	 Without	 the	 far‐left	
types	 who	 run	 this	 bookshop,	 the	 threat	 of	 Islamism,	
and	 even	 Islamoterrorism,	would	 not	 be	 as	 great	 as	 it	
actually	is.55	
	
So,	 for	some	EDL	supporters	at	 least,	 the	political	







EDL	 has	 tried	 to	 bring	 further	 consistency	 to	 its	
protests	by	recently	 launching	a	series	of	broader	
pressure	 campaigns.	 These	 too	 are	 designed	 to	
court	 publicity	 and	 tap	 into	 an	 ultra‐patriotic	
sentiment,	 while	 also	 allowing	 the	 movement’s	
anti‐Muslim	rhetoric	to	take	centre	stage.		
In	 late	 2010,	 one	 of	 the	 most	 notable	 of	
these	pressure	campaigns	by	the	EDL	was	its	open	
letter	 to	 British	 local	 authorities,	 warning	 that	 if	
they	 ‘banned	 Christmas’	 then	 the	 EDL	 would	
protest	in	2011,	at	great	financial	cost	to	such	local	
councils.	The	EDL’s	letter	emphasised	a	critique	of	
an	 encroaching	 political	 correctness	 allegedly	
found	 in	 events	 put	 on	 by	 local	 authorities	 to	
celebrate	Christmas.	Essentially,	if	local	authorities	
used	 language	 such	 as	 ‘winter	 festival’,	 then	 the	
EDL	 would	 mount	 expensive	 protests	 in	 the	
coming	year:	
	
Any	 council	 that	 does	 not	 keep	 the	word	 Christmas	 in	
the	annual	celebrations	and	opts	for	Winter	Festival,	out	
of	 the	 politically	 correct	 appeasement	 of	 others	 to	 the	
detriment	 of	 our	 traditions,	 will	 have	 their	 town/city	









The	 campaign	 even	 received	 some	 broadly	
favourable	 coverage	 in	 the	 wider	 press.	 On	 26	
October	 2010,	 the	Daily	Star	 picked	 up	 the	 story,	





“Islamisation	 of	 Britain”.	 His	 declaration	 comes	 after	




2011,	 Lennon	 began	 talking	 about	 two	 new	
campaigns	 that	 would	 bring	 further	 focus	 to	 the	
movement:	 ‘No	 More	 Mosques’	 and	 the	 ‘Halal	
Campaign’.	Yet	in	spring	2011	the	development	of	
these	campaigns	was	hampered	by	the	emergence	
of	 the	 Infidels	 faction	 (see	 below),	 according	 to	
one	 YouTube	 statement	 delivered	 in	May	 2011.58	
In	 this	address,	significantly,	Lennon	claimed	that	
these	 two	 strands	 of	 anti‐Muslim	 campaigning	
were	 designed	 to	 bring	 further	 cohesion	 to	 the	
movement.	This	is	again	revealing	of	how	the	EDL	
is	becoming	much	more	open	in	the	way	it	widens	
out	 its	 anti‐Muslim	 politics.	 Both	 campaigns	 are	
now	 included	on	 the	EDL’s	new	webpages,	which	
were	launched	in	July	2011.		
The	 aim	 of	 the	 ‘No	 More	 Mosques’	
campaign	 is	 largely	 self‐explanatory.	 What	 the	
issue	 does	 is	 empower	 localised	 EDL	 activists	 to	
demonstrate	 against	 any	 building	 of	 possible	 use	
to	Muslim	communities.	As	previously	noted	in	the	
EDL	 Mission	 Statement,	 the	 movement	 operates	
on	 the	 premise	 that,	 to	 become	 acceptable	 to	 the	
movement,	 Islam	 as	 a	 whole	 needs	 to	 undergo	 a	
sort	 of	 ‘cultural	 revolution’.	 The	 ‘No	 More	
Mosques’	 campaign	 develops	 on	 this	 premise.	
Without	 some	 form	 of	 fundamental	 Muslim	
‘cultural	 revolution’,	 the	 EDL	 has	 assumed	 the	
right	 to	 oppose	 the	 building	 of	 all	 mosques,	 or	
Muslim‐related	buildings,	anywhere	in	Britain.		
One	 example	 of	 this	 process	 in	 action	 is	
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In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Noor	 A	 Madina	 Mosque	 in	
Blackpool,	 the	 EDL’s	 LGBT	 Division	 leader,	 Liam	
Wood,	has	 led	 the	 campaign	with	allegations	 that	
the	 local	 LGBT	 community	 are	 being	 excluded	
from	 the	 development. 60 	Other	 tactics	 being	
highlighted	by	the	EDL	include	allegations	that	the	
mosque	contravenes	planning	regulations.	In	sum,	
the	 ‘No	 More	 Mosques’	 campaign	 is	 flexible	
enough	to	be	adopted	around	the	country,	and	can	
inspire	localised	campaigning.		
Similarly,	 the	 ‘Halal	 Campaign’	 gravitates	
around	the	argument	that	British	people	are	being	
forcibly	 given	 Halal	 meat	 by	 a	 conspiracy	 of	
silence.	 The	 EDL	 had	 already	 developed	
demonstrations	 around	 this	 theme.	 For	 example,	
in	 October	 2010	 EDL	 supporters	 in	 Blackburn	
mounted	 a	 demonstration	 against	 KFC	 for	 selling	




13	 minute	 YouTube	 video,	 also	 posted	 on	 the	
central	EDL	website.	This	webpage	also	contains	a	
lengthy	essay	outlining	 the	aims	of	 the	campaign.	
In	 this	 text,	 emotive	 arguments	 are	 the	 order	 of	
the	 day.	 The	 online	 statement	 emphasises	 the	
process	 of	 slaughtering	 and	 meat	 that	 it	 sees	 as	
inhumane,	 and	 compares	 Halal	 and	 Kosher	
techniques.	 As	 one	would	 expect	 given	 the	 EDL’s	
pro‐Jewish	position,	 the	 analysis	 here	 claims	 that	
Kosher	slaughter	is	not	problematic	as	it	typically	
stuns	 animals	 before	 slaughter.	 Halal	 meat	
production,	on	the	other	hand,	allegedly	does	not,	
and	thus	is	singled	out	by	the	campaign.	Moreover,	
statistics	 are	 presented	 to	 argue	 that	many	more	
animals	 are	 slaughtered	 according	 to	 Halal	
practices	 than	 could	 ever	 be	 demanded	 by	
Britain’s	 Muslim	 population.	 So	 Muslims	 are	
presented	 as	 enforcing	 a	 cruel	 cultural	 practice	
upon	 the	 wider	 population	 through	 deception.	
Thus,	the	narrative	of	the	‘Halal	Campaign’	chimes	
with	 the	 underlying	 EDL	 message	 of	 a	 hidden	
Islamification	of	Britain:	
	
In	 the	 last	 few	 years,	 public	 bodies	 such	 as	 schools,	
hospitals	 and	 even	 football	 grounds	 have	 been	 serving	
halal	meat	to	the	public	with	no	choice,	and	we	are	none	
the	wiser.	In	the	past	many	Islamic	authorities	have	also	
rejected	 halal	 slaughter	 using	 machines,	 after	 the	
internationally‐recognised	 Malaysian	 Halal	 Standard	
‘MS	 1500’	 removed	 machine	 slaughtering	 as	 an	
acceptable	practice	in	2009.	The	Birmingham	Council	of	






halal	 slaughtered	 by	 machines,	 and	 that	 the	 only	
acceptable	halal	is	from	manual	slaughter.	
Another	 popular	 view	 is	 that	 for	 meat	 to	 be	
‘truly	 halal’	 it	 has	 to	 be	 slaughtered	 and	 handled	
exclusively	by	Muslims.	This	 is	 yet	 just	 another	way	of	







Of	 late,	 halal	 meat	 has	 been	 linked	 to	 the	 funding	 of	
terrorism	 through	 some	halal	 certification	 bodies.	 CBN	
news	 has	 discovered	 that	 the	 halal	 meat	 in	 France	 is	
certified	 by	 the	 UIOF,	 the	 Union	 of	 the	 Islamic	
Organizations	 in	 France,	 who	 have	 strong	 ties	 to	 the	





siphoned	 off	 to	 fund	 terrorism.	Of	 course	 that’s	 not	 an	
accurate	 portrayal	 of	 all	 suppliers	 of	 halal	 meat,	 but	
what	 other	 nationally	 available	 products	 have	 been	
linked	to	the	funding	of	terrorism!?	62	
	
The	 ‘Halal	 Campaign’	 also	 fits	 with	 similar	
campaigns	in	Europe,	such	as	the	recent	campaign	
by	the	French	Bloc	Identitaire	against	the	fast	food	






Despite	 its	 many	 unique	 features,	 the	 EDL	 is	
nonetheless	 representative	 of	 a	 wider	 political	
change	that	has	swept	across	Europe	over	the	past	
fifteen	 years.	 The	 combination	 of	 a	 deeply	 anti‐
Muslim	 political	 agenda	 and	 populist	 ultra‐
patriotism,	 powered	 by	 grass‐roots	 critiques	 of	
mainstream	politics,	has	been	a	core	component	of	
the	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 in	 Europe.	 Unsurprisingly,	 the	




This	 international	 outreach	 began	 in	
earnest	 during	 April	 2010,	 when	 EDL	 activists	
demonstrated	in	supported	of	Geert	Wilders	at	the	
Dutch	Embassy	in	Berlin.	The	Pax	Europa	Citizens’	
Movement	 co‐organised	 the	 event	 –	 a	 clear	
instance	 of	 the	 EDL	 developing	 a	 wider	
international	network.	Then,	in	June	2010,	the	EDL	
sent	two	representatives	to	the	annual	conference	








the	 EDL	 gave	 a	 presentation	 detailing	 its	
organisational	 style,	 and	 approaches	 to	 its	





in	 an	 informal	 setting	 as	 well	 as	 to	 see	 the	 very	
attractive	and	 impressive	 city	of	Zurich.	We	 found	 that	




The	 statement	 also	 hailed	 the	 EDL’s	 positive	
reception	 as	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	 new	 era	 of	
international	co‐operation	between	the	movement	
and	 other,	 like‐minded	 groups.	 Elsewhere	 in	 the	
statement,	 it	 also	 said	 that	 the	 high	 profile	
activities	of	 John	 ‘Snowy’	Shaw	(who	 is	discussed	
in	more	detail	in	Chapter	four	of	this	report)	were	
of	particular	interest	to	the	wider	conference.	64		
The	 most	 high‐profile	 of	 the	 EDL’s	
attempts	to	develop	international	links	to	date	was	
their	 September	 2010	 trip	 to	 New	 York.	 The	
contingent	 was	 led	 by	 Yaxley‐Lennon,	 though	 he	
was	 refused	 entry	 at	 JFK	 Airport.	 Fellow	 EDL	
activists	 were	 more	 successful,	 and	 joined	 a	
demonstration	–	also	attended	by	Geert	Wilders	–	
in	Lower	Manhattan	to	protest	against	the	‘Ground	
Zero	 Mosque’,	 a	 high	 profile	 issue	 at	 the	 time.65	
The	 event	 was	 planned	 by	 the	 anti‐Muslim	
organisation	 Stop	 the	 Islamisation	 of	 America,	
Pamela	Geller’s	offshoot	of	Stop	the	Islamisation	of	
Europe. 66 	The	 American	 connection	 continued,	
with	 the	 EDL	 associating	 itself	 with	 the	 US	 Tea	
Party	 movement.	 Indeed,	 several	 key	 figures	
within	 the	 right‐wing	 American	 movement	
actively	 associated	 with	 the	 EDL.	 These	 included	
Pamela	Geller,	founder	of	SIOA,	and	Rabbi	Nachum	
Shifren.67	Geller	has	since	withdrawn	her	support,	
citing	 an	 infiltration	 from	 neo‐Nazi	 elements	
within	 the	 moveemnt.68	The	 International	 Civil	
Liberties	Alliance	has	also	been	connected	to	both	
anti‐Muslim	 sections	 of	 the	 Tea	 Party	 movement	
and	the	EDL.	Then	in	December	2010,	the	EDL	was	
able	 to	 gain	 national	 headlines	 upon	 inviting	 US‐
based	 Pastor	 Terry	 Jones	 to	 the	 UK,	 as	 the	 EDL	














withdrew	 the	 offer	 following	 much	 public	
pressure,	 claiming	 that	 further	 research	 had	
uncovered	Jones’	deeply	homophobic	views,	which	
were	deemed	unacceptable	to	the	movement.	69	
Apart	 from	 these	 American	 connections,	
the	 EDL	 continued	 to	 develop	 its	 European	
contacts	 too;	 for	 example,	 at	 a	 demonstration	 in	
the	Netherlands	in	October	2010,	organised	by	the	
European	Freedom	Initiative.	Again,	the	event	was	
designed	 to	 support	 Geert	 Wilders,	 though	
ultimately	Wilders	 did	 not	want	 to	 be	 associated	
with	 the	 EDL	 or	 the	 event,	 which	 ended	 up	 a	
disaster.	More	police	and	 journalists	attended	the	
rally	 than	 supporters,	 which	 was	 moved	 from	 a	
city	 centre	 location	 to	 an	 industrial	 estate	 by	
police.70	A	similar	situation	developed	again	when	
EDL	 leaders,	 including	Yaxley‐Lennon,	 attended	 a	
rally	 in	 Lyon	 in	 April	 2011	 alongside	 Bloc	
Identiaire, 71 	which	 was	 much	 hyped	 by	 the	
movement	 as	 part	 of	 an	 internationalisation	
strategy.	 This	 protest	 also	 was	 poorly	 attended,	
and	 led	 to	 arrests	 –	 including	 that	 of	 Yaxley‐




We	 need	 riots	 with	 the	Muslims	 at	 the	 tower	 hamlets	
demo,	 peaceful	 demos	 solve	 nothing	 and	 r	 a	 waste	 of	
time	and	effort	we	 should	 take	 the	 fight	 to	 the	Muslim	
scum,smash	back	to	where	they	belong...72	
	
At	 present,	 EDL	 leaders	 are	 still	 attending	
international	events,	like	the	recent	‘new	far	right’	
‘Counterjihad’	 conference,	 hosted	 in	 Stuttgart	 in	
June	 2011	 by	 Pax	 Europe.	 An	 EDL	 statement	
described	this	meeting	as	follows:	
	
The	 EDL	 met	 with	 key	 international	 figures	 including	
Robert	Spencer	of	Jihad	Watch	and	Stop	the	Islamization	
of	America,	and	Sheik	Yer	Mami	of	the	excellent	website	
Winds	 of	 Jihad.	 The	 work	 of	 the	 EDL	 is	 held	 in	 great	
esteem	 by	 members	 of	 the	 German	 Counterjihad	 and	
EDL	 involvement	 at	 this	 event	 has	 strengthened	 the	
friendship	 between	 the	 EDL	 and	 German	 groups.	 Of	
course	 EDL	 activists	 also	 met	 people	 from	 other	
countries	 including	 France,	 the	 Netherlands,	 United	
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The	 analysis	 so	 far	 here	 has	 pointed	 to	 the	
importance	of	interpreting	the	EDL	as	a	movement	
with	 both	 an	 active	 leadership	 and	 a	 dynamic	
grass‐roots	 support.	 Given	 the	 EDL’s	 critique	 of	
state	 institutions,	 it	 is	 unsurprising	 to	 find	 the	
movement	 taking	 a	 vocal	 –	 and	 at	 times	 active	 –	
role	 in	 the	 rioting	 and	 disturbances	 in	 London	
other	 parts	 of	 England	 in	 August	 2011.	 Shortly	
after	 the	 outbreak	 of	 disturbances	 on	 6	 August,	
EDL	 supporters	 on	 the	 group’s	 Facebook	 wall	
began	 to	 talk	 openly	 of	 schemes	 to	 patrol	 the	
streets	 in	order	 to	combat	 looters	and	rioters.	To	
be	 sure,	 all	 far	 right	 groups	 contain	 within	 their	
makeup	 a	 strong	 critique	 of	 social	 unrest	 and	
disorder,	 often	 styling	 themselves	 as	 alternate	
street	forces	perfectly	placed	to	combat	such	social	
tension.	From	the	rise	of	 Italian	Fascism	onwards	
we	 can	 see	 far	 right	movements	 trying	 to	 occupy	
such	a	 space	once	 it	 becomes	available.	The	 ‘new	
far	 right’	 is	 no	 exception	 here.	 Correspondingly,	
EDL	 message	 board	 discussions	 regularly	 linked	
the	 rioting	 in	 inner	 city	 areas	 to	 a	 failure	 of	 the	
state	to	protect	citizens	from	social	decay.	The	EDL	
leadership	was	clear	that	Islam	was	not	directly	to	
blame,	 but	 message	 board	 discussions	 on	 social	
networking	 sites	 did	 suggest	 that,	 at	 the	 grass‐
roots	 level	 at	 least,	 EDL	 supporters	 could	 see	 a	
connection	between	a	Muslim	presence	 in	Britain	
and	 a	wider	 social	malaise	 leading	 to	 the	 August	
2011	riots.	
	 This	 was	 not	 always	 mere	 talk.	 Around	
100	supporters	appeared	on	the	streets	of	Enfield	
on	 Tuesday,	 9	 August	 2011	 to	 ‘protect’	 the	
community.	This	contravened	police	guidance,	and	
came	 after	 a	 large	 increase	 in	 police	 numbers	 in	
the	capital.	Worryingly,	this	episode	of	vigilantism	
itself	 descended	 into	 violent	 disorder,	 as	
protestors	turned	on	attempts	at	law	enforcement	
during	 the	 period	 of	 crisis	 and	 threw	 bottles	 at	
police.	 Although	 the	 police	 denied	 that	 EDL	
members	 were	 clearly	 involved	 in	 spontaneous	
street	 responses	 to	 the	 initial	 rioting,	 this	 does	
raise	the	issue	of	defining	what	consist	a	‘genuine’	
EDL	 demonstration.	 A	 group	 calling	 themselves	
the	Eltham	Defence	League,	gained	notoriety	in	the	
press	coverage	of	the	events.79	While	this	was	not	
an	 official	 EDL	 event,	 the	 protestors	 clearly	
identified	 themselves	 with	 the	 EDL.	 Meanwhile,	
outside	 of	 London,	 Facebook	 messages	 similarly	
claimed	 that	 EDL	 supporters	 helped	 to	 maintain	
calm	on	the	streets	of	other	towns	and	cities	in	the	
days	 after	 the	 initial	 rioting	 clamed	 down.	 This	




achievements,	 but	 shows	 how	 the	movement	 can	
capitalise	quickly	on	disorder	to	present	its	street	
politics	as	a	relevant	and	trustworthy	force.		
In	 sum,	 EDL	 reactions	 during	 the	 August	
2011	 riots	 show	 several	 concerning	 trends.	 The	
EDL	 can	 gain	 some	 localised	 credibility	 by	 taking	
credit	 for	 restoring	 order,	 giving	 grass‐roots	
protestors	 an	 organisation	 to	 identify	 with;	
moreover,	 the	 riots	 providing	 the	 leadership	 an	






Successful	 social	movements	 are	 likely	 to	 inspire	
opposition,	 and	 this	 certainly	 has	 been	 the	 case	
with	the	EDL.	The	issue	of	‘tit	for	tat	radicalisation’	
has	 already	 been	 raised	 here,	 and	 many	 EDL	
demonstrations	 attract	 counter‐protestors	 from	a	
diverse	range	of	movements.	This	can	itself	prove	
a	 major	 policing	 problem,	 leading	 to	 arrests	 and	
resentment	 among	 opponents.	 In	 terms	 of	 direct	
opposition	 to	 EDL	 demonstrations,	 the	
organisation	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 protest	 is	 Unite	
Against	 Fascism,	 an	 offshoot	 of	 the	 Socialist	
Workers	 Party.80	UAF	 demonstrators	 believe	 that	




ideology	 and	 bringing	 violent	 elements	 onto	 the	
streets.	 Yet	 much	 discussion	 by	 the	 UAF	
perspective	 fails	 to	 note	 the	 distinction	 between	
the	extreme	right‐wing	neo‐Nazi	elements	and	the	
general	 tenor	 of	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 politics.81	All	 are	




potential	 for	 confrontation	 at	 demonstrations.	 As	




	 Affiliated	 with	 Unite	 Against	 Fascism	 is	
the	 Muslim	 Defence	 League:	 United	 We	 Stand,	
Divided	We	Fall.82	It	is	to	be	expected	that	Muslim	
opposition	to	the	EDL	should	develop,	and	some	of	
this	 opposition	 is	 also,	 like	 UAF,	 concerned	 with	
physically	opposing	the	EDL	on	the	streets.	There	
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most	 organised	 movement	 claiming	 the	 ‘defence	
league’	title.	The	MDL’s	online	literature	is	critical	
of	the	government’s	Prevent	Strategy,	and	sees	no	
reason	 to	 apologise	 for	 Islamist	 terrorists	 simply	
because	 such	 figures	 claim	 to	 be	 Muslim.	 The	
movement	 is	 connected	 to	 the	 Muslim	 Public	
Affairs	 Committee	 (MPACUK),	 and	 its	 formal	
literature	 distances	 the	 movement	 from	 figures	
such	 as	 Anjem	 Choudry.	 Via	 its	 Facebook	 wall,	
followers	 can	 participate	 in	 anti‐EDL	
demonstrations	such	as	those	organised	by	UAF.	
While	 these	 and	 other	 movements	
operate	on	the	principle	of	being	merely	anti‐EDL,	
other	 campaigners	 have	 developed	 a	 more	
positive	 strategy	 as	 the	 core	 message.	 The	 Hope	
not	Hate	campaign	has	been	particularly	resonant	
here. 83 	Controversially,	 especially	 among	 anti‐
fascist	campaigners,	it	does	not	follow	the	UAF	line	
that	 all	 demonstrations	 must	 be	 opposed	 with	 a	
direct	counter‐demonstration.	The	Hope	not	Hate	
campaign	 has	 also	 recognised	 that	 addressing	
underlying	 political	 problems,	 which	 create	 the	
demand	 for	 movements	 such	 as	 the	 EDL,	 are	 a	
central	part	of	any	long‐term	solution.	As	a	result,	
Hope	not	Hate	has	developed	parliamentary	 links	
(with	 the	 Labour	 Party	 in	 particular)	 in	 order	 to	
reconnect	 disaffected	 people	 with	 local	 and	
national	 political	 processes. 84 	This	 more	 ‘left	
realist’	position	demonstrates	a	greater	awareness	
of	 the	 social	 issues	 driving	 EDL	 support,	 when	
compared	 to	 the	 Marxist	 viewpoint	 of	 the	 UAF	
group,	and	so	helps	to	avoid	the	dangers	of	‘tit	for	
tat	radicalisation’	on	the	streets	of	Britain.		
With	 a	 distinct	 brand,	 the	Hope	 not	Hate	
campaign	 also	 targets	 individual	 demonstrations,	
regularly	calling	 for	 them	to	be	banned	or	 turned	
into	static	protests.	Its	most	high‐profile	campaign	
came	 in	August	2010,	when	 the	 campaign	helped	
to	 united	 disparate	 community	 groups	 based	 in	
Bradford	 for	 in	 peaceful	 protest	 against	 the	 EDL	
demonstration	 on	 28	 August.	 In	 a	 nightmare	
scenario,	 this	 demonstration	 could	 have	
potentially	 re‐ignited	 tensions	 in	 a	 city	 with	 a	
recent	 history	 of	 rioting	 between	 far‐right	 and	
Muslim	 youths.	 However,	 the	 Hope	 not	 Hate	
campaign	 spearheaded	 an	 inclusive	 strategy	 of	
bringing	 together	 many	 communities	 –	 including	
Christians,	 Muslims,	 Sikhs	 and	 Hindus	 from	 the	











counter‐protests,	 such	 broad‐based,	 community‐
driven	 opposition	 to	 the	 EDL	 appears	 as	 a	 more	





websites.	 Moreover,	 other	 radical	 left‐leaning	
online	 spaces	 regularly	 host	 news	 stories	 about	
the	 EDL,	 including	 Indymedia,	 Lancaster	 Unity,	
1MillionUnited,	 and	 Islamophobiawatch.	 This	
information‐gathering	 approach	 allows	 much	








social	 movement	 is	 important	 to	 discuss:	 the	




Though	 a	 loose	 structure	 of	 this	 type	 is	 in	 place,	
the	EDL’s	grass‐roots	are	much	more	empowered	
than	those	of	a	 traditional	 far	right	party,	 like	the	
BNP.	 The	 appearance	 of	 factions	 and	 sub‐groups	
should	 therefore	 be	 expected	 within	 the	 wider	
social	 movement.	 Though	 the	 central	 Social	
Movement	 Organisation,	 headed	 by	 Yaxley‐
Lennon,	distances	the	EDL	from	many	components	
of	the	wider	movement,	they	are	still	a	key	part	of	
the	 social	 dynamic	 that	 has	 been	 generated	 since	
2009.			
Exemplifying	 this	 potentially	 fractious	
mix,	the	Infidels	emerged	from	growing	discontent	
within	 the	 EDL	 in	 late	 2010	 and	 especially	 early	
2011	to	form	a	splinter	group.	Entering	2011,	the	
EDL’s	 northern	 contingent	 was	 becoming	
concerned	 that	 a	 north‐south	 divide	 was	
developing	 within	 the	 movement.	 By	 this	 time,	
some	of	the	EDL’s	northern	divisions	were	already	
referring	 to	 themselves	 as	 ‘Infidels’.	 Also	 at	 this	
time,	 the	 renegade	 figure	 John	 Shaw,	 nicknamed	
‘Snowy’,	 previously	 an	 EDL	 Regional	 Organiser,	
was	cultivating	a	profile	as	an	alternate	leadership	
figure	 within	 some	 of	 the	 more	 autonomous,	
northern	 EDL	 divisions.	 Snowy	 had	 been	 much	
feted	 by	 the	 EDL	 leadership,	 especially	 after	 his	
notorious	rooftop	protest	in	Dudley	in	May	2010.86	
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divisions.	 To	 date,	 this	 still	 offers	 broad	
coordination	of	the	wider	social	movement.	
And	 finally,	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	 social	
movement	 model	 outlined	 here,	 grass	 roots	
activists	for	the	EDL	have	been	empowered	to	act	
on	 their	 own.	 Especially	 since	 autumn	 2010,	
specific	 divisions	 and	 regions	 have	 been	
encouraged	to	develop	more	localised	flash	demos,	
or	 to	 launch	 single‐issue	 campaigns	 like	 the	 ‘No	
More	Mosques’	and	‘Halal	Campaigns’.	This	has	led	











Chapter 3: The 
English Defence 
League’s ‘New Far 
Right’ Rhetoric and 
the New Media 
 
Dr Paul Jackson, University of 
Northampton 
 
As	 we	 have	 seen,	 the	 English	 Defence	 League	 is	
best	understood	as	a	social	movement,	comprised	
of	a	central	Social	Movement	Organisation,	as	well	
as	 a	 range	 of	 grass‐roots	 groups.	 As	 such,	
innovation	 from	 below	 is	 vital	 to	 its	 on‐going	
success.	 As	 with	 all	 social	 movements	 over	 the	
past	ten	to	fifteen	years,	it	has	benefited	from	new	
media	 technologies	 that	 are	 now	 freely	 available.	
As	Nigel	 Copsey	 has	 noted,	 the	 EDL	 ‘is	 a	 child	 of	
the	 Facebook	 revolution’,1	and	 the	 movement	 is	
notable	for	its	use	of	online	products	and	services.	
Facebook,	 smartphone	 communication,	 YouTube	
videos,	 free	 blogs,	 merchandise	 sales	 through	
eBay,	 and	 networking	 via	 message	 boards	 have	
been	 wholeheartedly	 embraced	 by	 the	 EDL.	 By	
exploring	 aspects	 of	 this	 online	 culture,	 it	 is	
possible	 to	 see	how	 the	movement	 tailors	 a	 ‘new	
far	 right’	 rhetoric	 for	 a	 number	 of	 target	
audiences.	 This	 ‘targeted	 rhetoric’	 ranges	 from	
central	 EDL	websites	 putting	 forward	 the	 official	
line	 to	 local	 sites	 and	 grass‐roots	 blogs,	 such	 as	
that	 by	 Casuals	 United	 –	 offering	 similar	
perspectives	for	specific	football	‘firm’	audiences	–	
to	 semi‐breakaway	 movements	 like	 the	 Infidels,	
who	 are	 reverting	 back	 to	 more	 traditional	 far	
right	 themes	 of	 glorification	 of	 violence,	 anti‐
Semitism	and	neo‐Nazism.		
By	 examining	 elements	 of	 this	 online	
world	constructed	 from	the	 top	down	by	the	EDL	
leadership	 and	 bottom‐up	 by	 its	 followers,	 it	 is	
possible	 to	 glean	 a	 more	 nuanced	 understanding	
of	 the	 dynamics	 and	 the	 major	 concerns	 of	 the	
movement.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 stress	
that	new	media	has	not	created	the	EDL.	Rather,	it	











the	most	well	 known	new	media	 vehicle	 used	 by	
the	movement.	When	loading	up	the	main	page	for	
the	 EDL,	 one	 finds	 a	 well‐tended	 online	 space.	
Here,	 regularly	 updated	 sets	 of	 messages	 are	
designed	 to	 recruit	 new	 followers	 as	 well	 as	 to	
inform	 EDL	 supporters	 of	 the	 movement’s	 latest	
developments.	Aside	from	hosting	key	documents,	
like	 the	 EDL	 Mission	 Statement	 discussed	 in	 the	
opening	 chapter	 of	 this	 report,	 its	 Facebook	wall	
functions	 as	 a	 central	 source	 for	 disseminating	
details	 of	 recent	 and	 upcoming	 campaigns	 and	
planned	demonstrations,	as	well	 as	offering	news	
updates	 on	 key	 items.	 These	 range	 from	
statements	 or	 court	 appearances	 by	 Tommy	
Robinson,	to	commenting	on	news	developments	–	
such	 as	 the	 EDL’s	 criticism	 of	 the	 June	 2011	
Prevent	 Strategy	 or	 the	 national	 riots	 in	 August	
2011	 –	 to	 dealing	 with	 internal	 cohesion.	 In	
response,	 Facebook	 has	 raised	 concerns	with	 the	
EDL’s	politicised	use	of	their	website,	although	the	
EDL	 Facebook	 page	 currently	 remains	 highly	
active.	
Unlike	 more	 traditional	 far	 right	
movements,	 the	 EDL	 has	 encouraged	 the	 grass‐
roots	 development	 of	 new	 media	 spaces.2	EDL	
followers	 correspondingly	 take	 a	 much	 more	
active	part	in	this	online	sphere.	Such	participation	
might	 take	 the	 form	 of	 uploading	 video	 from	 a	
‘flash’,	 or	 unplanned,	 EDL	 demonstration,	 or	
commenting	on	EDL	media	appearances	 (often	 in	
real	 time);	 or	 more	 typically,	 using	 Facebook	 to	
develop	 networks	 among	 fellow	 activists.	 Such	 a	
dynamic	online	space	has	been	crucial	to	the	EDL’s	
ability	 to	 develop	 scattered	 anti‐Muslim	 attitudes	
into	a	more	coherent	and	sustained	movement.	Yet	
Facebook	 and	 other	 new	media	 tools	 can	 also	 be	
over‐emphasised	 in	 terms	 of	 EDL	 successes.	
Although	 tens	 of	 thousands	 of	 people	 are	
registered	 as	 supporters	 on	 Facebook	 (over	
90,000	 at	 the	 time	 of	 writing)	 this	 ever‐growing	
figure	does	not	necessarily	translate	 into	an	ever‐
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a	 dance	 beat,	 and	 the	 interviewee	 has	 since	
become	a	hot	topic	within	the	movement.6	The	re‐
edited	 video	 now	 has	 found	 no	 less	 than	 half	 a	
million	 YouTube	 views,	 and	 is	 often	 posted	 on	
various	EDL	 sites.	The	 song	has	also	been	 turned	
into	 ringtones	 and	 other	 ephemera,	 such	 as	 T‐
shirts	bearing	the	slogan	‘Muslamic	Rayguns’.7	
The	 politicised	 use	 of	 music	 has	 been	 a	
long‐standing	 feature	 of	 fascist	 and	 far‐right	
movements	 as	 well	 as	 football	 firms,8	and	 it	 is	
therefore	 not	 surprising	 to	 find	 the	 EDL	
















Scrutinising	key	 themes	 in	 the	English	Defence	
League’s	online	discourses	
	
From	 Facebook	 messages,	 to	 localised	 blogs	 and	
campaigns,	 to	 songs	and	YouTube	ephemera,	 it	 is	
clear	that	the	new	media	is	the	primary	source	for	
EDL	 material.	 As	 a	 result,	 it	 is	 often	 the	 space	
where	its	views	are	constructed	and	disseminated	
to	 supporters.	 Given	 the	 importance	 of	 such	 new	
media,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 get	 a	 better	 idea	 of	 how	
some	 of	 the	 major	 EDL	 sites	 put	 forward	 these	
messages	 by	 examining	 a	 snapshot	 of	 some	
discussions	 occurring	 over	 a	 period	 of	 a	 month.	
The	following	analysis	seeks	to	present	the	major	
themes	from	three	key	EDL	sites	–	English	Defence	
League	 News,	 English	 Defence	 League	 Extra,	 and	
the	 Casual	 United	 blog	 –	 during	 May	 2011.	 The	
first	 of	 these	 sites	 is	 clearly	 an	 example	 of	 the	
movement’s	 ‘front	 stage’,	 while	 the	 second	 and	
third	 blog	 takes	 us	more	 clearly	 into	 areas	 really	

















The	 English	 Defence	 League	 News	 site	 offers	 a	
window	on	 the	way	 the	EDL’s	 leadership	present	
the	 movement	 to	 followers,	 and	 presumably	
others	 too.	 Hosted	 by	 the	 organisation’s	 main	
website,	a	 total	of	15	articles	were	posted	on	this	
forum	 over	 May	 2011,	 approximately	 one	 every	
two	days.	As	elsewhere,	 the	most	 striking	 feature	
of	 these	 articles	 is	 an	 anti‐Muslim	 tenor.	 Yet	 the	
messages	 have	 a	 multiple	 purposes.	 Here,	
examples	 include	 giving	 a	 positive	 spin	 to	 EDL	
news	 stories,	 as	 well	 as	 offering	 Steven	 Yaxley‐
Lennon	 a	 platform	 for	 maintaining	 unity	 within	
the	ranks.	One	instance	of	the	latter	is	the	posting	
of	 a	 40‐minute	 YouTube	 address,	 where	 Yaxley‐
Lennon	 denies	 accusations	 of	 fraud	 from	 Infidel	
factions	while	maintaining	 his	 authority	 over	 the	
organisation.	10	
Similar	to	the	EDL’s	Mission	Statement,	on	
the	 whole	 the	 language	 on	 the	 English	 Defence	
League	 News	 site	 is	 very	 consciously	 couched	 in	
terms	 of	 combating	 Islamist	 extremism.	 In	 doing	
so,	 there	 is	 always	 the	 strong	 implication	 that	
British	 Muslims	 as	 a	 whole	 either	 support	 jihadi	
Islamists,	 or	 are	 led	 by	 just	 such	 extremists.	
Correspondingly	the	notion	that	Islam	is	somehow	
menacing	 is	 evident	 in	 nearly	 all	 of	 15	 articles	
posted	for	May	2011.		
Typifying	this	emotive	criticism	of	British	
and	other	Muslims,	 and	 linking	 this	 to	 a	 patriotic	
agenda,	 the	 first	 posting	 for	 the	 month	 embeds	
and	 offers	 comments	 on	 a	 YouTube	 film	 by	 Evan	
Mark,	a	non‐EDL	 figure.	The	 film	 loosely	narrates	
the	 rise	 of	 the	 Taliban,	 the	 9/11	 attacks	 and	 the	
subsequent	 invasion	 of	 Afghanistan,	 and	 features	
violent	images	of	a	stoning	and	beheadings.	As	this	
suggests,	 the	war	 in	 Afghanistan	 is	 a	 particularly	
resonant	 issue	 for	 the	 EDL	 as	 it	 emotively	
combines	key	themes	of	combating	jihadi	Islamism	
and	 comradely	 patriotism,	 while	 also	 raising	
issues	 with	 the	 mainstream	 political	
establishment’s	 record	 of	 supporting	 front‐line	
troops.	 In	addition	to	 the	 film’s	 images,	 the	EDL’s	
commentary	 is	 especially	 keen	 to	 remind	
followers	 of	 the	 potential	 threats	 posed	 by	 the	
introduction	 of	 Shari’ah	 law	 to	 Britain.11	This	











The	 on‐going	 war	 in	 Afghanistan	 also	
connects	 with	 a	 thread	 running	 throughout	 the	
postings	 of	 May	 2011:	 the	 death	 of	 Osama	 bin	
Laden.	 Most	 strikingly,	 the	 various	 statements	
from	this	site	present	bin	Laden’s	Islamist	violence	
as	 a	 direct	 product	 of	 his	 Muslim	 faith,	 not	 the	
product	 of	 a	 particular	 political	 agenda	 that	 has	
emerged	 from	 a	 specific	 context.	 For	 example,	
English	 Defence	 League	 News	 commentary	
stresses	 that	 he	 was	 ‘a	 devout	 Muslim	 who	
sincerely	believed	the	words	of	the	Qur’an	and	the	
example	 of	 the	 prophet’. 12 	Such	 simplification	
argues	 that	 devotion	 to	 scripture	 alone	 was	 the	
reason	 for	 bin	 Laden’s	 terrorist	 actions.	
Furthermore,	bin	Laden’s	9/11	attack	are	seen	as	
the	starting	point	for	a	western	confrontation	with	
political	 Islam.	 Yet	 such	 short‐term,	 simplified	
analysis	 neglects	 to	 identify	 any	 long‐term	 causal	
factors	for	the	emergence	of	jihadi	Islamism	in	the	
twentieth	 and	 twenty‐first	 centuries.	 Broadly	
speaking,	 this	 could	 include	 the	 impact	 of	
European	decolonisation,	or	 the	complex	postwar	
politics	 of	 the	 wider	 Middle	 East,	 or	 the	
internecine	 war	 in	 leading	 to	 Afghanistan’s	
identification	 as	 a	 ‘failed	 state’.	 Most	 textbook	
discussions	 on	 the	 emergence	 of	 Al‐Qaeda	 and	
similar	groups	include	such	themes	among	others,	
but	are	glaringly	absent	from	the	EDL’s	portrayal.	
The	EDL’s	perspective	 is	not	 simply	misguided;	 it	
is	 intended	 to	 associate	 all	 Muslims	 with	 bin	
Laden’s	 violent	 extremism.	 To	 achieve	 this,	 the	
editing	 out	 of	 important	 facts,	 and	 selective	
storytelling,	 misrepresent	 Islam	 as	 an	 inherently	
violent	faith.		
In	 the	 fallout	 from	 bin	 Laden’s	 death,	
other	reports	during	May	2011	discuss	the	EDL	‘in	
action’.	 Often	 describing	 itself	 as	 a	 ‘street	
movement’,	 the	 EDL	 responded	 to	 events	 in	May	
with	 a	 ‘tit‐for‐tat’	 approach.	 In	 early	May,	 several	
postings	 highlight	 clashes	 between	 the	 ‘brave	
patriots’	of	the	EDL	and	Muslims	Against	Crusades	
(MAC)	 activists,	 which	 occurred	 outside	 the	
American	Embassy	 in	London.13	Updates	on	 these	
clashes	 were	 disseminated	 through	 uploaded	
YouTube	 video,	which	 is	 a	 popular	 by‐product	 of	
EDL	 actions.14	The	 speed	 and	 scale	 of	 this	 new	
media	 approach	 is	 a	 potent	 propaganda	 tool	 for	
EDL	 followers,	 as	 it	 offers	 dynamic	 images	 of	
Islamist	 protestors	 who,	 as	 with	 EDL	 textual	









The	 behaviour	 of	 the	 police	 is	 also	
discussed	 in	 these	 postings.	 As	 previously	
highlighted,	 developing	 a	 strong	 critique	 of	 the	
state	 is	 a	 crucial	 component	 of	 far	 right	 politics,	
old	 and	 new.	 This	 theme	 can	 be	 deployed	
whenever	 the	 issue	 of	 policing	 the	 EDL	 is	
discussed.	 English	 Defence	 League	 News	 reports	
tend	 to	present	 street	 level	 officers	 as	 essentially	
in	 sympathy	 with	 the	 aims	 of	 the	 movement.	
Meanwhile,	 more	 senior	 police	 are	 strongly	
criticised	 for	 giving	 orders	 allegedly	 privileging	
Muslim	 protestors	 above	 those	 of	 the	 EDL.15	This	
juxtaposition,	suggesting	a	distinction	between	the	
honourable	 bobby	 and	 the	 out‐of‐touch	
bureaucrat,	 is	 given	 immediacy	 when	 discussing	
an	 anti‐Muslim	 theme,	 such	 as	 MAC	
demonstrators.		
Beyond	 major	 news	 events,	 localised	
stories	are	also	 foregrounded	 in	order	 to	develop	
more	 general	 anti‐Muslim	 arguments.	 For	
example,	 anti‐Muslim	 sentiment	 was	 highlighted	
in	 a	 post	 discussing	 the	 case	 of	 an	 18‐year	 old	
Muslim	 man	 who	 had	 mounted	 a	 homophobic	
sticker	 campaign	 in	 Whitechapel,	 London.	 The	
article	concluded	by	stating	the	EDL	‘will	continue	
to	 challenge	 the	 Muslim	 world’s	 intolerance	 of	
sexual	 freedoms’,	 and	 pointed	 to	 statistical	 data	
suggesting	 that	 British	 Muslim	 communities	 are	
more	 homophobic	 that	 the	 wider	 British	
population.16	Again,	such	discussion	lends	itself	to	
the	underlying	‘new	far	right’	message,	and	allows	
the	 EDL	 to	 style	 itself	 as	 the	 defender	 of	 liberal	
values	 over	 intolerant	 Muslim	 ones.	 This	 theme	
also	 allowed	 the	 article	 to	 establish	 contrasting	
views	on	homosexuality	via	a	typically	caricatured	
representation	 of	 Shari’ah	 law.	 The	 article	
simplistically	 argued	 that	 Shari’ah	 law	 would	
inevitably	 lead	 to	 the	 death	 penalty	 for	
homosexuality,	once	again	caricaturing	the	Islamic	
faith	as	a	whole	as	violent	and	intolerant.	
The	 EDL’s	 international	 context	 is	 also	
notable	in	this	forum,	especially	with	reference	to	
two	 developments	 within	 the	 European	 ‘new	 far	
right’.	 The	 first	 related	 to	 the	 French	 fast‐food	
chain	 Quick,	 which	 had	 ceased	 selling	 pork	
products	at	some	of	its	restaurants.	This	issue	had	
already	 become	 a	 rallying	 point	 for	 French	 far‐
right	movements	 like	the	National	Front	and	Bloc	
Identitaire.	 These	 French	 ‘new	 far	 right’	
campaigns	argued	that	Quick’s	actions	 typified	an	
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contained	 a	 YouTube	 posting	 of	 a	 speech	 by	
Yaxley‐Lennon,	 who	 attended	 a	 rally	 in	 Lyon	
organised	by	Bloc	 Identiaire.	Presenting	 the	 issue	
as	a	binary	one	between	patriotic	western	values	
and	 an	 enforced	 Islamification,	 the	 posting	 then	
connected	this	struggle	to	the	defence	of	European	
freedoms	 during	 the	 Second	 World	 War.	
Conflating	 ‘radical	 Islam’	with	 Nazism,	 the	 forum	
claimed:	 ‘Today	 we	 face	 a	 new	 enemy.	 But	 the	
ideology	of	 radical	 Islam	 is	 just	as	dangerous	and	
repulsive	as	that	of	Nazism,	if	not	more	so.’	17			
Similarly,	 the	 developments	 on	 the	
Continent	 came	 to	 the	 fore	 again	 in	 a	 supportive	
article	 on	 Geert	 Wilders’	 proposed	 film	 to	 retell	
the	 story	 of	 the	 prophet	 Mohammed.	 Having	
offered	 some	 sympathetic	 comments	 on	Wilders’	
own	 problems	 with	 state	 prosecutions	 in	 the	
Netherlands,	 the	 article	 then	 uses	 this	 theme	 to	
offer	 a	 brief,	 highly	 critical	 biography	 of	
Mohammed.	 The	 commentary	 stresses	 the	
purportedly	 violent,	 militaristic	 nature	 of	 the	
prophet,	 and	 that	 it	 was	 this	warlord	 figure	who	
first	 inspired	 the	more	 intolerant	 side	of	 Shari’ah	
law.	The	piece	then	characterises	the	prophet	as	a	
paedophile,	 even	 a	 ‘serial	murderer,	 torturer	 and	
rapist’.	 The	 English	 Defence	 League	 News	 then	
offers	 a	 stark	 and	 damning	 commentary	 on	 the	
significance	of	this	for	modern	Muslims:	
	
Regardless	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 it	 is	 fair	 to	 refer	 to	
Mohammed	 as	 a	 child	 abuser	 (he	 lived	 in	 a	 different	
time,	with	very	different	ideas	about	sex,	childhood,	and	
the	 rights	 of	 the	 individual),	 its	 [sic]	 clearly	 very	
worrying	to	think	that	 this	 is	 the	man	Muslims	are	still	
told	they	should	emulate.	Some	perfect	example	he	set!	
	
The	 piece,	 brimming	 with	 assumptions	 and	
prejudice,	 finally	 suggests	 that	 Mohammed’s	
alleged	 tendency	 towards	 paedophilia	 actually	
influences	 higher	 rates	 of	 sex	 offending	 among	




very	 lively	 topic	 across	 May	 2011.	 The	 theme	
keyed	in	with	an	EDL	demonstration	at	the	end	of	
the	 month	 in	 Blackpool.	 The	 protest	 on	 28	 May	
2011	focused	on	the	‘Justice	for	Charlene	Downes’	
theme.	 The	 case	 of	 Charlene	 Downes	 became	 an	
issue	 the	 EDL	 made	 their	 own	 in	 the	 spring	 of	
2011	–	again	showing	the	flexibility	and	‘localism’	
that	can	be	employed	by	the	movement.	The	crux	
of	 the	 story	 involves	 a	 collapsed	 prosecution	 of	








paedophilia.	 It	 also	 facilitated	 strong	 criticism	 of	
the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 and	 mainstream	
politicians.	Once	more,	the	EDL’s	wider	message	is	
developed:	dangerous	Muslims	are	scoring	victory	
after	 victory	 over	 non‐Muslim	 communities,	 in	 a	
growing	 Islamification	 of	 Britain.	 This	 simplistic	
analysis	is	packaged	in	a	highly	emotive	online	and	
street	 campaign	 that	 contains	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	
anti‐Muslim	sentiment.		
This	 summary	of	English	Defence	League	
News	postings	 from	May	2011	only	 scratches	 the	
surface	of	a	complex	set	of	messages	developed	in	
but	 one	month.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 these	
messages,	 particularly	 from	 formal	 EDL	 sites	 like	
this	 one,	 do	 at	 least	 attempt	 to	make	distinctions	
between	 moderate	 Muslims	 and	 what	 is	 usually	
termed	‘radical	Islam’.	Such	a	binary	distinction	is	
itself	highly	simplistic,	yet	is	offered	as	the	central	
get‐out‐clause	 for	 allegations	 that	 the	 EDL	 is	
Islamophobic.	This	is	the	EDL’s	‘front	stage’,	and	to	
a	 certain	degree	more	 guarded	 commentary	 is	 to	
be	 expected.	 Still,	 the	 site	 evinces	 a	 strong	 anti‐
Muslim	tenor,	one	going	beyond	merely	critiquing	
Islamist	violence.	The	Koran	itself	rather	than	any	
radicalising	 political	 contexts	 is	 repeatedly	






While	 the	 English	 Defence	 League	 News	 offers	 a	
somewhat	 guarded	 presentation	 of	 the	 EDL’s	
views,	other	blogs	are	explicit	in	their	anti‐Muslim	
critiques.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 English	 Defence	
League	Extra	blog	site	 can	be	 considered	another	
key	 source	 of	 the	 EDL	 perspective.	 The	 site	 is	
edited	 by	 a	 Birmingham‐based	 supporter	 who	
claims	not	to	represent	formal	EDL	positions,	and	
so	 offers	 an	 example	 of	 grass‐roots	 website	
development	within	 the	EDL.	 It	posted	32	 stories	
during	 May	 2011.	 In	 addition	 to	 being	 more	
frequent,	these	articles	also	tend	to	be	longer	than	
those	 of	 the	 English	 Defence	 League	 News.	 Here,	
most	 posts	 are	 again	 specifically	 critical	 of	
Muslims	in	Britain	and	around	the	world,	backing	
up	 core	 EDL	 messages.	 There	 is	 also	 significant	
space	given	over	to	criticising	anti‐EDL	protestors,	
such	as	Unite	Against	Fascism.	Yet	this	 is	all	done	
through	more	 a	 lengthy	 analysis	when	 compared	
to	 English	 Defence	 League	 News	 postings,	
including	engagement	with	high	profile	academics	
like	 the	 late	 Edward	 Said,	 as	 well	 as	 grander	
political	 theorising	 broadly	 around	 Samuel	
Huntington’s	 ‘clash	 of	 civilisation’	 thesis.	 The	
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English	 Defence	 League	 Extra	 site	 thus	 offers	
supporters	 a	 comparatively	 in‐depth	 level	 of	
discussion,	 notably	 relating	 to	 foreign	 affairs,	
critiques	 of	 the	 state,	 activities	 of	 anti‐EDL	
protestors	 and,	 of	 course,	 on‐going	 EDL	
campaigns.		
Similar	 to	 the	 EDL’s	 Mission	 Statement,	
here	 too	 the	 anti‐Muslim	 sentiments	 are	 couched	
in	a	way	 that	 attempts	 to	distance	 the	movement	
from	accusations	of	being	far	right	or	racist	–	both	
fiercely	 rejected	 by	 the	 EDL.	 To	 achieve	 this,	 one	
common	 rhetorical	 tactic	 is	 to	 develop	 anti‐Nazi	
themes	 that	 offer	 opportunities	 to	 conflate	 Islam	
and	 Nazism.	 For	 example,	 when	 castigating	 Sun	
journalist	 Anila	 Baig,	 analysis	 quickly	 veers	 into	
this	 territory	 by	 comparing	 Muslims	 who	 have	
contributed	 major	 cultural	 achievements	 to	
intellectual	Nazi	supporters,	like	Martin	Heidegger	
and	 Richard	 Strauss.19	Such	 comments	 help	 to	
create	 a	 common	 sense	 view	 that	 the	 two	 are	
essentially	similar.	
Importantly,	 several	 articles	 from	 May	
2011	 also	 specifically	 address	 the	 issue	 of	 the	
EDL’s	political	 identity	and	governing	ideology.	In	
keeping	 with	 the	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 ideology,	
accusations	 of	 fascism	 and	 biological	 racism	 are	
strongly	 contested.	 Yet	 these	 articles	 do	 argue	
that,	 although	 the	 EDL	 is	 not	 racist,	 it	 is	 an	






cultural	 terms’.20	This	 self‐identified	 ‘culturalist’	
position	 is	 used	 to	 develop	 much	 negative	
commentary	 on	 Islamic	 culture.	 So	 despite	
rejecting	the	biological	racism	of,	say,	Nazism,	such	
messages	 openly	 embrace	 anti‐Muslim	
discrimination	 based	 on	 cultural	 ‘otherness’.	 For	
such	 ‘culturalists’,	 Muslims	 are	 irredeemably	
‘other’.	
Correspondingly,	 the	 critique	 of	 all	
Muslims	 is	 actually	 much	 stronger	 here	 than	 on	
the	 English	 Defence	 League	 News	 site.	 Although	
the	 strategy	of	 guilt	by	association	 remains	a	key	
rhetorical	 device,	 the	 English	 Defence	 League	
Extra	 site	develops	 this	 theme	 in	a	more	detailed	
manner.	 Anti‐Muslim	 discussions	 typically	
characterise	 the	 Islamic	 faith	 as	 a	 whole	 as	
inherently	 violent	 and	 threatening.	 An	 explicit	
article	 published	 from	 May	 2011	 on	 the	 threat	






“Moderation”	 =	 Patient	 Strategy’,	 exemplifies	 this	
strategy. 21 	Yet	 again,	 non‐violent	 Muslims	 are	
considered	an	on‐going	threat	to	the	nation.	In	fact	
violence	 and	 non‐violence	 are	 presented	 as	 two,	
interrelated	 strategies	 for	 the	 supposedly	
imminent	 Islamification	 of	 Britain.	 The	 article	
further	contends	that,	since	Muslims	are	currently	
a	 minority	 population,	 it	 does	 not	 always	 make	
sense	 for	 them	 to	 adopt	militant	 tactics	 for	 their	
alleged	 Islamification	 of	 Britain.	 So	 here,	 all	
Muslims	 are	 styled	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 Trojan	Horse	 for	
extremist	 values.	 Whether	 associated	 with	 jihadi	
Islamism	or	not,	all	Muslims	are	alleged	to	adhere	
to	 values	 that	 are	 inherently	 ‘outside’	 those	 of	 a	
British	way	 of	 life	 and	want	 to	 impose	 extremist	
views	 on	wider	 society.	 All	 followers	 of	 Islam,	 in	
this	 reading,	 are	 therefore	 more	 susceptible	 to	
terrorism.	For	example:	
	
There	 is	 nothing	 to	 stop	 a	 Muslim	 from	 becoming	 a	
suicide	 bomber	 or	 a	 terrorist.	 That	 is,	 he	 need	 not	




Simply	 put,	 Muslims	 calling	 for	 moderation	 are	
actually	 enacting	 a	 long‐term	 strategy	 of	
Islamification,	 yet	 sometimes	 impatient	 Muslims	
turn	 to	 terrorism	 in	 order	 to	 try	 speeding	 things	
up.	 Both	 of	 these	 reductive	 characterisations,	
moderate	 and	 extreme,	 portrays	 Muslims	 as	 an	
existential	 threat	 to	 the	 British	 way	 of	 life.	 The	
article	 then	 argues	 that	Muslim	 states	worldwide	
are	 in	 a	 similar	 position	 of	 weakness.	 However,	
should	 such	 a	 Muslim	 state	 gain	 parity	 with	 the	
USA,	this	would	result	in	nuclear	Armageddon	due	
to	 the	 inherent	 drive	 toward	 aggression	 and	
domination	 within	 Islam.	 By	 this	 logic,	 the	 piece	
asserts	 that	 the	 threat	 to	 Britain	would	 be	much	
greater	if	the	Muslim	population	was	even	double	
its	 current	 size.	 To	 stress	 this	 point,	 it	 concludes	
by	 stating	 the	 British	 Muslim	 population	 is	
increasing	 at	 ten	 times	 the	 rate	 of	 the	 average	
population	 growth.	 Thus	 wild	 inaccuracies,	





In	 analysis	 of	 English	 Defence	 League	
News	 postings,	 it	 was	 noted	 that	 the	 war	 in	
Afghanistan	 featured	 heavily	 in	 EDL	 rhetoric.	
Alongside	 Afghanistan,	 bin	 Laden’s	 death	 in	 May	
2011	 allowed	 for	 Islamism	 in	 Pakistan	 to	 enter	
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Extra’s	 perspective,	 in	 contrast,	 shows	 some	
awareness	 of	 different	 Muslim	 communities	 in	
Pakistan;	 for	 example,	 examining	 demographics	
and	key	faith	groups,	as	well	as	talking	about	links	
between	 Deobandi	 interpretations	 of	 Islam	 and	
the	emergence	of	 the	Taliban.	On	 first	 inspection,	
perhaps,	this	suggests	some	potential	to	raise	valid	
points	 regarding	 the	 impact	 of	 such	 politicised	
Islam	in	Pakistan,	and	 in	 turn,	how	this	relates	 to	
Britain.	 The	 propaganda	 purpose	 of	 the	 site,	
however,	quickly	highlights	the	underlying	reason	
for	 such	discussion.	Once	more	analysis	 is	deeply	
one‐sided,	 simply	 using	 a	 more	 nuanced	 set	 of	




more	 finessed	 discussion	 of	 Pakistan’s	 complex	
circumstances	 are	merely	 conjured	 up	 to	 present	
the	 country	 as	 a	 hothouse	 for	 extremists	 –	
individuals	 who	 are	 then	 finding	 their	 way	 to	
Britain	 to	 ferment	 trouble.22	Though	 the	 issue	 of	
jihadi	 Islamism	 is	 a	 real	 and	 pressing	 one,	 the	
presentation	here	omits	all	context,	proportion,	or	
clear	 research,	 and	merely	 serves	 the	 purpose	 of	
extending	the	EDL’s	anti‐Muslim	views.		
English	Defence	League	Extra,	across	May	
2011,	 also	 castigates	 the	 British	 state	 for	 being	
cowed	 by	 Muslim	 lobbies.	 This	 comes	 out	 most	
strongly	on	the	high‐profile	issue	of	installing	and	
then	 decommissioning	 CCTV	 cameras	 in	 the	
Sparkbrook	area	of	Birmingham.	Entries	criticised	
the	 ‘victory’	 by	Muslims,	 while	 stressing	 that	 the	
initial	 presence	 of	 CCTV	 nonetheless	 identified	 a	
deep‐seated	 problem	 of	 violent	 extremism	 in	 the	
Sparkbrook	area.23	For	the	English	Defence	League	
Extra,	the	story	of	the	removal	of	the	CCTV	system	
effectively	 legitimised	 the	 Muslim	 ghetto	 in	 the	
city,	 while	 also	 wasting	 state	 resources.	 We	 can	
see	 here	 how	 the	 EDL	 can	 make	 some	 political	
momentum	from	Prevent	Strategy	related	projects,	
themselves	designed	to	ease	community	tensions.	
The	 English	 Defence	 League	 Extra	 site	
also	 contains	 strong	 critiques	 of	 the	 local	 media	
reporting	on	EDL	activities.	For	example,	one	entry	
examines	 the	 reporting	 of	 a	 demonstration	 in	
Weymouth	 by	 the	 Dorset	 Echo. 24 	Here	 and	
elsewhere,	 the	 local	media	 is	 presented	 as	 failing	
to	represent	the	true	views	of	the	local	population,	










in	 such	 media	 critiques	 is	 to	 reproduce	 a	 news	
article	 from	 the	 local	 press,	 which	 is	 then	
interpolated	 with	 comments	 on	 alleged	
inaccuracies	 by	 the	 blogger.	 These	 interpolations	
reiterate	 core	 EDL	 views	 on	 the	 failings	 of	





mainstream	 interpretations	 of	 such	 issues	 are	
misguided	and	need	correcting.	Such	an	approach	
appears	 with	 a	 good	 degree	 of	 regularity	 in	May	
2011,	and	offers	a	quick	way	to	develop	a	lengthy	
blog	entry.	Examples	include	comments	on	a	story	
taken	 from	 Carlisle	News	&	Star,	 which	 reported	
on	a	Carlisle	United	steward	who	resigned	because	
of	 his	 support	 for	 the	 EDL,	 in	 particular	 Andrew	
Ryan’s	 burning	 of	 the	 Koran;25	and	 a	 piece	 taken	
from	 the	 Fulham	 &	 Hammersmith	 Chronicle	
reporting	 a	 clash	 between	 EDL	 supporters	 and	
Muslims	 outside	 West	 London	 Magistrates	 Court	
in	 Hammersmith,	 at	 the	 time	 Steven	 Yaxley‐
Lennon’s	public	order	offence	was	heard.26		
As	with	the	English	Defence	League	News,	
by	 the	 end	 of	 May,	 entries	 also	 become	 focused	
upon	 the	 impending	 EDL	 demonstration	 in	
Blackpool.	 Here	 too,	 the	 Charlene	 Downes	 case	
became	 a	 vehicle	 for	 developing	 anti‐Muslim	





Of	 course	 all	 ethnicities	 have	 members	 who	 abuse	
young	girls.	But	not	all	ethnic	groups	have	a	religion,	like	
Islam,	which	sanctions	and	even	encourages	that	abuse.	








What	 is	 particularly	 striking	 here	 is	 how	 quickly	
the	 rhetoric	 slips	 from	 an	 ostensible	 anti‐jihadi	
theme	 to	 into	 condemning	 the	 Islamic	 faith	 as	 a	
whole	 –	 a	 common	 quality	 with	 English	 Defence	
League	Extra	postings.	
To	 summarise,	 issues	 relevant	 to	 the	
EDL’s	 ideology	 on	 the	 English	 Defence	 League	












helps	 rationalise	 the	 radical	 messages	 developed	
by	 the	 social	 movement.	 These	 more	 articulate,	
radical	positions	are	not	 imposed	 from	above	but	
are	 cultivated	 from	within	 the	 EDL’s	 grass‐roots.	
This	 more	 complex	 discourse	 offers	 details	
missing	 from	 the	 English	 Defence	 League	 News	
postings,	 yet	 still	 conforms	 to	 a	 scare‐mongering	








Moving	 on,	with	 just	 over	 150	discrete	 entries	 in	





uploaded	 YouTube	 videos	 (there	 are	 two	 cover	
versions	 of	 the	 Muslamic	 Rayguns	 song,	 for	
example),	or	 footage	 from	EDL	demos.	The	site	 is	
largely	 run	 by	 ‘Joe	 Cardiff’,	 also	 known	 as	 Jeff	
Marsh.	 As	 discussed	 elsewhere,	 he	 created	 the	
Casuals	 United	 organisation	 in	 2009	 and	 its	
network	 is	 closely	 affiliated	 with	 the	 EDL.	 The	
Casuals	 United	 blog’s	 politics	 again	 gravitates	
around	 ultra‐patriotism,	 anti‐Muslim	 sentiment	
and	 populist	 critiques	 of	 the	 British	 state,	 while	
also	 drawing	 on	 Marsh’s	 previous	 ‘career’	 in	
organised	 football	 hooliganism.	 The	 Casuals	
United	 blog	 shows	 the	 way	 in	 which	 cognate	
organisations	 cluster	 together	 to	 form	 networks	
around	 compatible	 themes	within	 the	wider	 EDL	
social	 movement.	 As	 such,	 Casuals	 United	 has	
developed	 a	 key	 blog	 site	 that	 is	 well	 integrated	
into	EDL	campaigns.		
Like	 previous	 EDL	 related	 sites,	 the	
predominant	 characteristic	 of	 the	 Casuals	 United	
blog	 is	 the	use	of	both	text	and	 image	 to	advance	
an	 anti‐Muslim	 agenda.	 Here,	 however,	 entries	
offer	neither	the	more	detailed	analysis	presented	
by	 the	English	Defence	League	Extra	 site,	nor	 the	
more	careful	 tenor	of	 the	English	Defence	League	
News	site.	The	language	often	veers	into	expletives	
and	 ad	 hominem	 attacks	 on	 opponents. 28 	As	
elsewhere	in	the	EDL	discourse,	opponents	are	not	
only	 Muslims,	 but	 also	 left‐wing	 critics,	 such	 as	
Unite	Against	Fascism.		
Moreover,	 the	double	standards	expected	






one	 posting	 decries	 a	 piece	 of	 graffiti	 on	 an	
advertising	 hoarding	 where	 a	 Burka	 has	 been	
painted	 over	 a	 woman	 wearing	 a	 bikini. 29	
Elsewhere,	another	posting	complains	of	two	EDL	
supporters	being	prosecuted	for	spraying	poppies	
on	 a	 mosque. 30 	The	 implication	 seems	 clear:	
graffiti	 is	acceptable	when	committed	by	the	EDL,	
but	not	by	others.	Moreover,	the	idea	that	many	in	
Britain	 would	 find	 extremely	 distasteful	 an	 EDL	
related	appropriation	of	the	poppy	image	for	such	
a	 politicised,	 anti‐Muslim	 agenda	 is	 not	 even	
entertained	by	the	blogger.	
As	 elsewhere	 in	 EDL‐related	 sites	 during	
May	 2011,	 the	 bin	 Laden	 theme	 is	 frequently	
raised	in	the	Casuals	United	Blog.	This	is	primarily	
achieved	 by	 re‐printing	 news	 stories	 lifted	 from	
other	publications.	As	such,	while	this	blog	is	more	




and	 the	Daily	Express	were	 also	 used	 during	May	
2011	to	reproduce	particular	news	stories,	helping	
to	 fuel	 an	anti‐Muslim	agenda.	Even	 international	
media	 is	 employed,	 such	 as	 in	 a	 piece	 titled	 ‘Bin	
Laden’s	 wank	 pit’.31	This	 entry	 reproduces	 an	
article	 from	Fox	News	on	the	alleged	predilection	
for	 pornography	 among	 bin	 Laden	 and	 Islamist	
militants	 generally	 (a	 medium	 often	 used	 to	
communicate	 concealed	 messages	 to	 fellow	




As	with	 other	 sites,	many	postings	 relate	
to	EDL	demos.	At	the	start	of	the	month,	an	entry	
positively	 describes	 a	 grass‐roots	 EDL	 protest	 in	
Weymouth	 gravitating	 around	 the	 ostensible	
threat	 posed	 by	 Islamist	 radicalisation	 in	 the	
area. 33 	This	 theme	 centred	 on	 accusations	 of	
‘grooming’	 of	 a	 local	 youth	 by	 Muslims	 Against	
Crusades.	 (Allegations	 that	 were	 denied	 by	 the	
family	 in	question,	but	 this	did	not	deter	 the	EDL	
supporter’s	 concerns.)34	In	 addition	 to	 reporting	
on	 such	 demos,	 other	 Casuals	 United	 postings	
relating	 to	 EDL	 events	 relay	 pragmatic	
information.	 For	 example,	 the	 EDL’s	 counter‐
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protests	 at	 US	 embassy	 in	 May	 2011	 were	
announced	 in	 advance	 by	 a	 posting	 inviting	
readers	 to	 ‘go	 pay	 our	 (dis)respect’.35	Supporters	
were	invited	to	meet	at	a	pub	close	to	the	Embassy	
ahead	of	the	MAC	protest.	Posts	after	this	London	
demonstration	 again	 highlighted	 alleged	 failings	
by	 the	police,	 although	here	distinctions	between	
junior,	 on	 the	 ground	 police,	 and	 more	 senior	
officers,	 were	 not	 made.	 Later	 in	 the	 month,	 a	
similar	 notice	 for	 a	 protest	 against	 Amnesty	
International	was	 also	 announced	 on	 the	 Casuals	
United	 blog,	 further	 revealing	 the	 links	 between	
such	 online	 activity	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 localised	
EDL	flash‐demos.		
As	 with	 other	 EDL	 blogs,	 a	 European	
perspective	 on	 the	 anti‐Muslim	 theme	 is	 also	
developed	by	the	Casuals	United	site.	One	posting	
detailed	 the	 state	 suppression	 of	 various	 anti‐
Muslim	 campaigners	 in	 Finland,	 such	 as	 Jussi	
Kristian	 Halla‐aho,	 who	 argued	 in	 2009	 that	
Muhammad	 was	 a	 paedophile	 –	 leading	 to	 a	
notorious	 prosecution	 in	 Finland. 36 	These	
international	anti‐Muslim	postings	help	to	connect	
the	 EDL’s	 anti‐Muslim	 campaign	 to	 a	 wider	
European	 perspective,	 allowing	 the	movement	 to	
align	 itself	 with	 other	 organisations	 with	 similar	
agendas;	 in	 this	 case,	 the	 far	 right	 True	 Finns	














a	 key	 EDL	 organiser	 was	 discussed	 here	 but	 not	
elsewhere.	Joel	Titus	was	given	a	criminally	sought	
Anti	 Social	 Behaviour	 Order	 (or	 ‘CRASBO’)	 for	
three	 years	on	6	May	2011,	 preventing	him	 from	
all	 EDL‐related	 activity	 following	 public	 order	
offences	 at	 a	 north	 London	 pub	 in	 December	
2010.38	This	 topic	 was	 raised	 in	 several	 articles	
during	 May	 2011,	 and	 advanced	 the	 familiar	










UAF	 protestors	 to	 escape	 arrest	 and	 prosecution.	
The	 sentencing	 of	 Joel	 Titus	 also	 allowed	 for	 the	
reposted	opinion	blog	by	Patrick	Hayes,	writer	for	
Spiked	 Magazine,	 again	 condemning	 such	
restrictions	on	freedom	to	protest.39		
Many	 postings	 later	 in	 the	 month	 again	
developed	the	backstory	to	the	Blackpool	protest.	
Here,	 as	 well	 as	 anti‐Muslim	 rhetoric,	
merchandising	is	also	promoted,	such	as	Charlene	
Downes	 memorial	 badges	 available	 at	 50	 pence	
per	 badge. 40 	Also,	 developing	 the	 connection	
between	Muslims	and	paedophilia,	there	are	many	
re‐postings	 of	 press	 stories	 that	 suggested	
Muslims	in	Blackpool	and	elsewhere	groom	young	




counter‐demonstrations	 bring	 violence	 to	
otherwise	 peaceful	 gatherings.	 However,	 the	
posting	 related	 to	 the	 Blackpool	 demonstration	
titled	‘Excellent,	they	took	the	bait	–	UAF	will	now	
demo	in	solidarity	with	child	killers/groomers	–	at	
least	 they	 are	 open	 with	 their	 views	 now’42	
suggests	a	different	attitude	among	the	EDL	grass	
roots:	 protestors	 actively	 seek	 to	 provoke	
confrontation	 and	 develop	 situations	 for	 conflict.	
Indeed,	 the	 actions	 of	 anti‐fascist	 protestors	 are	
regularly	discussed,	as	is	the	radical	left	in	general.	
According	 to	 the	 Casuals	 United	 blog,	 active	
campaigning	 against	 such	 targets	 can	 be	 deemed	
legitimate.	This	point	is	most	clearly	revealed	in	a	
reposting	 of	 an	 English	 Defence	 League	 Extra	
entry	that	endorses	an	attack	on	a	Merseyside	left‐
wing	bookshop.43	Such	re‐postings	also	highlight	a	
synergy	 between	 the	 blog	 sites	 under	 analysis	
here,	 allowing	 similar	 messages	 to	 be	 developed	
for	 different	 audiences	 within	 the	 social	
movement.		
At	the	end	of	the	month	another	localised	
EDL	 demo	 in	 Shotton,	 Deeside	 is	 highlighted	 on	
the	 Casuals	 United	 blog.44	The	 main	 aim	 of	 this	
demonstration	 was	 to	 campaign	 against	 the	
building	 of	 an	 Islamic	 cultural	 centre	 on	 the	
derelict	 site	 of	 an	 old	 social	 club.	 Postings	 to	
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information,	 comments	 on	 critical	 reports	 from	
the	 local	 press,	 and	 photos	 related	 to	 the	
demonstration.	Entries	also	noted	the	inclusion	of	
EDL	 splinter	 group,	 the	 Infidels,	 at	 this	 demo.	
Indeed,	 the	 Casuals	 United	 blog	 appears	 broadly	
hospitable	 to	 these	 2011	 offshoots.	 The	 final	
postings	 for	 the	 month	 begin	 to	 give	 details	 of	
another	 unofficial	 EDL	 demo,	 this	 time	 in	
Dewsbury,	again	showing	the	connection	between	
the	 Casuals	 United	 post	 and	 the	 organisation	 of	
unofficial	demonstrations.45		
In	 comparison	 with	 the	 English	 Defence	
League	 News	 and	 English	 Defence	 League	 Extra,	
then,	 the	 Casuals	 United	 blog	 is	more	 of	 a	 grass‐
roots	 site.	 Though	 it	 offers	 little	 in	 the	 way	 of	
detailed	 discussion,	 it	 clearly	 structures	 its	
messages	 around	 the	 same	 anti‐Muslim,	 ultra‐
patriotic	 views	 found	 elsewhere	 within	 the	 EDL.	
Like	 Venn	 diagrams,	 these	 blogs	 overlap,	 and	
centre	 on	 the	 role	 of	 anti‐Muslim	 sentiment	
common	to	all	 three	blog	sites.	Moreover,	as	 they	
by	 developing	 this	 anti‐Muslim	 ideology	 at	 such	






As	 is	 becoming	 apparent,	 the	 wider	 EDL	 social	
movement	 develops	 many	 shades	 of	 online	
discourse.	We	saw	in	the	previous	chapter	that	 in	
2011	the	social	movement	has	developed	splinter	
organisations:	 the	 North	 East	 and	 North	 West	
Infidels.	 These	 groupings	 have	 also	 developed	
their	own	web	spaces,	largely	on	Facebook.	These	
offshoots	of	 the	EDL	operate	within	a	much	more	




Facebook	 pages,	 also	 linked	 to	 the	 breakaway	
















The	 more	 guarded	 language	 found	 elsewhere	
within	 the	EDL	online	 is	not	developed	here,	 and	
so	a	much	more	openly	racist	and	violent	tenor	is	
immediately	 detectible.	 While	 the	 mainstream	
currents	of	the	EDL	try	to	take	the	British	far	right	
agenda	 away	 from	 an	 open	 embrace	 of	 violence	
and	 a	 neo‐Nazi	 heritage,	 the	 Infidels	 groups	 are	
much	 happier	 to	 associate	 themselves	 with	 this	
agenda,	even	on	open	access	new	media	sites	such	
as	Facebook.		
To	 take	 some	 example	 of	 this	 openly	









‐	 still	 right	wing	not	 silent	and	very	violent	and	a	 cunt	
\o/	\o/	
	
Moreover,	 showing	 how	 the	 culture	 of	 this	
extremist	 splinter	 grouping	 can	 turn	 to	 the	
terroristic	 neo‐Nazism	 found	 in	 America	 for	
inspiration,	 we	 find	 references	 to	 David	 Lane	
notorious	‘14	Words’	slogan	on	this	Facebook	wall	
too.	 For	 example,	 one	 posting	 from	 June	 2011	
explicitly	aligns	the	North	West	Infidels	movement	
with	 Lane’s	 blend	 of	 neo‐Nazism	 and	 terrorist	
violence:	
	
"WE	MUST	 SECURE	 THE	 EXISTENCE	 OF	 OUR	 PEOPLE	
AND	 A	 FUTURE	 FOR	 WHITE	 CHILDREN."	 The	 Final	
Address	of	David	Lane	to	the	Jury	From	the	era	of	Plato,	
Socrates,	and	Cato	to	that	of	DaVinci	and	Michelangelo,	




David	 Lane’s	 final	 statement	 in	 court.47	Lane’s	
statement	 to	 the	 jury	narrates	 the	 ‘the	deliberate	
destruction	of	our	very	racial	existence’,	and	so	he	
offers	 the	 brand	 of	 brazen	 neo‐Nazism	 that	 is	
carefully	 eschewed	 by	 the	 EDL’s	 ‘new	 far	 right’	
leadership.	 Beyond	 examples	 endorsing	 violence	
and	 racial	 hatred,	 further	 evidence	of	 a	 reversion	
to	 the	 ‘old’,	 neo‐fascist	 far	 right	 is	 evident	 across	
the	 Infidels	 sites.	 Indicators	 of	 a	 more	 extreme	
milieu	 also	 include	 uploaded	 YouTube	 videos	 of	
key	 far‐right	 musicians,	 like	 the	 Swedish	
nationalist	 singer,	 Saga	 (a	 figure	 endorsed	 by	
Anders	Behring	Breivik),	and	the	original	Blood	&	
Honour,	 neo‐Nazi	 group,	 Skrewdriver.	 The	 latter	
were	central	 to	the	 formation	of	 the	 international	
                                                            
47	www.churchoftrueisrael.com/the‐order/lanefinal.html.	
The EDL: Britain’s Far Right Social Movement 
 
  42
network	 promoting	 neo‐Nazi	 ideas	 through	
(usually)	punk	music.		
Finally,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 stress	 that	 the	
mainstream	 EDL	 comes	 under	 much	 criticism	
here.	Posts	mock	the	pro‐Israeli	stance	of	the	EDL,	
for	 instance,	 as	 well	 as	 its	 pro‐LGTB	 position.	
Furthermore,	 the	central	 leadership	of	 the	EDL	 is	
represented	 as	 corrupt.	 Yaxley‐Lennon	 is	
frequently	 insulted,	 sometimes	 including	 ad	
hominem	 attacks.	 Although	 composed	 of	 splinter	
groups	that	still	contributed	significant	support	to	
the	wider	EDL	social	movement,	these	breakaway	






The	 Infidel’s	 clear	 reversion	 to	 a	 more	 openly	
extreme	 right‐wing	 rhetoric,	 begs	 the	question	of	
the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 wider	 extreme	 right‐wing	
views	the	EDL.	Needless	to	say,	more	traditionally	
anti‐Semitic	and	neo‐Nazi	organisations	have	also	
developed	 their	 own	 perspectives	 via	 online	
spaces.	 In	 its	 early	 days,	 the	movement	 attracted	
the	support	of	now	defunct	organisations	such	as	
the	 Aryan	 Strike	 Force.	 Typifying	 the	 attitude	 of	
the	extreme	right‐wingers	towards	the	EDL	at	this	
time,	 the	 National	 Front’s	 website	 somewhat	
presciently	 adopted	 the	 following	 position	
towards	the	movement	in	2009:		
	
They	 are	 obviously	 groups	 who	 need	 to	 be	 educated	







Yet	 perhaps	 tellingly,	 since	 such	 postings	 were	
originally	 made,	 Searchlight	 has	 reported	
emergent	 links	 between	 some	 Infidel	 splinter	
groups	 that	 are	 taking	 a	 turn	 towards	 neo‐Nazi	
themes,	and	the	National	Front.49	
It	 is	 also	 instructive	 to	 see	 the	 way	 in	
which	the	EDL	is	discussed	on	the	leading	extreme	
right‐wing	 online	 hub,	 Stormfront.org.	 The	
diversity	 of	 postings	 referring	 to	 the	 EDL	 here	
highlights	the	range	of	potential	positions	open	to	









Semitic,	 conspiratorial	 worldview.	 Similarly,	 for	
some	on	such	online	message	boards	the	EDL	is	to	
be	 rejected	 because	 they	 are	 seen	 as	 a	 state	
sponsored	 organisation,	 or	 are	 simply	 allowed	 to	
exist	 at	 the	 behest	 of	 the	 state	 to	 act	 as	 a	 sort	 of	
‘pressure	 valve’	 for	 the	 far	 right.	 There	 is	 also	
some	strong	criticism	of	 the	 leadership,	 including	
comments	 on	 Steven	 Yaxley‐Lennon’s	 supposed	
racial	 impurity,	 while	 elsewhere	 commentary	





the	 EDL’s	 pro‐Jewish	 stance.	 For	 some,	 ‘useful	
idiots’	could	summarise	why	the	EDL	is	significant	
to	the	British	far	right	politics.	There	are	a	number	
of	 ways	 this	 is	 spun.	 Echoing	 with	 the	 National	
Front’s	 position,	 the	 EDL’s	 street	 protests	 offer	
opportunities	 to	 mobilise	 a	 wider	 support	 base.	
These	contacts	can	then	be	 ‘poached’	by	other	 far	
right	 organisations.	 Indeed,	 one	 post	 even	 likens	
this	technique	to	Christian	missionary	work.	Some	
posts	 further	 suggest	 that,	 in	 time,	 the	EDL	could	
to	 embrace	 a	more	 traditional	 far	 right	 ideology.	
For	other,	critical	Stormfront.org	contributors,	the	
EDL	 usefully	 occupies	 the	 time	 and	 focus	 of	 the	
police	 and	 anti‐fascist	 campaigners,	 who	
correspondingly	neglect	more	potent	 forms	of	 far	
right	extremism.		
Finally,	 Stormfront.org	 discussions	 offer	
more	 fulsome	 support	 too,	 especially	 regarding	
the	 EDL’s	 anti‐Muslim	 agenda.	 These	 types	 of	
online	 messages	 include	 praise	 for	 offering	
opportunities	 to	engage	 in	 street	violence	against	
Muslims,	 and	 for	 offering	 a	 general	 fillip	 to	 the	




Muslim	 agenda	 while	 creating	 situations	 for	
engaging	 in	 street	 politics	 (both	 non‐violent	 and	
violent),	 are	 prime	 motives	 for	 supporting	 the	
EDL.		
Online	 responses	 on	 extreme	 right‐wing	
websites	 like	Stormfront.org	 range	 from	rejection	
to	active	support,	especially	at	a	grass‐roots	level.	
The	 development	 of	 breakaway	 factions	 more	
hospitable	 to	 right‐wing	 extremism	 also	 suggests	
that,	as	the	social	movement	progresses,	it	is	likely	
to	continue	creating	host	environments	capable	of	











This	 chapter	 has	 surveyed	 the	 diversity	 of	 EDL	
online	media,	and	from	this	it	is	possible	to	draw	a	
number	 of	 conclusions.	 Firstly,	 new	 media	
networking	 sites	have	become	a	 vital	 tool	 for	 the	
EDL.	Services	such	as	Facebook	and	localised	blogs	
allow	 complex	 ties	 between	 the	 local	 and	 the	
national	to	develop,	key	for	the	success	of	a	social	
movement.		
Secondly,	 sites	 directly	 associated	 with	
the	 Social	 Movement	 Organisation,	 like	 the	 main	
EDL	 Facebook	 page,	 tend	 to	 maintain	 a	 strong	
‘party	 line’.	 This	 centres	 upon	 anti‐Muslim,	 ‘new	
far	 right’	 rhetoric	 and	 views,	 championing	 local	
issues,	and	promoting	national	campaigns	warning	
of	 a	 looming	 threat	 of	 Islamisation	 by	 a	minority	
Muslim	 population.	 Thirdly,	 websites	 and	 blogs	
that	are	more	indirectly	associated	with	the	Social	
Movement	 Organisation	 send	 out	 a	more	 diverse	
set	of	messages.	The	English	Defence	League	Extra	
blog	takes	this	in	one	direction,	advancing	a	more	
nuanced	 view	 of	 the	 threat	 allegedly	 posed	 by	
Muslims	 in	 Britain,	 for	 example	 positing	 a	
sustained	 conspiracy	 by	 both	 ‘moderate’	 and	
‘extreme’	Muslims.	Meanwhile,	 the	Casuals	United	
blog	 is	 far	 less	 sophisticated,	 though	 seemingly	
effective	 at	 tapping	 into	 the	 movement’s	 central	
concerns	 at	 the	 grass‐roots	 level.	 This	 forum	




at	 the	 most	 extreme	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum,	
breakaway	 groups	 like	 the	North	 East	 and	North	
West	 Infidels	promote	an	openly	violent,	extreme	
right‐wing	set	of	messages.	
Fourthly,	 there	 is	 evidence	 of	 a	 clear	
relationship	 between	 new	 media	 and	 offline	
activity.	 Crucially,	 the	 new	media	 advertises	 EDL	
events	by	giving	details	of	times	and	places,	allows	
supporters	to	network	and	disseminate	ideas,	and	
even	 helps	 develop	 a	mood	 tailored	 to	 particular	
demonstration,	such	as	prompting	analysis	linking	
Islam	 to	 paedophilia	 ahead	 of	 the	 protest	 in	
Blackpool	 in	 May	 2011.	 More	 generally,	 the	 new	
media	 also	 helps	 to	 create	 an	 alternate,	 direct	
access	culture	promoting	the	EDL’s	‘new	far	right’	
views	 amongst	 grass‐roots	 followers.	 Finally,	 by	
examining	 its	 own	 new	 media	 blog	 sites	 and	
postings,	 the	 more	 traditional	 far	 right	
organisations	 in	 Britain	 have	 a	mixed	 reaction	 to	
the	 movement.	 For	 some,	 the	 EDL	 fights	 an	
incompatible	 campaign	 and	 fails	 to	 identify	 a	
Jewish	 conspiracy.	 Yet	 for	 others,	 it	 is	 seen	 as	 a	
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2009.	 As	 detailed	 elsewhere,	 the	 catalyst	 for	 its	
creation	 was	 abuse	 by	 small	 group	 of	 Islamists	
protesting	at	the	homecoming	parade	of	the	Royal	
Anglian	 Regiment	 on	 10	March	 2009	 in	 Luton.	 It	
brought	 together	 a	 number	 of	 football	 hooligan	
firms	 and	 anti‐jihadist	 groups.	 Therefore,	 the	
EDL’s	 origins	 are	 not	 typical	 of	 established	 or	
previous	 far	 right	 groups	 such	 as	 the	 National	
Front	 (NF)	 or	 British	 National	 Party	 (BNP).	 This	
has	 taken	 many	 forms,	 including	 the	 use	 of	
placards	 explicitly	 rejecting	 the	 BNP	 and	 racism,	
the	 carrying	 of	 the	 Israeli	 flag	 as	 a	 token	 of	 its	
disavowal	 of	 anti‐Semitism,	 and	 the	 televised	
burning	of	a	swastika	flag	on	the	BBC’s	Newsnight	
programme.	 The	 EDL	 continued	 this	 stance	 from	
its	forerunner,	the	United	Peoples	of	Luton	(UPL).	
For	 example,	 one	 placard	 at	 the	 UPL’s	
demonstration	 on	 13	 April	 2009	 read	 ‘NF	 Go	 To	
Hell’.	 Nor	 is	 this	 antagonism	 one	 sided.	 The	 BNP	
has	 proscribed	 the	 EDL,	which	means	 that	 it	 is	 a	
disciplinary	offence	for	BNP	members	to	attend	an	
EDL	meeting,	or	to	encourage	others	to	do	so.		
How	 accurate	 are	 these	 claims	 that	 EDL	
leaders	 and	 followers	 are	 discrete	 from	 other	 far	
right	movements?	On	the	surface,	the	EDL	may	fit	
neatly	 into	 one	 of	 the	 four	 distinct	 types	 of	
contemporary	 right‐wing	extremism	 identified	by	
Matthew	 Goodwin,	 ‘a	 grassroots	 social	
movement’. 1 	It	 claims	 to	 have	 an	 inclusive	
membership	rather	than	an	ethnically	defined	one,	
and	mobilises	mass	 support	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 single	
issue	 instead	 of	 engaging	 in	 the	 democratic	
process	 and	 adopting	 the	 behaviour	 of	 a	 political	
party.	 From	 its	 beginning,	 however,	 the	 EDL	 has	
undeniably	 attracted	 the	 attention	 of	 more	
traditional	 far	 right	 activists.	 The	 presence	 of	







has	 identified.	This	 fact	poses	problems	 for	 those	
seeking	to	understand	the	EDL’s	current	position,	
and	its	likely	trajectory	(discussed	in	depth	in	the	
following	 chapter).	 This	 chapter	 addresses	 the	
EDL’s	 connections	 with	 Britain’s	 wider	 far	 right	
culture	by	examining	the	profiles	and	behaviour	of	
some	of	 the	most	prominent	 individuals	 that	 lead	
and	 support	 it,	 and	 considers	what	 this	means	 in	
terms	of	how	we	view	the	EDL.		
Beforehand,	 however,	 we	 require	 a	 clear	
understanding	of	 the	term	 ‘support’.	The	EDL	has	
no	 official	 dues‐paying	 membership,	 unlike	 the	
BNP.	 Instead,	as	 far	 as	we	know,	 the	EDL	derives	
its	funds	from	the	donations	of	one	individual	and	
the	 revenue	 received	 via	 its	 internet	
merchandising.	 These	 considerations	 raise	 the	
obvious	 problem	 of	 how	 to	 identify	 someone	 as	
being	 a	 supporter	 of	 the	 EDL,	 other	 than	 those	
expressly	 identified	 with	 it.	 In	 one	 sense,	 the	
answer	 is	 relatively	 simple:	 anyone	 sympathising	
with	 the	 EDL,	 via	word	 or	 deed,	 self‐identifies	 as	
an	EDL	supporter.	Such	a	definition	is	permissible	
so	 long	 as	 the	 EDL	 eschews	 an	 institutional	
membership.	 However,	 this	 definition	 is	 too	
embracing	 as	 it	 potentially	 includes	 the	 idly	
curious	and	ignorant,	neither	of	which	are	likely	to	
become	activists	and	thus	play	a	significant	role	in	
determining	 the	 nature	 of	 an	 organisation.	
Therefore,	 a	 tighter	 parameter	 is	 required	 that	
explicitly	identifies	an	individual	as	a	supporter	of	
the	 EDL	 and/or	 its	 aims.	 In	 this	 respect,	 an	
individual’s	 known,	 or	 reasonably	 suspected,	
beliefs	add	weight	to	their	identification	as	an	EDL	
supporter.	 Hence,	 we	 can	 confidently	 identify	 an	
EDL	 supporter	 as	 someone	 who	 attends	 an	 EDL	
function	 and	 who	 also	 possess	 similarly	 anti‐
Islamic	 views,	 regardless	 of	 the	 varying	 nuances	
within	 such	 views,	 unless	 there	 is	 a	 compelling	






Starting	 with	 the	 key	 figure	Alan	 Lake,	 here	 we	




fascist.	 There	 is	 no	 evidence	 that	 race	 or	 anti‐
Semitism	 is	 prominent	 in	 Lake’s	 views.	 Nor	 is	
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British	 ‘golden	 age’,	 a	 characteristic	 shared	 by	
Mussolini’s	Fascists,	Hitler’s	Nazis	and	many	neo‐
Nazi	 groups.	He	 is	 connected	 to	a	European	 ‘new	
far	 right’	 network,	 including	 figures	 such	 as	 Kent	
Ekeroth	 of	 the	 Swedish	 Democrats.	 Lake’s	
4Freedoms.ning.com	 website	 contains	 a	 liberal‐
sounding	 mission	 statement	 that	 espouses	
freedom	 of	 speech,	 election	 and	 religion,	 and	
denounces	 discrimination.3		 Moreover,	 it	 appears	
that	Lake	donated	to	the	EDL	on	the	condition	that	
it	 distanced	 itself	 from	 the	 BNP.4	Indeed,	 it	 is	
possible	 that	 Lake	 has	 been	 closer	 to	 the	 United	
Kingdom	 Independence	 Party	 (UKIP).	 In	 May	
2010,	 Lake	 introduced	 UKIP’s	 prospective	
parliamentary	 candidate	 Magnus	 Nielsen	 to	 a	
Guardian	 reporter	 as	 a	 man	 ‘who	 has	 agreed	 to	
speak	at	forthcoming	EDL	rallies’,	and	a	few	weeks	
later	 told	 the	same	 reporter	 that	he	was	 focusing	
on	‘the	Ukip	thing’.5	It	would	seem,	therefore,	that	
Lake	 is	 closer	 to	 the	 ‘libertarian’	 right,	 and	 may	
even	wish	to	create	a	version	of	the	American	Tea	
Party	movement.6	
This	 image	 of	 Lake,	 however,	 requires	 a	
few	caveats.	First,	Lake	advocates	street	politics,	in	
which	 demonstrators	 use	 intimidation	 and	
violence	 to	 achieve	 their	 objectives.	 He	 has	
claimed	 that	 ‘The	EDL	has	a	 lot	of	 support	and	 is	
growing	quickly	and	crucially	what	 it	has	done	 is	
deliver	an	activist	on	the	streets	…	if	they	continue	
to	 be	 suppressed	 it	 will	 turn	 nasty	 …	 if	 we	 are	
going	 to	have	 a	mess	 that	 is	 so	much	grist	 to	 the	
mill.’ 7 	Nor	 is	 this	 an	 isolated	 incident.	 In	 a	
4Freedoms	 blog,	 Lake	 spoke	 about	 the	 execution	
of	 individuals	 trying	 to	 escape	 from	 ‘Islamic	
enclaves’.	 This	 comment	 suggests	 that	 Lake	
intends	 a	 violent	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 he	
identifies.	Moreover,	 the	 title	of	 the	blog’s	 thread,	
‘Treatment	 of	 Traitors,	 Leftist	 and	 Liberal	
Sympathisers	 and	 Appeasers	 of	 Islamofascism’,8	
indicates	 that	 Lake	would	not	 limit	 such	 violence	
to	Islamists.	Secondly,	therefore,	Lake’s	comments	
and	 the	 non‐Islamic	 people	 he	 identified	 in	 the	
blog	as	deserving	violent	measures,	questions	the	
narrow	 basis	 on	 which	 the	 EDL	 claims	 to	 be	 a	
counter‐jihad	movement	rather	than	a	fascist	one.	
Indeed,	 Lake’s	 comments	 regarding	 Muslims	 are	
similar	to	those	by	post‐Second	World	War	fascist	
groups	in	Britain	regarding	Black	immigrants.	Just	














be	 English	 because	 of	 their	 religion.	 Using	 (or	
abusing)	 liberal‐sounding	 notions	 of	 freedom	 as	
characteristics	 of	 English	 society,	 Lake	 portrays	
Muslims	 as	 antithetical	 to	 such	 ideas.	 For	 Lake,	
moderate	 Muslims	 do	 not	 exist	 because	 he	
believes	 they	 all	 accept	 the	 immutability	 of	 the	
word	 of	 Allah	 as	 revealed	 by	Mohammed.	 In	 this	
respect,	through	a	culturally	racist	agenda	the	EDL	
scapegoats	 Muslims	 today	 just	 as	 the	 National	
Front	did	to	blacks	in	the	1970s.	Thirdly,	the	EDL’s	
followers	 also	 appear	 unable,	 or	 unwilling,	 to	
adhere	 to	 a	 solely	 anti‐Islamist	 position,	 using	
racist	 terms	 such	 as	 ‘Paki’	 at	 their	
demonstrations.9	Fourthly,	 although	 Lake	 has	 not	
overtly	identified	a	mythical	golden	age,	he	clearly	
has	 one	 in	 mind;	 i.e.	 the	 one	 that	 existed	 before	
Muslim	 immigrants	 came	 to	 Britain	 and	 found	
woolly‐minded	 liberals	 to	 appease	 them.	 Finally,	
Lake	 may	 seek	 respectability	 within	 the	
‘libertarian’	 right,	 but	 his	 chances	 of	 succeeding	
are	minimal.	UKIP	considers	the	EDL	‘extremist’,10	
and	 so	 many	 groups	 already	 exist	 along	 the	
Conservative	 Party’s	 nebulous	 right‐wing	 border	










with	other	EDL	 leaders.	He	believed	 that	 the	EDL	
was	 making	 a	 mistake	 by	 organising	 a	
demonstration	 in	Birmingham	on	 8	August	 2009,	
as	this	date’s	particular	appeal	to	neo‐Nazis	would	
result	 in	 them	 attending,	 and	 thus	 become	
associated	 with	 the	 EDL.12	Ray	 left	 the	 EDL	 in	
March	2010,	rejecting	linking	the	EDL	with	the	far	
right.	 However,	 other	 events	 suggest	 that	 this	
picture	 of	 Ray	 as	 an	 anti‐BNP	 individual	 is	





















position	 before	 he	 founded	 the	 EDL	 resulted	 in	 a	
member	 of	 the	 American	 Tea	 Party	 movement	
ending	 her	 association	 with	 him.15	In	 summer	
2010,	Bedford	police	arrested	Ray	on	suspicion	of	
stirring	 up	 racial	 hatred,	 having	 already	 warned	
him	 about	 the	 content	 of	 his	 blog	 in	 January.16	
These	 facts	 leave	 open	 the	 possibility	 that	 Ray’s	
split	 with	 the	 EDL	 owes	 more	 to	 thwarted	




part	 is	 not	 a	 Nazi	 movement’,	 and	 that	 he	 knew	
that	 ‘the	 majority	 of	 the	 core	 leadership	 are	 not	
Nazis,	and	most	of	the	membership	are	not’.17	This	
suggests	 strongly	 that	 Ray	 believes	 some	 of	 the	
EDL	 leadership	 and	 its	 followers	 do	 have	 more	
traditional	neo‐Nazi	sympathies.	Ray’s	comment	is	
similar	 to	 that	 of	 the	 Secretary	 of	 the	 League	 of	
Empire	Loyalists	(LEL),	a	far‐right	group	operating	
in	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s,	 who	 countered	
accusations	 that	 it	 was	 fascist	 by	 claiming	 that	
there	 were	 ‘only’	 four	 former	 fascists	 within	 it.18	
The	 LEL	 proved	 the	 breeding	 ground	 for	
subsequent	 prominent	 far‐right	 activists	 such	 as	
John	Tyndall,	John	Bean	and	Colin	Jordan,	and	was	
a	 founding	 group	 of	 the	 NF	 alongside	 an	 earlier	
incarnation	of	the	BNP	and	the	Racial	Preservation	
Society.	 Historical	 precedent	 suggests	 the	 futility	
of	downplaying	far	right	connections,	but	it	is	even	
more	difficult	to	accept	Ray’s	attempted	limitation	
of	 far	 right	 influence	 at	 face	 value	 when	 we	
consider	 the	 antecedents	 of	 the	 EDL’s	 ‘core’	
leadership.	More	recently,	Ray	has	been	associated	
with	 Anders	 Behring	 Breivik,	 and	 admits	 that	




is	 an	 articulate	 individual	who	has	 presented	 the	
EDL’s	 position	 on	 television,	 both	 in	 Britain	 and	
abroad.20	However,	Robinson	is	not	the	reasonable	
individual	that	his	television	persona	suggests.	He	
is	 a	 former	member	 of	 the	 football	 hooligan	 firm	















and	 initially	 adopted	 the	 pseudonym	 ‘Tommy	
Robinson’	 from	 a	 leading	 figure	 within	 MIG.	
Although	 MIG	 violence	 originally	 focused	 mainly	
on	other	 football	 firms,	 they	also	 targeted	Asians;	
in	 November	 2001,	 the	 police	 were	 sufficiently	
concerned	 about	 MIG	 activity	 to	 warn	 Asian	
shopkeepers	and	householders	 in	Luton	to	expect	
possible	 attacks.21	The	 police’s	 warning	 occurred	
eight	 years	 earlier	 than	 the	 EDL’s	 formation,	
ostensibly	 in	 response	 to	 the	 actions	 of	 a	 small	
group	 of	 Islamists.	 This,	 of	 course,	 questions	
whether	 it	 is	 fear	 of	 Islamism	 at	 the	 root	 of	 the	
EDL’s	 formation,	 or	 merely	 the	 racism	 usually	
associated	with	other	far	right	groups.	Admittedly,	
it	 is	 possible	 that	 the	 Islamists’	 Luton	 protest	
awakened	the	likes	of	‘Robinson’	to	the	threat	that	
Islamism	 posed	 to	 a	 liberal‐democratic	 country	
such	as	Britain.	Yet	we	have	to	ask:	is	this	really	a	
believable	scenario?	The	Islamists’	protest	focused	
on	 British	 foreign	 policy,	 not	 pluralism	 or	
culturally	 liberal	 issues	 such	as	 civil	 partnerships	
and	 the	 right	 to	 drink	 alcohol.	 Making	 anti‐
Islamism	 even	 less	 credible	 as	 the	 sole	 driver	




reprisals	because	he	 lived	 in	 a	 ‘heavily	populated	
Islamic	 extremist	 town’. 22 	However,	 ‘Robinson’	
had	 another	 reason	 to	 disguise	 himself.	 When	
Searchlight	 identified	 ‘Robinson’	 as	 Stephen	
Yaxley‐Lennon,	they	revealed	that	in	2004	he	had	
joined	 the	 BNP	 under	 a	 family	membership.	 It	 is	
difficult	 to	 believe	 that	 Yaxley‐Lennon	 had	 no	
perception	 that	 racism	 is	 a	 permanent	 feature	 of	
the	 BNP’s	 ideology.	 Also	 noteworthy	 is	 his	
persistent	 association	 with	 violence.	 In	 2005,	 he	
received	a	12‐month	 jail	sentence	 for	occasioning	
actual	 bodily	 harm,	 and	 a	 concurrent	 3‐month	
sentence	for	intent	to	resist	arrest.23	His	girlfriend	
at	 the	 time,	 Jenna	 Vowles,	 whom	 the	 police	
cautioned	 for	cocaine	possession	at	 the	 time,	was	
also	 a	 BNP	 member.24	Increased	 age	 and	 the	
responsibility	of	 leading	a	political	movement	has	
not	 resulted	 in	 any	 significant	 change	 in	 Yaxley‐
Lennon’s	 actions.	 On	 Armistice	 Day	 2010,	 police	
charged	 him	 with	 assaulting	 one	 of	 their	










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In	 other	 words,	 Yaxley‐Lennon	 could	 be	
attempting	 a	 populist	 appeal,	 capturing	 the	




worth	 noting	 Yaxley‐Lennon	 was	 arrested	
following	the	EDL’s	Tower	Hamlets	demonstration	
in	September	2011.	He	has	since	claimed	to	be	on	
hunger	 strike,	 in	 protest	 against	 the	 state	
curtailing	his	right	to	lead	his	organisation.35	
Yaxley‐Lennon’s	 second	 in	 command	 is	
his	 cousin,	Kevin	Carroll.	 Following	Searchlight’s	
exposure	 of	 Robinson’s	 previous	 BNP	 activity,	
Carroll	 temporarily	 took	 charge	 of	 the	 EDL.	
However,	 this	 did	 nothing	 to	 improve	 the	 EDL’s	
image.	 Carroll	 revealed	 in	 a	 BBC	 documentary	
Young,	British	 and	Angry	 that	 he	 had	 signed	 the	
nomination	 papers	 for	 Robert	 Sherratt,	 a	 BNP	
candidate	 in	 Luton	 in	 2007,	 and	 that	 only	 his	
partner’s	 intervention	stopped	him	from	standing	
for	the	BNP	also.36	Sherratt	was	also	an	activist	in	
the	 neo‐Nazi	 November	 9th	 Society.37	As	 Steven	
Woodbridge	pointed	out,	the	November	9th	Society	
is	one	of	a	number	of	 ‘hard‐line	groups	that	draw	
their	 inspiration	 directly	 from	 National	 Socialist	
racial	 philosophy	 and	 fantasise	 about	 revolution	
and	 “race	war”.’38	This	 particular	 EDL	 connection	
clearly	does	not	limit	its	hatred	to	seventh‐century	
Islamism.	 More	 prosaic,	 if	 unsurprising,	 was	
Carroll’s	 conviction	 for	 violence	 in	 Luton	 just	
before	 taking	 over	 from	 Yaxley‐Lennon.39	Carroll	
is	 a	 little	 more	 circumspect	 than	 Yaxley‐Lennon.	
His	 speeches	 often	 contain	 a	 clear	 distinction	
between	Muslims	and	Islamists,40	and	he	is	clearly	
aware	of	 the	need	 to	distance	 the	EDL	 from	neo‐
Nazi	groups	that	attach	themselves	to	its	events.41	
Does	 this	 mean,	 therefore,	 that	 Carroll	 has	
repudiated	 his	 BNP‐past?	 So	 far,	 no	 such	 mea	
culpa	exists.	A	chance	to	do	so	occurred	when	EDL	
members	 used	 Carroll’s	 Facebook	 page	 to	
commend	 the	 desecration	 of	 Muslim	 graves	 in	




















having	 far	 right	 connections.	 According	 to	 Paul	
Ray,	Chris	Renton	stepped	up	 to	become	 ‘de	facto	
commander	of	the	EDL	as	a	whole’	when	the	police	
arrested	 Yaxley‐Lennon.43	Renton	 uses	 the	 alias	
‘John	Sheridan’	when	posting	on	various	blogs.	He	
attended	 the	UPL’s	 24	May	 Luton	demonstration,	
and	 subsequently	 has	 played	 an	 important	 role	
within	 the	 EDL	 by	 taking	 responsibility	 for	 its	
Facebook	 site.	 Renton,	 from	 Weston‐super‐Mare,	
is	 also	 a	 ‘Gold’	 member	 of	 the	 BNP	 (no.	 19732).	
This	connection	did	not	seem	to	bother	either	Ray	
or	 Robinson.	 Ray	 dismissed	 Renton’s	 political	
affiliation	 by	 stating	 that	 ‘people’s	 political	 views	
are	their	own	affair’,44	whilst	Robinson	denied	that	
anyone	 had	 sacked	 or	 pushed	 Renton	 out	 of	 the	
EDL.45	It	would	 seem,	 therefore,	 that	 EDL	 leaders	
are	at	best	ambivalent	about	Renton’s	connection	
with	 the	 BNP.	 The	 same	 ambivalent	 attitude	
appears	 to	 apply	 to	 other	 known	 members	 or	
associates	 of	 far	 right	 political	 parties	 too.	 Davy	
Cooling,	 for	 example,	 is	 a	 driver	 for	 his	 local	
council.	 He	 is	 also	 an	 administrator	 of	 the	 EDL’s	
Luton	 Facebook	 group,	 and	 a	 ‘key	 activist	 in	 the	
EDL	 Luton	 “division”.’46	Cooling	 came	 to	 the	 EDL	
via	 membership	 of	 the	 Luton‐based	 football	
hooligan	gang	MIG.	He	is	also	a	 ‘fully‐fledged	BNP	
member’,47	who	 remained	 active	 on	 their	website	
whilst	 performing	 this	 prominent	 EDL	 role.	 Sean	
Walsh	is	also	an	activist	for	the	EDL	in	Luton.	He	is	
a	 member	 of	 the	 BNP’s	 Bedfordshire	 Facebook	
group.48			
Other	 EDL	 leaders	 might	 not	 have	 such	
obvious	 connections	 to	 far	 right	 organisations	
such	 as	 the	 BNP.	 Nevertheless,	 they	 do	 share	
similar,	 unsettling	 characteristics.	Guramit	Singh	
has	 been	 an	 important	 figure	 for	 the	 EDL.	 As	 a	
Sikh,	 he	 lends	 credibility	 to	 the	 EDL	 claim	 to	 be	
non‐racist.	 The	 problem	 for	 the	 EDL,	 however,	 is	
that	 Singh	 apparently	 shares	 Yaxley‐Lennon’s	
inconsistent	 attitude	 towards	 Muslims.	 His	
Facebook	page	contains	racist	 jokes	and	offensive	
comments	 against	 all	 Muslims,	 which	 he	
frequently	 lumps	 together	 under	 the	 well‐known	
far	 right	 tag	 of	 ‘Pakis’;	 the	 approval	 of	 them	 by	
other	EDL	supporters	shows	that	he	is	not	alone	in	
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little	 further.	 In	a	YouTube	broadcast	 in	February	
2011,	Singh	did,	admittedly,	 say	 there	was	such	a	
thing	 as	 moderate	 Muslims,	 but	 then	 explained	
this	away	by	saying	that	‘there	is	no	such	thing	as	
moderate	 Islam	 …	 Islam	 is	 a	 militant,	 extreme	
ideology	 …	 Islam,	 evil	 to	 its	 core’.50	In	 Singh’s	
interpretation,	 based	 on	 his	 selective	 reading	 of	
the	Koran,	Muslims	 are	 bound	 to	 segregate	 from,	
and	 eventually	 attack,	 non‐Muslim	 societies.	
Moreover,	Singh	seems	intent	on	stirring	up	racial	
antagonism.	 In	 the	 same	 YouTube	 appearance,	
Singh	blames	Islam	for	the	civil	wars	in	the	Sudan	
and	 Nigeria,	 where	 ‘Islam	 has	 made	 the	 black	
brother	turn	against	his	black	brother;	that’s	how	
evil	 it	 is.’51	Singh’s	 comments	 resulted	 in	 a	 threat	
of	 excommunication	 from	 the	 global	 Sikh	
community.52	In	 the	 summer	 of	 2011,	 Singh	 has	
stepped	 down	 from	 his	 post	with	 the	 EDL,	 citing	
family	illness.53	
Jeff	Marsh	 is	 an	 organiser	 for	 both	 the	
EDL	and	its	sister	organisation	the	Welsh	Defence	
League	 (WDL).	 He	 is	 another	 individual	 with	 a	
background	in	football	violence,	and	prominent	in	
the	 Soul	 Crew	 Seasiders,	 a	 football	 firm	 that	
supports	 Cardiff	 City	 F.C.	 In	 1986,	 Marsh	 was	
convicted	 for	 a	 football‐related	 assault	 in	Halifax,	
and	 in	 1989	 received	 a	 two‐year	 prison	 sentence	
for	stabbing	two	Manchester	United	supporters	in	
Cardiff.54 	In	 August	 2009,	 Marsh	 helped	 form	
Casuals	United,	an	amalgamation	of	football	firms,	
many	containing	BNP	and	NF	supporters,	who	had	
united	 to	 support	 the	 EDL.	 Casuals	 United	
announced	their	arrival	by	attacking	young	Asians	
in	 Birmingham	 city	 centre.55	In	 March	 2010,	 the	
44‐year	 old	 Marsh	 proved	 that	 advancing	 years	
does	 not	 equate	 with	 increasing	 maturity	 by	
receiving	 a	 four‐month	 suspended	 jail	 sentence,	
150	hours	community	service,	and	a	five‐year	ban	
from	 all	 football	 grounds	 for	 possession	 of	 a	
knuckle‐duster	during	an	affray	in	Cardiff.56	Marsh	
clearly	 glorifies	 violence,	 which	 is	 obvious	 in	 the	
two	 books	 that	 he	 has	 written	 providing	 an	
account	 of	 his	 time	 as	 a	 football	 hooligan.57	It	 is	
also	 obvious	 that	 these	 books	 contain	 racist	















inclusiveness.58 	Nevertheless,	 like	 the	 EDL	 the	
WDL	 claimed	 to	 be	 non‐racist.	 However,	 there	 is	
evidence	 that	 shows	 this	 is	 incorrect.	 In	 March	
2010,	 the	BBC	published	 results	 of	 its	 infiltration	
of	the	WDL,	as	discussed	elsewhere	in	this	report.	
Its	 content	 led	 Judge	Mark	 Powell	 QC	 to	 state	 of	
the	comments	expressed	by	WDL	supporters:	 ‘It's	
mindless,	 it's	racist,	 the	purpose	of	what	 they	are	
doing	is	to	inflame	racial	hatred.	I	think	from	what	
you	have	shown	me	it	is	criminal	behaviour	and	no	
doubt	 something	 that	 the	 police	 would	 want	 to	
look	at.’59	It	appears,	therefore,	 that	the	WDL	that	
Marsh	has	led	also	engages	in	doublespeak.	Also	of	
interest	 is	 Marsh’s	 role	 as	 administrator	 of	 the	
Norwegian	 Defence	 League	 (NDL),	 one	 of	 whose	
supporters	was	Anders	Breivik.60	
Joel	Titus	is	another	who	came	to	the	EDL	
through	 football	 violence.	 He	 is	 the	 leader	 of	 the	
EDL’s	 youth	 organisation.	 Being	 of	 mixed	 race,	
Titus	also	 fulfils	 the	role	played	by	Guramit	Singh	
of	 poster‐boy	 for	 EDL	 inclusivity.	 He	 became	
involved	 with	 the	 EDL	 through	 Marsh’s	 Casuals	







attacking	 fellow	 football	 hooligans.	 In	 May	 2011,	
Uxbridge	 Magistrates	 gave	 Titus	 an	 ASBO	 that	
barred	 him	 from	 entering	 or	 loitering	 outside	
mosques	 or	 Islamic	 prayer	 rooms,	 attending	 any	
EDL	 demonstration,	 or	 visiting	 an	 area	 of	
Whitechapel	for	three	years.63		
Others	who	fulfil,	or	have	fulfilled,	the	role	
of	 poster	 boy	 or	 girl	 are	 Liam	 Wood,	 Leisha	
Brookes	 and	 Roberta	 Moore,	 leaders	




work	 of	 Islamic	 terrorists. 64 	His	 opponents	
describe	 him	 as	 a	 drug	 dealer	 and	 football	
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deny	 his	 drugs	 involvement	 because	 in	 February	
2011	 at	 Preston	 Crown	 Court	 Judge	 Christopher	
Cornwall	gave	him	a	six‐month	deferred	sentence	
for	 possession	 of	 cocaine	with	 intent	 to	 supply.67	
Leisha	Brookes	seems	to	have	played	a	prominent	
role	 in	 organising	 the	 EDL’s	 September	 2009	
Birmingham	 demonstration,	 where	 Police	
confiscated	 from	 her	 a	 knuckleduster,	 and	 has	
contacts	 with	 the	 criminal	 underworld. 68 	Her	
Myspace	 website	 links	 her	 with	 known	 football	
hooligan	Jason	Marriner,69	whom	Donal	McIntyre	
revealed	 as	 a	 leading	 figure	 in	 the	 Chelsea	
Headhunters	 football	 firm. 70 	In	 March	 2011,	
Marriner	received	a	two‐year	prison	sentence	and	




make	un‐contextualised	 attacks	on	 Islam,	 such	as	
those	made	 at	 the	 EDL’s	 Dudley	 rally	 on	 17	 July	
2010,	 in	 which	 she	 claimed,	 inter	 alia,	 that	 ‘The	
Koran	condones	rape’.72	Moore	failed	to	make	any	
textual	 comparison	 with	 similar	 passages	 in	 the	
scripture	 of	 the	 other	 Abrahamic	 faiths.	 It	 did	
seem	that	Moore	had	gone	too	far	when	she	allied	
the	 Jewish	 Division	 of	 the	 EDL	 with	 the	 Jewish	
Task	 Force,	 a	 USA‐based	 organisation	 run	 by	
convicted	 bomber	 Victor	 Vancier. 73 	However,	
within	 a	 few	 weeks	 of	 issuing	 a	 threat	 to	
disassociate	 itself	 from	 the	 Jewish	 Division,	 the	
EDL	 leadership	 restored	 normal	 relations	 after	 a	
meeting	 with	 Moore.74	It	 would	 seem,	 therefore,	
that	 anti‐Muslim	 terrorism	 is	 acceptable,	 another	
example	of	EDL	double‐speak.	In	June	2011,	Moore	
quit	the	EDL,	ostensibly	for	another	 job.	Although	
she	 maintained	 her	 support	 for	 the	 EDL	
leadership,	Moore	warned	that	Nazis	had	hijacked	
the	 movement	 and	 would	 destroy	 it	 unless	 the	
leadership	 dealt	 with	 it. 75 	Considering	 the	
antecedents	of	some	EDL	leaders,	who	is	going	to	
deal	with	whom?	
Another	 person	 who	 has	 quit	 is	 John	




















Humberside	 Regional	 Organiser	 for	 the	 EDL,76	
with	the	unusual	occupation	of	llama	farmer.	On	5	
May	 2010,	 Shaw	 appeared	 before	 Dudley	
magistrates	 on	 burglary	 and	 inciting	 religious	
hatred	charges,77	although	the	Crown	Prosecution	





of	 financial	 mismanagement.	 The	 EDL	 leadership	
has	 retaliated	 with	 YouTube	 productions	
lampooning	Shaw	as	a	‘Muppet’.	In	a	move	typical	
of	 the	 fissiparous	nature	of	 extremist	movements	
as	discussed	elsewhere,	Shaw	is	now	prominent	in	
the	Infidels	splinter	faction	of	the	EDL.		
For	 one	EDL	 leader,	 however,	 violence	 is	
not	the	limit	of	their	criminality.	Richard	Price	 is	
the	 EDL’s	 West	 Midlands	 co‐ordinator.	 In	
December	 2010,	 Judge	 Lord	 Parmoor	 sentenced	
41‐year	old	Price	of	Quinton	in	Birmingham	to	12‐	
weeks	imprisonment	and	gave	him	a	10‐year	Anti‐
Social	 Behaviour	 Order	 (ASBO)	 for	 his	 role	 in	
violence	during	the	EDL’s	1	May	demonstration	in	
Aylesbury.79	Alongside	 Price	 in	 court	 was	 fellow‐
EDL	supporter	Collum	Keyes,	a	23‐year	old	 from	
Birmingham	who	also	received	a	10‐year	ASBO	as	
well	 as	 a	 fine.80	Aylesbury	 magistrates	 bailed	 a	
third	EDL	supporter	at	the	demonstration,	43‐year	
old	 Daryl	 Hobson	 of	 Worthing,	 to	 appear	 at	
Aylesbury	 Magistrates	 Court	 in	 November.81	Yet,	
the	 tale	 does	 not	 end	 there.	 The	 EDL,	 which	
described	Price	as	a	‘political	prisoner’,	launched	a	
campaign	 to	 free	 him,	 urging	 its	 supporters	 to	
write	to	the	Prime	Minister	and	MPs	to	‘win	justice	
for	 Richard	 Price,	 EDL’.82	The	 EDL	 seem	 to	 have	
failed	 to	 spot	 that	after	Price’s	 arrest	 for	an	EDL‐
related	 incident	 in	 2009,	 that	 the	 police	 had	
discovered	cocaine	and	crack	cocaine	at	his	house,	
and	 indecent	 images	of	children	on	his	computer,	
for	 which	 he	 received	 a	 three‐year	 community	
supervision	order	and	a	place	on	the	sex	offenders	
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conviction	 for	 paedophilia	 at	 Birmingham	 Crown	
Court	 six‐months	 before	 becoming	 the	 EDL’s	
‘political	prisoner’,	this	questions	whether	the	EDL	
understand	who	its	supporters	are.		
Responsible	 for	 presenting	 the	 EDL	 in	 a	
reasonable	 light	 is	 Trevor	 Kelway.	 He	 told	
Guardian	 reporters	 that	he	had	 taken	over	public	
relations	because	‘the	previous	mouthpiece	for	the	
organisation	 was	 “Islamophobic”’.	84	Kelway	 does	
appear	a	reasonable	figure	to	 interviewers,	giving	
coherent	 answers	 that,	 unlike	 other	 EDL	 leaders,	
do	 not	 depart	 from	 the	 anti‐Islamist,	 inclusive	
line.85	Others,	 however,	 see	 Kelway	 as	 leading	 ‘a	
major	 propaganda	 assault	 on	 online	 newspaper	
forums,	 posting	 reams	 of	 lies,	 contortions	 and	
misinformation	 centred	 around	 the	 rights	 of	 free	
speech,	 while	 playing	 down	 the	 obvious	
unpleasant	 facts	 about	 the	 organisation.’86	Who,	
then,	is	the	real	Trevor	Kelway?	His	Facebook	page	
shows	 that	 Kelway	 has	 some	 unsavoury		
connections.	 These	 include	 Frank	 Atack,	 who	
stood	for	the	BNP	in	Dewsbury	in	2007	and	has	a	
penchant	 for	 SS	 insignia;	 BNP	 supporter	 (and	
probably	 BNP	 member	 no.	 20842)	 Ian	 Sayers;	
Wales	 BNP	 member	 Roger	 Phillips	 who	 has	 a	
photograph	 of	 himself	with	Nick	 Griffin;	 and	 two	
who	 appear	 supportive	 of	 the	 BNP,	 Paul	 Tranter	
(probably	 no.	 130915	 on	 BNP	 membership	 list)	
and	Dave	Brennan.87	
Other	 leading	 fiures	within	 the	EDL	have	
not	 attracted	 as	 much	 public	 attention.	 These	
include	 John	Smith,	 the	 EDL’s	 London	 Organiser	
with	 responsibility	 for	 Regional	 Organisers,88	and	
Steve	 Simmons,	 another	 spokesperson	 who	
appears	 to	 have	 been	 responsible	 for	 co‐
ordinating	 the	 EDL’s	 activities	 in	 Europe.89	One	
person	 for	whom	avoiding	 recognition	 is	 difficult	
is	 ‘Leon	 Britain’.	 Considerd	 as	 close	 to	 the	 EDL	





United	 and	 Northern	 Ireland	 footballer	 David	


















religious	 hatred	 on	 5	 May	 2010. 93 	Wether	
prominent	 or	 not,	 EDL	 leaders	 are	 distinguished	






For	 BNP	 members	 who	 attend	 EDL	 events,	 the	
attraction	seems	to	 lie	 in	potential	 for	violence	at	
them.	 Copsey	 has	 highlighted	 how	 the	 BNP’s	
withdrawal	 from	 ‘street	 politics’	 in	 the	 1990s	
removed	 anti‐fascists’	 opportunity	 for	 direct	
action.94	However,	 the	 BNP’s	 eschewal	 of	 such	
tactics	does	not	mean	 that	 its	members	have	 lost	
their	 desire	 for	 it.	 This	 probably	 explains	 the	
involvement	 of	 known	BNP	members	 in	UPL	 and	
EDL	 events.	 For	 example,	 Laurence	 Jones	 is	 a	
Dunstable	BNP	activist;95	he	 is	 also	 the	 individual	
that	 helped	 Ray	 organise	 the	 UPL’s	 Luton	
demonstration	 on	 13	 April	 2009.	 In	 addition,	 the	
BNP’s	 Young	 BNP	 Bedfordshire	 organiser,	 Chris	
Mitchell,	 attended	 this	 early	 demonstration.	 This	
may	 have	 resulted	 from	 the	 encouragement	 to	
attend	 this	 demonstration	 by	 the	 BNP’s	 Luton	
organiser,	 Peter	 Fehr,	 who	 also	 advised	 BNP	
members	not	to	wear	identifying	party	badges.96		
The	attendance	of	BNP	members	at	 early	
EDL	 events	 led	 to	 their	 party	 leader	 proscribing	
the	EDL	 in	September	2009,	but	 this	has	 failed	 to	
stop	 the	 crossover.97	Indeed,	 quite	 a	 number	 of	
BNP	 members	 have	 attended	 EDL	 events	 since,	
such	 as	 Karen	 Otty,	 the	 BNP’s	 Merseyside	
Secretary.	Alan	Spence	was	a	BNP	parliamentary	
candidate	for	Newcastle	East	in	May	2010.	He	is	a	
Gold	 member	 of	 the	 BNP.	 His	 son,	 Steven	
(probably	 no.	 27830	 on	 BNP	 list),	 stood	 for	
election	 in	 Fawdon	ward	 of	Newcastle	 Council	 in	
May	 2010.	 Both	 have	 attended	 EDL	 meetings.	
Other	 BNP	 election	 candidates	 seen	 at	 EDL	
meetings	 include	 Charlie	 Baillie	 and	 Max	
Dunbar,	 who	 both	 stood	 in	 the	 2009	 European	
Elections. 98 	Also	 seen	 at	 EDL	 meetings	 are	





















BNP	 organiser	 Sion	Owens,	 and	members	 of	 the	
BNP	 West	 Midlands	 security	 team	 Stuart	 Bates	
and	Michael	Fritz.99	Another	BNP	bodyguard	seen	
at	 the	 EDL’s	 ‘flash’	 9/11	 Oldham	 protest	 is	
convicted	 drug	 dealer	 Jock	 Shearer. 100 	Dave	
Bradley,	 a	 BNP	 supporter	 who	 gave	 evidence	 in	
court	supporting	party	leader	Nick	Griffin,	is	close	
to	 the	 Blackburn	 EDL	 leader	 Shane	 Calvert	 and	
attends	 EDL	 meetings. 101 	Attendance	 at	 EDL	
meetings	 is	 not,	 however,	 the	 only	 evidence	 of	
support	from	the	BNP:	Rob	Purcell,	a	former	BNP	
Birmingham	 organiser,	 sells	 BNP	 and	 EDL	
merchandise	 on	 eBay	 under	 the	 name	 ‘Brit	
Pancake’.102	It	 would	 seem,	 therefore,	 either	 that	
Griffin’s	proscription	of	the	BNP	is	a	sham,	or	that	
his	members	simply	 ignore	 it.	So	 far,	 the	BNP	has	
not	 disciplined	 a	 single	member	 for	 attending	 an	
EDL	event.	
Nor	 is	 attendance	 at	 these	 events	 by	
known	 right	wing	 extremists	 limited	 to	members	
of	 Britain’s	 most	 prominent	 extremist	 party.	
Wayne	 Baldwin,	 a	 convicted	 criminal	 and	 open	
Nazi	 sympathiser,	 has	 attended	 WDL	 meetings	
with	 Sion	 Owens.103	Tom	 Holmes,	 a	 former	 NF	
chairman	 and	 sometime	 critic	 of	 the	 BNP,	 also	
attended	 the	 UPL’s	 Luton	 meeting	 on	 13	 April	
2009.104	Police	 arrested	 former	NF	 activist	David	
Tull	 twice	 for	 foul	 and	 abusive	 language	 at	 EDL	
demonstrations.105	The	 desire	 for	 violent	 street	






131031).106	His	 attempt	 to	 acquire	 a	 leadership	
position	 within	 the	 EDL	 by	 forming	 an	 over‐45’s	
division	 failed,	 resulting	 in	 Baker	 creating	 the	
supposedly	 separate	 English	 National	 Alliance	
(ENA),	 but	 which	 in	 reality	 often	 merges	 its	





















extreme	 Muslims,	 but	 it	 also	 contains	 gratuitous	
insults	 to	 Mohammed	 under	 the	 obviously	 Nazi‐
derived	 slogan	 ‘One	 People.	 One	 Nation.	 One	
Cause’. 108 	Baker’s	 own	 comments,	 however,	
remove	any	ambiguity.	Instead	of	calling	for	action	
against	 individuals	 that	 commit	 crime,	 Baker	
advocated	attacking	religious	communities	that	he	
believes	 support	 them.109	On	 one	 blog	 thread	
Baker	 was	 even	 more	 explicit	 when	 he	 stated,	
‘Nuke	 Islam	and	be	done	with	 it.	 Sooner	we	 start	
killing	 Muslims	 the	 Better	 and	 their	 socialist	
pals’.110	Not	 until	 February	 2011	 did	 the	 EDL	
distance	 itself	 from	Baker.	 Yet,	 the	EDL’s	 reasons	
for	doing	so	did	not	contain	any	condemnation	of	
Baker’s	attitude	to	Muslims	as	a	whole,111	possibly	
because	 others	 within	 the	 EDL	 share	 his	 views,	
such	 as	 the	 EDL	 administration	 leader,	 Helen	
Gower,	 who	 has	 stated	 that	 ‘it	 is	 a	 fact	 that	
Muslims	 are	 scum	 bags’.112	Nor	 is	 Baker	 the	 only	
link	between	the	EDL	and	ENA.	Roger	Firth,	a	49‐
year	 old	 security	 guard	 from	 Eltham,	 South	
London,	 is	 an	 EDL	 steward	 and	 a	 leader	 of	 the	
ENA.113					
Two	other	extremists	prominent	in	a	now	
defunct	 neo‐Nazi	 organisation	 are	 Trevor	
Hannington	 from	 South	 Wales	 and	 Michael	
Heaton	from	Leigh,	Greater	Manchester.	Both	men	
have	 attended	 several	 early	 EDL	 rallies	 and	 have	
used	 their	website	 to	praise	 it.114	Heaton	has	also	
been	an	EDL	 forum	moderator.115	They	were	 also	
members	of	the	Aryan	Strike	Force	(ASF).	Ian	and	
Nicky	Davison,	 the	 founders	of	 the	ASF,	 received	
custodial	 sentences	 in	 February	 2010	 for	
possessing	 material	 useful	 to	 commit	 acts	 of	
terror,	 including	 the	 poison	 ricin. 116 	(Their	
conviction	 supports	 Goodwin’s	 categorisation	 of	
the	ASF	as	being	one	of	the	‘more	openly	neo‐Nazi	
groups	that	are	less	interested	in	mobilizing	mass	
support	 than	 recruiting	 elite	 activist	 cadres.’117)	
Hannington	 and	 Heaton	 also	 fit	 this	 description.	
They	have	posted	anti‐Semitic	and	racist	messages	
on	their	website,	and	advocated	the	use	of	violence	
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been	 monitoring	 their	 comments,	 raided	 their	
houses,	 they	 found	 Nazi	 flags,	 and	 weapons	 that	
included	knives,	a	samurai	sword,	knuckledusters	
and	a	machine	gun.118	Heaton	is	a	former	member	
of	 the	 NF,	 and	 is	 possibly	 involved	 in	 white	
supremacist	 movements	 such	 as	 the	Wolfs	 Hook	
White	 Brotherhood	 and	 Patriots	 of	 the	 White	
European	 Resistance.119	Jailing	 Heaton	 for	 two	
years,	 Justice	 Irwin	 said	 of	 him,	 ‘You	 wanted	 to	
start	 a	 race	war.	You	are	 clearly	 filled	with	 racial	
hatred	and	also	with	violent	and	angry	beliefs.’120	
Hannington	 received	 the	 same	 punishment,	 and	
Justice	 Irwin’s	 condemnation	 as	 a	 ‘long‐standing	
racist	who	has	never	hidden	your	views,	which	are	
violent	and	vicious	in	the	extreme’.121	The	EDL	has	
denied	 any	 links	 to	 Hannington	 and	 Heaton.	
Nevertheless,	Hannington	 and	Heaton	 are	 exactly	
the	 type	 of	 individual	 that	 the	 EDL’s	 adoption	 of	
street	politics	attracts.	They	are	violent	neo‐Nazis	
whose	 notoriety	 at	 best	 calls	 into	 question	 the	
EDL’s	 security	 measures,	 but	 also	 leaves	 them	
open	to	the	charge	of	collusion,	and	of	being	neo‐
Nazi	 fellow	 travellers.	 In	 this	 light,	 the	 EDL’s	
refusal	to	attend	an	interview	to	discuss	evidence	
of	 its	association	with	 these	neo‐Nazis	 takes	on	a	
more	sinister	hue.122	
Indeed,	 violence,	 criminality	 and	
incitement	 are	 persistent	 features	 of	 English	
Defence	 League	 supporters.	On	2	 June	2010,	 EDL	
supporter	 Kevin	 Smith	 received	 an	 8‐week	 jail	
sentence,	suspended	for	12	months,	for	religiously	
aggravated	 intentional	 harassment. 123 	As	
discussed	 elsewhere	 in	 this	 report,	 Smith	 had	
placed	a	pig’s	head	on	 the	wall	 of	Dudley	Central	
mosque,	 hardly	 an	 action	 designed	 only	 to	 target	
Islamists.	The	following	month,	Bristol	Magistrates	
Court	handed	out	a	suspended	sentence	to	45‐year	
old	 Kevin	 Jenkins,	 an	 EDL	 supporter	 who	 had	
groped	a	fourteen‐year	old	on	a	bus.124	Also	in	July	
2010,	 Mick	 Bridge,	 a	 school	 gardener	 from	
Burnley,	 boasted	 on	 the	 Internet	 of	 getting	
children	 to	 chant	 ‘E	 E	 EDL’	 in	 their	 school	
playground. 125 	Two	 months	 later,	 Flintshire	




















of	 racially	 aggravated	 threatening,	 abusive	 and	
insulting	language.	The	prosecuting	counsel	stated	
that	 he	 sought	 Evans’	 remand	 in	 custody	 ‘after	
reading	 texts	 on	 Evans’	 mobile	 phone	 between	
himself	and	the	English	Defence	League’.126	At	 the	
EDL’s	Leicester	demonstration	on	9	October	2010,	
a	 group	 of	 its	 supporters	 attacked	 women	 and	
children	 in	 a	 fast	 food	 restaurant.127	Three	 of	 the	
EDL	 attackers,	 Deejay	 Avfu	 Doyle,	 Andrew	
Millard	and	Tom	Hagues	 are	 from	 Birmingham,	
and	a	fourth,	identified	as	‘Gaz’,	is	from	Middleton	
in	 Greater	Manchester.128	Two	 have	 posted	 racist	
comments	 on	 the	 Internet.	 Doyle	 stated	 ‘If	 it	 aint	
white	 it	 aint	 right’,	 and	 Millard	 wrote	 ‘pakkie	
bastards’	and	 referred	 to	 footballer	Emile	Heskey	
as	a	‘MONKEY’.129				
Perhaps	 one	 of	 the	 most	 shocking	
examples	of	violence	by	EDL	supporters	appeared	
in	 December	 2010.	 Daryll	 Jones	 and	 Mark	
Jackson,	aged	17	and	21	respectively,	are	Lincoln	
FC	 supporters.	 Football	 intelligence	 officers	
identified	 them	 as	 two	 targets	 for	 Lincolnshire	
Police	 to	 try	 to	exclude	 from	certain	areas	during	
match	 days.	 However,	 Lincolnshire	 Police	
suspended	 their	 case	 against	 them	 after	 their	
arrest	on	suspicion	of	killing	Shaun	Rossington,	a	
21‐year	 old	 Aspergers	 sufferer.	 Rossington	
suffered	 more	 than	 forty	 injuries,	 resulting	 from	
punching,	kicking	and	stamping.	PC	Karl	Williams,	
a	 Lincolnshire	 Police	 football	 intelligence	 officer,	
stated	that	‘there	were	some	indications	they	were	
connected	 to	 the	 English	 Defence	 League’.130	So	
far,	 the	 EDL	 has	 not	 denied	 these	 links,	 or	
condemned	the	killing.	Then	again,	it	is	difficult	to	
condemn	 violence	 when	 leaders	 of	 the	 EDL	 also	
engage	in	it.		
The	 most	 persistent	 feature	 of	 EDL	
criminality,	 however,	 continues	 to	 be	 racially	
aggravated.	In	March	2011,	for	example,	Doncaster	
Crown	 Court	 handed	 a	 ten‐year	 Criminal	 Anti‐
Social	 Behaviour	 Order	 (CRASBO)	 to	 self‐
proclaimed	 EDL	 leader	 Shane	 Overton.	 As	 the	
title	 suggests,	 a	 CRASBO	differs	 from	 an	 ASBO	 in	
that	 it	 results	 from	a	criminal	conviction.	 It	 is	 the	
second	 time	 that	 a	 court	 has	 given	 an	 EDL	
supporter	 a	 CRASBO.	Overton	 pleaded	 guilty	 to	 a	
racially	 aggravated	 public	 order	 offence.	 He	
racially	 abused	 a	 family,	 terrifying	 the	 children,	
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demonstration	 on	 29	 May	 2010.	 Chief	 Inspector	
Tom	Naughton	 of	 British	 Transport	 Police	 stated	
that,	 ‘Racist	abuse	of	any	sort	is	unacceptable,	but	
the	nature	of	Overton’s	insults	levelled	at	a	family	
minding	 their	 own	 business	 sat	 on	 the	 platform	





year	old	Michael	Riley,	 both	 from	Hull,	 admitted	
criminal	 offences	whilst	 among	 a	 group	 of	 fellow	
supporters	 chanting	 racist	 songs	 in	 a	 Halifax	
pub.133	These	 attacks,	 which	 make	 no	 distinction	
between	 Islamism	 and	 Muslims,	 are	 typical	 of	
those	that	continue	to	involve	the	EDL.		
For	the	EDL,	skin	colour	and	race	are	not	
exclusively	 the	 catalysts	 of	 their	 supporters’	
violence.	 Robert	 Gavin	 Tromans,	 a	 29‐year	 old	
EDL	 supporter	 from	 West	 Bromwich,	 pleaded	
guilty	 to	 threatening	 behaviour	 at	 Blackburn	
magistrates’	 court	 in	 June	 2011.	 Tromans	 had	
attended	an	EDL	demonstration	 in	Blackburn.	He	
admitted	trying	to	pull	PC	Palmer	Davies	from	her	




was	 being	 interviewed	 after	 his	 arrest’. 134	
Therefore,	we	might	 accept	 some	doubt	 as	 to	 his	
nature	due	to	the	pain	he	suffered.	What	 is	not	 in	
doubt,	however,	is	that	a	Mr.	Tromans	of	Beverley	
Rd,	 West	 Bromwich	 is	 a	 member	 of	 the	 BNP	






These	profiles	beg	 the	question:	 is	 the	EDL	 really	
just	 the	 latest	 vehicle	 for	 football	 hooliganism,	or	
are	 we	 witnessing	 something	 even	 more	 closely	
associated	 with	 the	 far	 right?	 The	 former	
interpretation	has	some	merit.	From	its	inception,	
the	 EDL	has	had	 links	 to	 football	 ‘firms’.	 Football	
hooliganism	continues	to	be	prominent	among	the	
EDL.	However,	these	profiles	suggest	strongly	that	
the	 EDL	 is	 potentially	more	 than	 a	 concatenation	
















groups.	 Moreover,	 the	 EDL	might	 profess	 itself	 a	
single	 issue,	 counter‐jihadist	 movement,	 but	 its	
failure	 to	adhere	 to	 this	 line	 leaves	 it	 looking	 like	
all	 previous	 racist	 extreme‐right	 groups.	 This	
failure	makes	 it	 even	more	 difficult	 to	 ignore	 the	
neo‐Nazi	 methods,	 antecedents	 and	 current	
connections	of	the	EDL’s	leaders	and	its	followers.		
Consequently,	 these	 profiles	 allow	 four	
conclusions.	 First,	 the	 EDL	 is	 unarguably	
connected	 to	 the	BNP	 and	other	 far‐right	 groups,	
whether	 by	 previous	 association	 or	 by	 shared	
interest.	 Secondly,	 some	 of	 these	 far‐right	
individuals	 have	 possessed	 significant	 weaponry	
that	 identifies	 them	 as	 potential	 ‘lone	 wolf’	
terrorists.	Thirdly,	EDL	leaders	and	followers	have	
engaged	 in	 criminality,	 especially	 racially	
aggravated	incidents.	Fourthly,	the	EDL	engages	in	
double‐speak	 that	 powerfully	 questions	 their	
claim	to	be	a	single‐issue,	non‐racist	movement.	
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As	 noted	 earlier,	 social	movements	 tend	 to	move	
through	 a	 number	 of	 stages:	 initial	 emergence;	
coalescence	 and	 stabilisation;	 formalisation;	 and	
finally,	eventual	decline.	At	the	time	of	writing,	the	
EDL	 may	 be	 located	 in	 the	 third	 of	 these	 four	
stages,	though	this	in	itself	is	not	an	indicator	that	
moving	 to	 decline	will	 occur	 in	 the	 near	 or	 even	
intermediate	 future.	 To	 frame	 a	 response	 to	 the	
English	Defence	League’s	development,	it	is	useful	
to	 employ	 a	 multi‐dimensional	 approach	 for	
identifying	 and	 understanding	 factors	 producing	
the	 present	 ‘fertile	 conditions’	 for	 new	 far	 right	
groups	to	operate.	Such	conditions	are	vital	for	the	
on‐going	 viability	 of	 ultra‐patriotic,	 protest‐type	
social	 movements,	 and	 are	 crucial	 when	
identifying	the	EDL’s	potential	future	trajectory.		
Of	 course,	 discussing	 the	 future	 is	 a	
notoriously	 difficult	 aspect	 of	 any	 analysis.	 To	 be	
able	 to	make	more	than	speculative	statements	 is	
problematic	–	academics	do	not	have	a	crystal	ball	
and	 nor	 does	 anyone	 else.	 In	 order	 to	 underpin	
any	 informed	 guesswork	 regarding	 the	 EDL’s	
future,	 a	 number	 of	 overlapping	 approaches	
drawn	 from	psychological	 criminology,	 social	and	
political	sciences,	and	history,	can	directly	assist	in	
better	 understanding	 both	 why	 the	 far	 right	 has	
grown	 in	 Britain	 in	 this,	 and	 the	 last,	 century.	 In	
particular,	 this	 analysis	 highlights	 the	 rising	
prominence	 of	 anti‐Muslim	 sentiment	 in	 British	
society	 more	 widely	 as	 a	 key	 driver	 in	 the	
development	 of	 the	 EDL.	 Combatting	 this,	
alongside	 the	 movement’s	 ability	 to	 mount	






Amongst	 the	 varied	 writings	 available	 to	 date,	
there	is	a	emergent	consensus	that	elements	of	the	
core	 support	 for	 the	 EDL	 consists	 of	 former	
football	 firm	 activists,	 who	 have	 found	 a	 new	
vehicle	 for	 violent	 street	 protests.	 Academic	
research	 into	 the	 movement	 is	 also	 beginning	 to	
piece	 together	 the	 psychology	 of	 support	 found	




based	 upon	 qualitative	 interviews,	 offers	 an	
especially	 clear	 perspective	 on	 the	 allure	 of	
violence	directed	against	 a	 clearly	defined	enemy	
figure	for	many	supporters.		
Treadwell	 and	 Garland	 stress	 that	 EDL	
participation	allows	(mostly)	young,	working‐class	
men	 the	 opportunity	 to	 engage	 in	 activity	 that	 is	
part	 of	 a	 codified	 ‘masculine’	 sub‐culture.	
Participation	in	or	around	violence,	and	attendant	
expressions	 of	 aggressive	 masculinity,	 in	 turn,	
allows	 supporters	 to	 re‐establish	 a	 feeling	 of	
control	and	power	in	a	world	seen	as	 ‘anomic’,	or	
descending	 into	 a	 state	 of	 crisis.	 The	 focus	 on	




too,	and	 the	 idea	of	 ‘performing’	violence	 in	 front	
of	 others	 who	 share	 a	 similar	 value	 system	 only	
adds	to	a	sense	of	empowerment.	Though	Islamist	
extremism	is	the	EDL’s	specified	target,	underlying	
frustrations	 of	 activists	 often	 centre	 upon	
perceived	 structural	 and	 social	 problems	 with	
modern	Britain.		
	Treadwell	 and	 Garland’s	 fieldwork	




The	Paki,	 the	Muslim,	 to	me	is	 the	enemy,	 they	are	 like	
everything	 we	 are	 not,	 like	 Sikhs	 and	 Hindus	 are	 not	
cunts,	 the	 Indians,	 they	are	ok.	They	are	not	 like	Pakis.	
Pakis	 are	 different.	 It	 is	 like	 they	 enjoy	 taking	 the	 piss	
and	 trying	 to	 fuck	 around	 with	 us.	 Like	 Sikhs	 and	
Hindus,	 and	 the	 blacks,	 they	 know	 you	 have	 to	 follow	
English	 laws,	 but	 the	Pakis,	 the	Muslim	ones,	 basically,	
they	are	all	different.	They	come	here	to	take	advantage	









They	 got	 it	 together,	 the	 Pakis,	 and	 now	 whites	 run	
scared	 of	 them	 a	 lot	 of	 the	 time	 ....	 You	 get	 them	now,	
blowing	 themselves	 up	 on	 trains—we	 have	 to	 do	
something	 about	 that.	 I	 want	 them	 to	 feel	 fear,	 put	 it	
back	on	the	Pakis,	you	know.	I	love	the	satisfaction	I	get	
when	 I	 know	 that	 they	 are	 shitting	 themselves	 cos	 the	





it’s	 about	 time	 that	 we	 give	 them	 some	 of	 their	 own	
fucking	medicine.	
	
Insofar	 as	 these	 views	 may	 be	 taken	 as	 to	 some	
degree	representative	of	the	EDL	rank‐and‐file,	we	
can	see	how	the	movement	appeals	most	strongly	
to	 those	 who	 feel	 marginalised	 and	
disenfranchised,	 while	 appearing	 to	 offer	 active	
solutions	 to	 underlying	 social	 issues.	 The	 EDL	
provides	 a	 platform	 for	 direct	 action,	 one	 that	 is	
potentially	 violent	 in	 nature,	 for	 those	 who	 feel	
alienated	 within	 society.	 Worryingly,	 for	 many	
supporters	 any	 actively	 violent	 involvement	with	
the	 movement	 is	 likely	 to	 continue	 a	 cycle	 of	
disorder	 –	 and	 thus	 disconnection	 –	 from	 wider	
society	 that	 has	 often	 brought	 them	 to	 the	
movement	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 Violence	 in	 this	
context	 is	 not	 merely	 restricted	 to	 Muslims,	 but	
can	 also	 be	 directed	 at	 anti‐fascist	 protestors,	
journalists,	 and,	 of	 course,	 police	 at	
demonstrations.	
In	 consequence,	 without	 a	 wider	 policy‐
based	 response	 to	 engage	 disconnected	
individuals	 and	 groups,	 potentially	 through	
Prevent	Strategy	activities,	over	and	above	already	
existing	mechanisms,	the	EDL	is	likely	to	continue	
to	 have	 significant	 appeal.	 As	 Treadwell	 and	
Garland	 conclude:	 ‘Unless	 and	 until	 their	 voices	
are	 heard	 and	 their	 concerns	 listened	 to,	 then	
there	 is	 every	 danger	 that	 the	 English	 Defence	
League	will	seem	ever	more	appealing	as	an	outlet	







Psychological	 approaches	 to	 EDL	 activism	 can	 be	
augmented	 by	 analysis	 of	 structural	 factors	 that	
allow	 for	 the	 growth	 of	 far‐right	 perspectives.	
There	is	no	clear	academic	consensus	that	sets	out	
hard‐and‐fast	 laws	 for	predicting	 the	 rise	and	 fall	
of	 far‐right	 movements.	 Yet	 among	 political	 and	
social	 scientists	 of	 the	 far	 right,	 Roger	 Eatwell’s	
public‐facing	 research	 has	 boiled	 down	 complex	
debates	 into	 a	 number	 of	 key	 issues	 that	 frame	
analysis	 on	 factors	 that	 affect	 the	 supply	 of,	 and	
demand	 for,	 far	 right	 politics.	 In	 turn,	 these	 have	
provided	 for	 focused	 thinking	 in	 recent	 years.	










Political	 Opportunity	 Structure:	 This	 theme	
emphasises	 strategies	 whereby	 mainstream	
parties	can	actively	occupy	(or	leave)	the	political	
space	 in	 which	 far	 right	 organisations	 tend	 to	
operate.	 A	 classic	 example	 here	 is	 Margaret	
Thatcher’s	 ‘ownership’	 of	 the	 anti‐immigration	
agenda	across	the	1980s,	which	helped	to	deny	the	
populist	British	far	right	the	political	space	within	
which	 to	 grow.	 Perceived	 ‘establishment’	
weakness	 on	 immigration	 in	 the	 later	 1990s	 and	
2000s,	 meanwhile,	 arguably	 allowed	 for	 an	
expansion	of	the	populist	far	right	in	Britain.	Yet	it	
is	 far	 from	clear	 that	 simply	developing	hard‐line	
language	 on	 immigration	 in	 the	 political	
mainstream	 is	 preferable	 to	 such	 positions	 being	
expressed	 by	 far	 right	 movements,	 which	 only	




creating	 an	 environment	 for	 the	 far	 right	 to	
exploit,	 the	messages	 put	 out	 by	 the	mainstream	
media	are	also	crucial	in	the	growth	(or	otherwise)	
of	 far	 right	 parties.	 In	 particular,	 the	 populist	
media	 outlets	 can	 give	 tacit	 support	 to	 far	 right	
campaigns	 by	 offering	 clear	 scapegoats	 for	 the	
public	 to	 latch	 onto,	 such	 as	 new	 migrants.	
Sensationalist	 mass	 media	 coverage	 of	
immigration	 and	 Islamist	 terrorism	 over	 the	 last	
decade,	 for	 example,	 has	 undoubtedly	 helped	 to	
fan	the	 flames	of	 the	 ‘new	far	right’s’	anti‐Muslim	
prejudice.	 In	 the	case	of	 the	EDL,	we	can	see	 that	
the	Daily	Star	 in	particular	has	helped	 to	develop	
the	 wider	 populist	 framework	 for	 the	movement	
to	gravitate	around.	Moreover,	scoops	such	as	the	
Daily	Star’s	February	2011	headline	suggesting	the	





by	 either	 focussing	 a	 single	 emotive	 issue,	 or	 by	
attempting	 to	 develop	 a	wider	 political	 ‘package’.	
Typically	 in	 the	 past,	 however,	 far	 right	
movements	 have	 tended	 to	 sit	 somewhere	
between	these	two	poles.	In	the	case	of	the	EDL	we	
largely	 see	 a	 focused,	 single‐issue	 agenda	 based	
upon	anti‐Muslim	prejudice	clearly	event	–	despite	















Protest	Thesis:	This	 longstanding	 approach	 holds	
that	 far	 right	 movements	 are	 able	 to	 gain	 wider	
support	 as	 they	 allow	 people	 to	 register	 a	
‘populist’	protest	against	the	political	mainstream.	
This	 approach	 does	 not	 view	 supporters	 of	 such	
movements	as	people	who	necessarily	agree	with	
a	 far	 right	 perspective,	 but	 rather	 as	 largely	
opportunists	 seeking	 to	 register	 more	 general	
dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 political	 mainstream	
though	 limited	 support	 of	 (in	 this	 case)	 far	 right	
groups.	
	
Charismatic	 Leadership:	 A	 cliché	 of	 far‐right	
politics	 is	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 centralising	
charismatic	 figure,	 around	 whom	 the	 wider	
movement	 gravitates.	 Though	 charismatic	 figures	
can	dominate	a	far	right	movement,	examples	are	
also	 numerous	 of	 comparatively	 successful	 far	
right	movements	 lacking	 a	 charismatic	 leader,	 as	
well	as	ones	that	fail	despite	possessing	a	powerful	
leader	 figure.	 To	 some	 limited	 extent,	 Steven	
Yaxley‐Lennon	 has	 been	 able	 to	 carve	 out	 such	 a	
role	 through	 media	 appearances	 on	 radio	 and	
television.	 Yet	 the	 appearance	 of	 splinter	 groups	
within	 the	 EDL	 shows	 his	 authority	 is	 not	




more	 general	 approach	 identifies	 a	 growing	
fragmentation	of	society	over	the	past	thirty	or	so	
years,	 leading	 to	a	breakdown	of	 traditional	 class	
and	 gender	 identities,	 which	 in	 turn	 acts	 a	 key	
factor	 for	 renewed	 far	 right	 growth.	 As	 a	 more	
traditional,	and	seemingly	stable,	 forms	of	society	
fragment,	a	number	of	social	and	economic	‘losers’	
from	 such	 processes	 are	 thus	 created.	 These	
‘losers’	 of	 modernisation	 generally	 believe	 they	
have	 poorer	 job	 and	 life	 prospects	 than	 that	 of	
previous	generations,	and	so	can	become	attracted	
to	 the	 far	 right	 –	 especially	 through	 its	 simplistic	
promises	 of	 community,	 traditional	 identity,	 and	
security	in	an	increasingly	complex	world.		
	
Economic	 interest:	 This	 view	 holds	 that	 far	 right	
activism	succeeds	when	its	messages	connect	with	
far	more	material	concerns.	Similarly,	the	far	right	
gains	 traction	 when	 it	 is	 able	 to	 present	 ethnic	
minorities	 and	 migrants	 as	 a	 threat	 in	 the	
competition	 for	 scarce	 resources,	 which	 could	
include	 access	 to	 social	 housing,	 or	 projects	 for	
localised	regeneration.	It	is	notable	that	the	theme	





National	 Traditions:	 The	 far	 right	 develops	 in	
different	countries	 in	different	ways.	Comparative	
analysis	 of	 the	 national	 histories	 of	 far	 right	
activity	 helps	 establish	 how	 various	 factors	 can	
mark	the	growth	of	such	organisations	in	different	
settings.	 What	 works	 in	 one	 country	 will	 not	
necessarily	work	 in	another.	 In	 the	British	case,	a	
strong	 undercurrent	 of	 neo‐Nazism	 has	 often	
energised	 some	 of	 the	 more	 extreme	 far‐right	




exclusive.	 Yet	 considered	 as	 a	 whole	 they	 give	 a	
series	 of	 focal	 points	 for	 mapping	 the	 ‘fertile	
conditions’	 that	 allow	 for	 the	 growth	 of	 far	 right	
movements	 generally.	 As	 such,	 they	 help	 inform	
speculation	 into	 the	 future	 viability	 of	 the	 EDL.	
Before	continuing	to	discuss	the	present	situation,	
it	 is	 worth	 briefly	 re‐examining	 Britain’s	 longer	
history	 of	 far	 right	 parties	 in	 order	 to	 appreciate	




Historical	 development	 of	 the	 British	 far	 right	
and	the	growth	of	the	anti‐Muslim	agenda	
	
The	history	of	 far	right	movements	 in	Britain	 is	a	
complex	 series	 of	 overlapping	 developments,	
comprising	many	small	scale	groupings,	as	well	as	
larger	movements	 (most	 recognisably	 the	 British	
Union	 of	 Fascists,	 or	 BUF,	 in	 1930s	 Britain).	 This	
pattern	 is	 typical	 of	 far	 right	 politics,	 in	 both	
Britain	and	abroad.	Yet	only	rarely	does	a	far	right	
movement	 grow	 to	 the	 size	 of	 the	 EDL,	 let	 alone	
rise	 to	 executive	 political	 power.	 In	 total,	 Britain	
has	 witnessed	 four	 sizeable	 far	 right	
organisations:	 the	 BUF,	 the	 National	 Front	 (NF),	
the	 British	 National	 Party	 (BNP)	 and	 the	 English	
Defence	 League.	 Unlike	 the	 previous	 three,	 the	
EDL	 can	 be	 usefully	 seen	 to	 represent	 the	
emergence	of	a	large	‘new	far	right’	movement	–	at	
the	 same	 time	 as	 another	 large‐scale	 far	 right	
party,	the	BNP,	one	far	more	clearly	identified	with	
neo‐Nazism,	is	in	decline.	Such	an	overlap	between	
major	 far	 right	 movements	 has	 not	 previously	
occurred	in	Britain.	
Looking	 further	 back,	 organisations	
marked	 by	 ultra‐nationalism,	 racism,	 and	 anti‐
establishment	 views	 came	 of	 age	 in	 the	 interwar	
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to	 postwar	 migration	 and	 the	 decline	 of	 Empire.	
Such	 a	 strategy	 continues	 in	 the	 anti‐Muslim	
politics	of	 the	past	decade.	All	of	 these	 issues	can	
be	 given	 a	 far	 right	 ‘spin’,	 blurring	 ultra‐patriotic	
politics	 with	 more	 localised	 campaigns	 aimed	 at	
presenting	the	British	public	as	being	betrayed	by	
an	 out‐of‐touch	 political	 elite.	 Moreover,	 the	
mainstream	 media	 can	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	
creating	 supportive	 or	 hostile	 environments	 for	
the	 far	 right.	 More	 often	 than	 not,	 British	 media	
sources	are	openly	hostile	to	the	far	right.	Yet	they	
can	 also	 offer	 latent	 support	 for	 such	 politics	 by	
normalising	 prejudices	 that	 are	 then	 further	
radicalised	 by	 far	 right	 movements.	 Similarly,	
more	‘populist’	right	wing	views	can	set	an	agenda	
that	 the	 far	 right	can	easily	exploit.	Enoch	Powell	
is	 a	 classic	 case	 in	 point,	 but	more	 recent	 figures	
can	also	be	appropriated	by	 the	 far	 right,	notably	
columnists	 for	 tabloid	 newspapers.	 The	 role	 of	
mainstream	politicians	is	also	crucial,	and	far	right	
movements	often	develop	a	following	on	the	back	
of	both	national	and	 localised	political	 crises	 (the	
best	example	being	 the	birth	of	 the	BUF	from	the	
Great	 Depression).	 Finally,	 regionalism	 is	 also	
important	 to	 stress,	 as	 understanding	 why	 local	
pockets	 of	 support	 have	 grown	 at	 particular	
period	 –	 such	 as	 the	 North	 West,	 and	 Yorkshire	
and	Humberside,	electing	two	BNP	MEPs	in	2009,	
or	 the	 EDL	 from	 Luton	 in	 2009	 –	 is	 crucial	 to	
explaining	 the	 rise	 and	 fall	 of	 the	 far	 right	 more	







The	 development	 of	 the	 far	 right	 in	 Britain	 over	
the	 past	 ten	 years	 merits	 consideration	 in	 more	
depth.	 The	 decade	 since	 the	 attacks	 of	 9/11	 has	




to	 grow	 in	 the	 2000s	 need	 to	 be	 more	 fully	
understood.		
The	 electoral	 success	 of	 the	 BNP	 in	 the	
2000s	 has	 been	 widely	 linked	 to	 the	 growing	
currency	 of	 anti‐Muslim	 politics,	 which	 has	 been	
particularly	 marked	 in	 areas	 with	 social	
deprivation,	divided	communities,	and	poor	access	
to	social	housing.	This	prejudicial	politics	has	also	
developed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 disconnect	 between	
mainstream	local	and	national	politicians	 in	some	
pockets	 across	 the	 country,	 and	 the	 wider	
communities	they	represent.	Inner	city	areas	such	
as	 Barking	 and	 Dagenham	 in	 London,	 as	 well	 as	
those	like	as	Stoke	on	Trent,	have	offered	the	BNP	
some	 localised	 ‘fertile	 conditions’	 in	 which	 to	
grow.8	Although	 the	BNP	grew	during	a	period	of	
economic	 prosperity	 for	 many	 in	 Britain,	 the	
movement’s	 targeted	 campaigns	 achieved	 the	
greatest	 relevance	 in	 areas	 where	 the	 local	
economy	 did	 not	 share	 in	 this	 wider	 wealth	
creation.	 BNP	 heartlands	 in	 Barking	 and	
Dagenham	 and	 Stoke	 on	 Trent	 epitomise	 this	
trend.	 The	 ‘political	 opportunity	 structure’	 was	
right,	 with	 anti‐Muslim	 politics	 having	 a	 high	
visibility,	 while	 the	 mainstream	 politicians	
appeared	 unwilling	 to	 offer	 hard‐line	 positions.	
Moreover,	 a	 national	media	 climate	 helped	 to	 set	
an	 anti‐Muslim	 tone	 as	 well	 as	 framing	




The	 influence	 of	 more	 general	 anti‐
Muslim	attitudes	in	Britain	in	this	period	has	also	
been	 crucial,	 and	 Muslims	 have	 correspondingly	
become	 the	major	 target	 figure	 for	 both	 the	 BNP	
and	the	EDL.	In	order	to	map	changing	perceptions	
of	 Muslims	 in	modern	 Britain	 across	 this	 period,	
the	work	of	Clive	D.	Field	 is	of	especial	relevance.	
He	 has	 conducted	 an	 authoritative	 survey	 of	
recent	British	opinion	polling	on	attitudes	towards	
British	Muslims,	roughly	from	the	emergence	of	a	
distinct	Muslim	 identity	 in	 the	 imagination	of	 the	
wider	population	at	the	end	of	the	1980s,	until	the	
mid	2000s.	His	findings	reveal	a	number	of	spikes	
in	 hostility	 that	 has	 framed	 an	 increasingly	




Satanic	Verses	 –	 and	have	 similarly	 spiked	during	
the	 1991	 Gulf	 War;	 the	 9/11	 attacks;	 the	 2003	
invasion	of	Iraq;	the	7/7	bombings;	and	finally,	the	
protests	 against	 the	 Danish	 Cartoons	 in	 2006.	
Field	 stresses	 that,	 by	 the	mid	 2000s,	 the	 British	
public	tended	to	believe	that	Muslim	communities	
needed	to	do	more	to	integrate	into	British	society,	
emphasising	 the	 limits	 of	 multiculturalism	 when	
doing	 so.	 His	 research	 also	 found	 that	 public	
perceptions	of	Islam	are	often	constructed	through	
the	 lens	 of	 Islamist	 extremism,	 helping	 to	
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32%	 of	 the	 British	 public	 deemed	 Islam	 to	 be	 a	
threat	 to	 Western	 liberal	 democracy,	 yet	 this	
figure	 had	 risen	 to	 53%	 by	 2006.	 Thus,	 claims	
Field,	 by	 taking	 ‘a	 cross‐section	 of	 attitudinal	
measures,	somewhere	between	one	in	five	and	one	
in	 four	 Britons	 now	 exhibits	 a	 strong	 dislike	 of,	
and	prejudice	against,	Islam	and	Muslims’.	Groups	
more	 likely	 to	 be	 hostile	 towards	 Muslims	 are	
‘men,	 the	 DE	 social	 class,	 oldest	 age	 cohort	 (not	
least	 pensioners)	 and,	 most	 especially	
Conservative	 voters’.	 The	 extent	 to	 which	 anti‐
Muslim	prejudices	have	become	normalised	in	the	
2000s	 is	 unmistakable,	 according	 to	 Field’s	
study.10		
Furthermore,	 expert	 on	 anti‐Muslim	
politics,	 Chris	 Allen,	 similarly	 highlights	 that	
roughly	 half	 of	 the	 British	 population	 in	 2010	
believed	 that	 society	 was	 marked	 by	 a	 sense	 of	
religious	 division,	 while	 just	 under	 half	 felt	 that	
such	 a	 split	 was	 detrimental	 to	 the	 country’s	
wellbeing.	 Discussing	 mainstream	 political	




incidents	 and	 undertakings	 –	 as	 well	 as	 the	 events	 of	
9/11	and	7/7	amongst	others	–	have	all	contributed	to	a	
climate	 where	 the	 immediacy	 of	 recognition	 and	
acknowledgement	of	Muslim	and	Islamic	difference,	the	
growing	 receptivity	 to	 anti‐Muslim	 ideas	 and	
expressions	 about	 Muslims	 and	 Islam	 posing	 a	 threat,	
and	the	sense	of	justification	that	is	recurrently	evident	
in	 being	 fearful	 and	 normatively	 against	 Muslims	 and	
Islam	has	increasingly	been	seen	to	make	sense.11	
	
The	 problem	 of	 anti‐Muslim	 sentiments	 ‘making	
sense’	 in	 mainstream	 Britain	 has	 not	 emerged	
overnight.	Nevertheless,	 such	 views	have	become	
quite	 pronounced	 over	 the	 last	 ten	 years,	 even	
passing	 what	 Baroness	Warsi	 recently	 called	 the	
‘dinner	 table	 test’	 of	 casual	 racism.	 Matthew	
Goodwin’s	 most	 recent	 analysis	 of	 the	 BNP	
provides	 additional	 discussion	 of	 the	 connection	
between	 growing	 anti‐Muslim	 sentient	 in	 the	
2000s	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 BNP	 in	 this	 period.	




affecting	 Britain	 alone.	 Across	 Europe	 and	 in	 the	











of	 this	 fertile	 climate,	 an	 anti‐Muslim	 ‘new	 far‐
right’	 is	having	a	genuine	impact	on	public	policy;	
for	 example,	 both	 Belgium	 and	 France	 have	
banned	 the	 niqab	 and	 burka	 in	 public,	 while	
Switzerland	 has	 banned	 any	 further	 construction	
of	 mosques.	 Another	 leading	 scholar,	 Liz	 Fekete,	





‘with‐hunts’	 of	 Muslims	 who	 display	 symptoms	 of	
‘unacceptable	 behaviour’	 as	 enunciated	 by	 terrorism	
laws.	 No	 other	 communities	 are	 placed	 under	 the	
microscope,	constantly	questioned	about	their	personal	
beliefs,	 their	 ‘foreign	 allegiances’,	 as	 the	 Muslim	
communities	 of	 Europe.	 It’s	 former	 Tory	 minister,	
Norman	Tebbit’s	cricket	test	gone	mad.13	
	
Without	doubt,	 therefore,	 a	 substantial	 growth	 in	
anti‐Muslim	 sentiment	 in	 Britain,	 especially	 since	
9/11,	also	operates	 in	a	pan‐European	context.	 In	
turn,	 this	has	been	a	driver	 for	 the	growth	of	 the	
‘new	far	right’	over	the	last	decade.		
Finally,	 this	 is	 a	 perspective	 shared	 by	
Nick	 Lowles’	 and	 Anthony	 Painter’s	 2011,	 report	
Fear	and	Hope.	This	study	not	only	stresses	that	a	
‘new	 politics	 of	 identity,	 culture,	 and	 nation	 has	
grown	out	of	the	politics	of	race	and	immigration,	
and	 is	 increasingly	 the	 opinion	 driver	 in	modern	





experienced	 the	 successful	 far‐right	 parties	 that	 have	
swept	 across	 much	 of	 Western	 Europe.	 Our	 report	
shows	 this	 is	 not	 because	 British	 people	 are	 more	






for	 populist	 far	 right	 politics	 has	 been	 confirmed	
by	 other	 academic	 commentators	 on	 the	
contemporary	 British	 far	 right	 as	 well.15	While	
older	 far	 right	 organisations	 are	 indelibly	
associated	 with	 a	 past	 era	 of	 overt	 fascist	 (and	
oftentimes	 neo‐Nazi)	 politics,	 there	 is	 genuine	
public	 interest	 in	 the	 ‘new	 far	 right’.	 Despite	
achieving	historically	unprecedented	successes	for	
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constrained	 its	 older,	 neo‐Nazi	 identity.	 This	 is	
exemplified	 by	 Nick	 Griffin’s	 disastrous	
performance	on	the	BBC’s	flagship	Question	Time	
programme	 in	 2009	 where	 he	 failed	 to	 clearly	
repudiate	 Holocaust	 denial,	 or	 the	 ideas	 of	 one‐
time	 KKK	 leader	 David	 Duke.	 The	 now‐
haemorrhaging	 British	 National	 Party	 has	 thus	






to	 prefer	 a	 non‐violent	 vehicle	 for	 this	 ‘new	 far	
right’	 politics,	 which	 starkly	 contrasts	 with	 the	
EDL’s	nature	and	reputation.	Moreover,	the	public	
are	 looking	 for	 an	 established	 political	 party,	







What	 we	 can	 draw	 from	 psychology,	 political	
science,	 history	 and	a	 contemporary	 appreciation	
of	 the	 anti‐Muslim	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 is	 that	 the	 EDL	
has	been	 successful	because	 it	 taps	 into	concerns	
which	 genuinely	 affect	 sections	 of	British	 society.	
As	 with	 all	 far	 right	movements,	 demand	 for	 the	
EDL	can	be	viewed	as	a	symptom	of	more	general	
political	 shortcomings	 to	 engage	 whole	
communities.	 As	 such,	 we	 need	 to	 understand	
more	 about	 the	 localised	 situations	 that	 provide	
the	 ‘fertile	 conditions’	 for	 such	 movements	 to	
grow,	such	as	localised	economic	issues.	This	issue	
of	 locality	 in	particular	needs	 to	be	 researched	 in	
more	detail	with	regard	to	the	far	right	in	modern	
Britain.	Often,	 local	political	 solutions	will	help	 to	
provide	answers	to	wider	far	right	support.		
We	 can	 also	 see	 that	 the	 EDL’s	 style	
politics	 is	 a	 particularly	 extreme	 expression	 of	
more	generalised	fears	surrounding	Muslims,	who	
have	 become	 a	 central	 scapegoat	 figure	 within	
many	 ultra‐patriotic	 discourses,	 taking	 centre	





So	 through	political	 and	economic	 issues,	
and	 a	 wider	 culture	 of	 anti‐Muslim	 sentiment,	 a	
significant	 demand	 for	 a	 ‘new	 far	 right’	 style	 of	
political	movement	has	arisen.	We	can	expect	this	
demand	 to	 remain	 substantial	 until	 the	 general	
profile	 of	 British	 Muslims	 in	 public	 discourses	











supporters,	 not	 just	 those	 susceptible	 to	 jihadi	
Islamism,	 would	 be	 a	 useful	 addition	 to	 state’s	
responses	 to	 the	 far	 right.	 Nigel	 Copsey	 has	




One	 suspects	 that	 much	 of	 the	 Government’s	 concern	
with	 extreme‐right	 terrorism	 still	 remains	 largely	
symbolic.	 Revealingly,	 the	Prevent	 strategy	 is	 reluctant	
to	 discuss	 any	 extreme‐right	 groups.	 The	 EDL	 is	 not	
subject	 to	any	consideration.	This	might	reflect	current	
thinking	 in	 the	 Home	 Office	 that	 the	 EDL	 is	 not	 an	
‘extreme‐right’	 group	 (the	 National	 Co‐ordinator	 for	
Domestic	 Extremism	 currently	 defines	 the	 EDL	 as	 a	
‘right‐of	 centre’	 pro‐nationalist	 social	 movement	
engaged	 in	 direct	 action	 demonstrations).	 Neither	 is	
there	any	discussion	of	the	British	National	Party	(BNP),	
a	 far‐right	 organisation	 with	 a	 deeply	 Islamophobic	
agenda	 (in	 a	 recent	 e‐newsletter	 the	 BNP	 declared	 its	
intention	 to	 mobilise	 against	 ‘Muslim	 Paedophile	





remove	 the	 far	 right	 as	 an	 electoral	 threat,	 there	 is	 a	
possibility	that	disaffected	BNP	members	might	give	up	









though	 disruptive	 at	 its	 sites	 of	 protest,	 has	 not	
risen	to	a	level	where	it	can	influence	the	political	
agenda.	Moreover,	 although	 it	 has	 found	 a	 gap	 in	
the	 ‘political	 opportunity	 structure’,	 it	 is	 not	 able	
to	 fully	 exploit	 this.	 As	 with	 many	 far	 right	
organisations	 in	 British	 history,	 its	 brand	 has	
become	 indelibly	 associated	 with	 violence	 and	
extremism.	 Its	 media	 portrayal	 is	 caustic,	 so	
although	 it	 may	 have	 limited	 appeal	 among	 the	
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came	 into	 contact	with	 a	 number	 of	 figures	 that	
have	views	and	opinions	on	 the	English	Defence	
League.	 Though	 these	 are	 not	 necessarily	 the	
views	of	the	report’s	authors,	fostering	debate	on	
the	nature	of,	and	responses	to,	the	EDL	is	crucial.	






The	 EDL	 regards	 itself	 as	 a	 socio‐political	movement	 that	 is	 supposedly	 based	 on	
grass	 roots	 activism	 and	 with	 the	 desire	 to	 confront	 radical	 extremism	 from	
Islamism.	The	reality	is	that	the	leadership	of	the	group	is	built	on	pseudo‐hatred	of	
all	 things	Muslim	 couched	 in	 the	 narrative	 of	 confronting	 radical	 extremism	 from	









trying	 to	 isolate	 Muslim	 communities	 by	 reaching	 out	 to	 other	 communities	 in	
society.	They	have	tried	to	reach	out	to	LGBT	and	Sikh	communities	for	example	in	
areas	 like	Tower	Hamlets,	Wolverhampton	and	Walsall	and	have	paraded	their	ex‐
member	 and	 trooper,	 Guramit	 Sikh	 as	 a	 shining	 example	 of	 a	 'Sikh	 Warrior'	
combatting	 'Muslim	 hordes'.	 This	 is	 far	 from	 the	 truth	 since	 the	 EDL	 leadership	
simply	 attempts	 to	 manipulate	 other	 communities	 to	 promote	 its	 underlying	









party	 with	 an	 overall	 political	 programme	 but	 a	 single	 issue	 protest	 movement	




EDL	 Imitates	 the	 ‘march	 and	 grow’	 strategy	 of	 the	 1970s	 National	 Front	 or	 the	
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British	National	Party	during	 its	early	boot‐boy	phase.	 It	has	combined	 this	with	a	





The	 EDL	 leadership	 assert	 that	 their	 organisation	 rejects	 racism	 –	 Islam,	 they	
regularly	remind	us,	is	a	religion	not	a	race	–	but	the	EDL’s	Facebook	page	features	
endless	sickening,	hate‐filled	comments	about	Muslims	and	other	minorities	of	 the	
type	you	would	expect	 to	 find	on	a	neo‐Nazi	website.	Calls	 for	physical	 attacks	on	




Opposing	 the	 EDL	 cannot	 be	 separated	 from	 exposing	 and	 countering	 the	 lying	











Although	 the	 message	 of	 the	 EDL	 is	 focused	 on	 Muslims	 –	 all	 of	 them,	 not	 just	
extremist	groups	as	they	claim	–	nobody	should	doubt	that	the	politics	of	the	EDL	is	
still	driven	by	the	familiar	bigotry	and	hatred	of	the	far	right,	with	a	new	language	
and	 target	 to	 fit	with	 the	 times.	 If	 you	 look	beyond	 the	 specific	 language	 then	 the	
similarities	should	be	obvious:	this	 is	the	politics	of	hatred	and	division,	which	has	
nothing	positive	 to	offer	any	part	of	society.	The	 fact	 that	Muslims	are	 the	current	
target	 simply	means	 that	 it	 is	Muslims	who	 should	 be	 the	 recipients	 of	 anti‐racist	




The	 EDL	 intimidate	 entire	 Muslim	 communities,	 causing	 tension	 and	 fear.	 Jews	
ought	 to	 remember	 that	we	have	 long	experience	of	being	on	 the	 receiving	end	of	
this	 kind	 of	 bigotry.	 They	 present	 a	 divisive,	 hateful	 politics	 that	 demonises	
minorities	and	damages	social	cohesion	in	a	way	that	is	never	beneficial	for	society	
as	 a	 whole.	 We	 believe	 that	 antisemitism	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 prejudice	 are	 best	
fought	by	bringing	communities	 together,	not	 setting	 them	 in	conflict	against	each	
other.	
	
Hatred,	 division,	 cycles	 of	 inter‐communal	 violence,	 intimidation	 and	 polarisation	










and	 identity‐based	 grievance	 narrative,	 from	which	 a	 small	 number	 of	 individuals	
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Professor	 Nigel	 Copsey	 of	 Teesside	 University,	 and	 author	 of	 The	 English	 Defence	 League:	
Challenging	our	 country	and	our	values	of	Social	 Inclusion,	Fairness	and	Equality	 (Faith	Matters,	
2010):	
	
What	 is	 the	 English	Defence	 League	 supposedly	 defending?	 The	 EDL	 cry	 out	 for	
‘English’	culture	to	be	given	the	‘right	to	exist	and	prosper	in	England’.	But	what	do	
the	EDL	mean	by	 ‘English’	culture?	 	Reference	 is	made	to	 freedom,	democracy	and	
individual	 or	 human	 rights,	 but	 nobody	 should	 be	 fooled.	 The	 EDL’s	 England	 is	
mono‐cultural.	If,	as	the	EDL	believe,	other	‘foreign’	cultures	can	integrate	and	adapt,	






Islam	 –	 culture	 in	 the	 EDL’s	 ‘green	 and	 pleasant	 land’	 would	 be,	 in	 practice,	
exclusivist	 and	 discriminatory.	 The	 EDL	 insist	 that	 what	 defines	 the	 ‘people	 of	
England’	is	not	their	race	but	their	culture.	But	make	no	mistake	the	‘English’	culture	
that	the	EDL	is	supposedly	defending	is	a	predominantly	white	culture,	the	culture	of	
the	 indigenous	(white)	English.	 	 In	 the	end,	 it	 is	 this	visceral	urge	 to	restore	white	
ethno‐national	 dominance	 that	 positions	 the	 EDL	 on	 the	 far	 right	 of	 the	 political	
spectrum.	
	
Yet	 the	 EDL	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 redoubt	 for	 fascists.	 Some	 of	 its	 violent	 support	
associates	with	the	football	hooligan	scene,	where	ultra‐patriotic	pride	simply	goes	
with	 the	territory.	More	significantly,	when	 it	comes	to	mobilising	numbers	on	the	
streets	 it	 is	 the	EDL’s	nativist	 clamour	 for	 recognition,	 crudely	articulated	 through	
sometimes	 racist	 and	 often	 violent	 Islamophobic	 language,	 which	 above	 all	
resonates	 with	 disenfranchised,	 disengaged,	 and	 resentful	 sections	 of	 the	 white	
working‐class.	In	the	throes	of	an	English	identity	crisis,	buffeted	by	socio‐economic	
change,	their	concern	is	not	with	some	fascist	revolution	but	with	the	loss	of	national	






The	 English	 Defence	 League	 (EDL)	 and	 other	 associated	 groups	 are allegedly	
a grass‐roots	 organisation	 tackling	 and	 challenging	 so	 called Islamification	 of	
Britain	 and	 Europe.	 These	 groups	 have	 quickly	 gained momentum.	 It	 could	 be	
argued	 that	 this	 momentum	 is	 linked	 to the	 acceptability	 of Islamophobia	 in	
mainstream	society,	including	in	politics,	and secondly	due	to	the	lack	of	ideological	
challenge	by	mainstream politicians and	society.	One	has	to	look	very	carefully	at	
the	 links	 of	 these	 groups	 to	 other right wing	 movements	 to	 understand	 their	
objectives,	 rather	 than	 take	 them	 on face value,	 based	 on	 their	 carefully	 chosen	
words	 for	 media	 marketing	 or their website.	 The	 demonstrations	 taking	 place	
nationally	by	 the	EDL	have	 confirmed	a deep seated	hatred	and	 fear	of	Muslims.	
These	 demonstrations	 have	 been	 the cause of	 much	 damage,	 concern	 and	
vulnerability	to	the	Muslim	communities, who	have frequently	felt	let	down	by	the	
services	 there	 to	 protect	 them. Indeed,	 a look	 at	 these	 so	 called	 peaceful	
gatherings	 and	 demonstrations	 shows that there	 is	 an	 unacceptable	 level	 of	
Violence,	 Harassment	 and Criminality.  There	 is	 considerable	 body	 of	




threat	 of	 the	 EDL	 to	 our communities.	 Yet	 the	 police	 service	 has	 failed	 to	 even	
acknowledge that	 the	EDL are	 right	wing. Furthermore,	 the	Association	of	Chief	
Police	Officers	(ACPO),	a	body responsible	for	issuing	guidance	to	the	police	forces	
nationally	lacks sufficient	foresight	to	understand	the	EDL	and	the	courage	to	take	
on	 the challenge	posed	 to	community	 relations.  There	 is	a	strong	perception	 in	
Muslim	 communities	 that	 the	 police service	 does	 not	 take	 the	 threat	 of	 the	 right	
wing	 seriously.		 This perception is	 fast	 becoming	 reality	 when	 communities	
witness	 an	 inconsistent, somewhat relaxed	 police	 approach	 to	 EDL	
demonstrations	resulting	in	very	few arrests and	prosecutions.	This	perception	is	
reinforced	by	the	position	of the	National Domestic	Extremism	Unit	(NDEU)	which	









An	 important	 aspect	 of	 my	 research	 involves	 the	 adverse	 impact	 of	 EDL	
demonstrations	 on	 Muslim	 communities	 in	 towns	 and	 cities	 in	 England.	 EDL	
campaigns	and	demonstrations	do	not	occur	 in	a	political	vacuum	but	significantly	
take	 place	 at	 the	 end	 of	 a	 decade	 dominated	 by	 the	 war	 on	 terror	 in	 which	
Islamophobia	 generally	 and	 anti‐Muslim	 hate	 crimes	 in	 particular	 have	 become	
familiar	 experiences	 for	 many	 Muslims.	 For	 instance,	 prior	 to	 9/11	 very	 few	
mosques,	Islamic	institutions,	Muslim	organisations,	Muslim	graves	and	Muslims	of	
distinctive	 Islamic	 appearance	 experienced	 criminal	 attacks	 in	 a	 way	 that	 has	
become	commonplace	since.	Thus	when	an	EDL	demonstration	targets	a	particular	
mosque	or	Muslim	community	 for	a	provocative	and	 threatening	demonstration	 it	
may	well	be	that	the	local	mosque	or	a	mosque	in	the	vicinity	has	been	subjected	to	a	
criminal	 attack	 or	 to	 harassment	 and	 vandalism	 in	 the	 recent	 past.	 In	 these	
circumstances	an	EDL	demonstration	re‐enforces	the	anxiety	and	 fear	experienced	
by	victims	of	anti‐Muslim	or	Islamophobic	hate	crimes.	Equally	EDL	campaigns	and	
demonstrations	 are	 sometimes	 followed	 by	 criminal	 attacks	 on	 mosques,	 Islamic	
institutions,	Muslim	 organisations,	Muslim	 graves	 and	 against	 individual	Muslims.	
However	 strenuously	 the	 EDL	 leadership	 (if	 that	 is	 what	 it	 is)	 seeks	 to	 disown	
members	or	supporters	who	engage	in	anti‐Muslim	violence	of	this	kind	it	does	not	
diminish	 the	 fact	 that	 EDL	 demonstrations	 licence	 Islamophobia	 which	 in	 turn	
increases	the	risk	of	violence	for	Muslims	in	the	area.	
	
Although	 it	 is	 offered	 with	 the	 best	 of	 intentions	 Muslim	 communities	 will	 also	
experience	 an	 increased	 sense	 of	 being	 at	 risk	 of	 attack	 and	 of	 being	 under	 siege	
more	generally	when	 they	are	advised	by	police	and	community	 leaders	 to	stay	at	
home	when	EDL	demonstrations	take	place	in	their	neighbourhoods.	Whether	or	not	
such	advice	 is	 correct	 is	a	matter	 for	debate	and	a	matter	 for	 careful	 case	by	case	
assessment.	However,	 it	 is	sufficient	to	note	that	 it	may	not	always	be	beneficial	 in	
terms	 of	 community	 confidence.	 For	 instance,	 I	 was	 encouraged	 to	 observe	 a	
successful	 multi‐faith,	 multicultural	 counter	 demonstration	 to	 the	 EDL	 in	 Tower	
Hamlets	 in	 2010	 that	 served	 to	 empower	 a	 local	 community	 that	 has	 bitter	
memories	of	racist	intimidation	from	the	National	Front	and	the	value	of	successful	
resistance	that	was	hard	won.	Such	pro‐active	multi‐faith,	multicultural	solidarity	is	






















out	 of	 its	 depth	with	 reference	 to	 producing	 evidence	 of	 the	 EDL’s	 criminal	 links,	




The	 cost	 to	 the	Treasury	 of	 policing	EDL	marches	 and	 even	 static	 demonstrations	
now	stands	at	well	over	£10	million.	The	cost	to	community	relations	and	the	losses	
to	businesses	as	a	result	of	disruption	caused	by	the	EDL	have	not	been	quantified.	
Yet	 the	 response	 of	 Adrian	 Tudway,	 the	 police	National	 Coordinator	 for	Domestic	
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homecoming	 parade	 of	 the	 Royal	 Anglian	
Regiment	 through	 the	 streets	 of	 Luton	by	 the	Al‐
Muhajiroun	Islamic	group	led	to	conflict	with	local	
and	 national	 anti‐Islamic	 groups.	 The	 United	
People	of	Luton	(UPL)	was	formed,	which	included	
members	of	the	March	for	England	(MFE,	an	anti‐
Islamic	 protest	 group),	 UK	 Casuals	 United	 (a	
football	 hooligan	 network)	 and	 local	 community	
members.	 After	 contact	 with	 another	 anti‐









March	 for	 England	 begin	 to	 organise	 a	














alleged	 ‘Islamisation’,	 and	 was	 attended	 by	
members	of	United	People	of	Luton	and	the	Welsh	
Defence	League	(WDL).		
Meanwhile	 in	 London,	 members	 of	 UPL,	
MFE	and	UBA	attended	a	demonstration	at	Wood	
Green	 mosque	 to	 protest	 against	 the	 alleged	
‘Islamisation’	of	London.	Attendees	 included	Jerry	





A	 large	 protest	 was	 held	 by	 members	 of	 the	
English	and	Welsh	Defence	Leagues,	backed	up	by	
football	hooligan	elements,	and	some	neo‐Nazis.	A	
counter‐protest	 was	 also	 organised	 by	 the	 Unite	
Against	 Fascism	 (UAF)	 group.	 Violent	 clashes	
broke	 out	 after	 the	 two	 groups	 met	 and	 police	
were	 forced	 to	 intervene.	 Claims	 that	 social	







English	 Defence	 League	 and	 other	 right	 wing	
supporters	 held	 a	 demonstration	 in	 Birmingham	
city	centre,	protesting	against	Socialist	and	Islamic	
supporters.	 Violent	 clashes	 broke	 out	 and	 the	
police	were	forced	to	use	riot	units	to	disperse	the	
protestors.	 West	 Midlands	 Police	 indicated	 that	
the	EDL	 appeared	 to	 be	 aiming	 for	 violence	 from	





English	 Defence	 League	 organised	 and	 attended	
counter	 demonstration	 in	 London	 against	 pro‐
Palestinian	groups	holding	an	annual	Al‐Quds	day	





Around	 700	 English	 Defence	 League	 supporters	
demonstrated	 against	 alleged	 ‘Islamisation’,	 and	
were	met	by	around	1,400	Unite	Against	Fascism	
counter‐protesters.	Violent	clashes	soon	broke	out	
and	 riot	 police	 were	 forced	 to	 intervene	 and	
separate	groups4.	Police	costs	for	500	officers,	dog	
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a	 protest	 300	 meters	 away	 from	 the	 main	
demonstration.	 Nine	 arrests	 were	 made	 in	
connection	with	the	protest,	with	offences	ranging	
from	 public	 disorder,	 to	 affray	 and	 conspiracy	 to	





The	 English	 Defence	 League	 attended	 a	




Police	 were	 forced	 to	 prevent	 the	 EDL	 from	
clashing	 with	 the	 UAF	 and	 the	 EDL,	 who	
responded	by	attacking	the	police	lines.	Some	700	
police	 officers,	 including	 many	 drafted	 in	 from	





The	 English	 Defence	 League	 demonstration	
attracted	1,500	supporters,	 the	 largest	so	 far,	and	
was	opposed	by	a	group	of	300	UAF	supporters	in	
the	 city	 centre	 of	 Stoke	 on	 Trent.	 Following	 the	
planned	 demonstration,	 some	 disguised	 and	
facially	 covered	 EDL	 supporters	 attacked	 police	
lines	 and	 caused	 damage	 to	 police	 vehicles	 –	





The	 English	 Defence	 League	 paraded	 past	 the	
Houses	of	Parliament	 in	support	of	visiting	Dutch	
‘new	 far	 right’	 politician	 Geert	Wilders,	 who	was	
visiting	the	UK	to	promote	his	anti‐Islam	film.	The	
EDL	 march	 was	 opposed	 by	 approximately	 100	





















who	 were	 allegedly	 frustrated	 at	 the	 EDL	 being	
granted	 permission	 to	 march	 and	 receive	 police	
protection.13	City	 centre	 businesses	were	 affected	






Approximately	 2,000	 members	 of	 the	 English	
Defence	League	descended	on	Dudley	town	centre	
in	the	West	Midlands	to	demonstrate	against	plans	
for	 a	 new	mosque.	 Some	 of	 the	 protesters	 broke	
out	 of	 a	 pen	 in	 a	 car	 park,	 breaking	 down	metal	
fences	and	throwing	the	metal	brackets	at	officers,	
who	 were	 armed	 with	 riot	 shields	 and	 batons.	
Members	 of	 the	 demonstration	 started	 fighting	
their	own	stewards,	who	were	trying	to	calm	them	
down	as	they	attacked	the	fences	penning	them	in.	
The	 UAF	 had	 held	 a	 static	 protest	 in	 the	 town	
earlier	that	day,	but	were	unable	to	be	seen	by	the	
EDL	 contingent,	 and	 therefore	 were	 unable	 to	






in	 Aylesbury	 town	 centre,	 but	 trouble	 started	
when	 the	 demonstration	 ended	 and	 EDL	
supporters	 are	 shepherded	 out	 of	 the	 area.	 Cans,	
bottles	and	stones	are	thrown	at	police.	Riot	police	
were	 forced	 to	 intervene.	 75	UAF	members	were	
present	 at	 the	 demonstration	 but	 left	 before	 the	





Large	 English	 Defence	 League	 march	 through	
Newcastle	 city	 centre	 passed	 without	 major	
incident	despite	the	1,000	UAF	counter‐protestors	


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































English	 Defence	 League	 held	 a	 protest	 in	
Nuneaton,	 styled	 as	 opposing	 Shari’ah	 law	 being	
practiced	 in	 the	 area.	 The	 UAF	 opposed	 the	 EDL	
with	150	protestors,	and	missiles	were	exchanged	






The	 biggest	 policing	 operation	 in	 the	 history	 of	
Peterborough	saw	11	men	arrested	following	two	
protest	 marches	 through	 the	 city.	 Around	 1,000	
officers	 from	 18	 forces	 were	 drafted	 in	 to	 police	
the	 English	 Defence	 League	 march	 and	 a	
Peterborough	 Trades	 Union	 Council	 counter	














The	 EDL	 held	 a	 mass	 rally	 and	 ‘homecoming’	
march	 through	 Luton.	 Invited	 members	 from	
Defence	 Leagues	 across	 Europe	 and	 UK	 divisions	
also	 took	 part.	 Two	 smaller	 counter	
demonstrations	 were	 also	 held	 in	 the	 town	 but	
were	 kept	 apart	 successfully.	 Massive	 police	




The	 leadership	 of	 the	 English	 Defence	 League	
distances	 itself	 from	 the	 group’s	 Jewish	 Division	
due	to	 its	partnership	with	 the	hard‐line	 far	right	
American	Jewish	Task	Force.	The	head	of	the	EDL’s	
Jewish	 Division,	 Roberta	 Moore	 had	 previously	
announced	 (16	 Feb	 2011),	 that	 the	 group	 was	















from	 UAF	 counter	 demonstration	 by	 fencing	 and	
strong	police	presence.	Much	abusive	chanting	but	





The	 English	 Defence	 League	 demonstrated	 in	
Blackburn	 and	 gathered	 at	 the	 Town	 Hall	 for	
speeches.	 Some	 violence	 erupted	 in	 the	 crowd	 as	
Yaxley‐Lennon	 targeted	 individuals	 for	 abuse.	
Sporadic	 incidents	 throughout	 the	 day,	 but	 they	
were	 primarily	 dealt	 with	 by	 the	 EDL	 stewards.	
The	UAF	hold	a	counter	demonstration	 later	with	






English	 Defence	 League	 demonstration	 in	 the	
name	 of	 justice	 for	 Charlene	 Downes	 passed	
relatively	 peacefully	 and	 with	 few	 incidents.	
Arrests	were	made	 for	drunken	behaviour,	public	
disorder	 and	 offensive	 weapon	 incidents.	 There	




Roberta	 Moore,	 head	 of	 the	 English	 Defence	
League	 Jewish	 Division	 declared	 her	 decision	 to	





English	 Defence	 League	 attempted	 to	 target	 a	
Cambridge	 mosque	 but	 a	 strong	 police	 presence	
prevents	 further	 action.	 Fighting	 broke	 out	




were	 kept	 apart	 from	 the	 EDL	 group.32	The	 day	





























































































































































































































the  notion  that  people  can  be  divided  into  a 
‘scientific’  hierarchy  of  discrete  races, with  inferior 
and  superior  qualities.  Pioneered  by  Nazism,  and 
based on many now‐defunct anthropological  ideals, 





claims  certain  subsections  of  society  hold  a  set  of 
culturally  fixed values  that  renders  it  impossible  for 
them  to  integrate  into  a  national  community.  The 
common  pattern  is  for  such  cultural  definitions  of 




David  Lane’s  ‘14  Words’:  David  Lane  was  a 
prominent  American‐based  neo‐Nazi,  and  founder 
member  of  The  Order  group,  which  committed 
robberies  and  murder  in  the  mid  1980s.  After  his 
prosecution,  Lane  styled  himself  as  a  guru  of  neo‐
Nazi  thought,  and  contributed  a  number  of  highly 
influential  texts. His  ‘14 Words’  slogan  drawn  from 
Mein Kamph – ‘We must secure the existence of our 




is  inherently  dangerous  to  the  wider  public.  Often 
extreme  right‐wing  views will  be  openly  developed 
through variants of neo‐Nazism,  though high‐profile 
cases such as Anders Behring Breivik show that this is 
not  always  the  case. The  core  ideological principles 
of  the  British  National  Party  still  fall  within  the 
extreme  right‐wing  category,  despite  it  having 
developed a more presentable  front stage  in  recent 
years.  Many  experts  would  still  classify  the 
movement’s  core  ideology  as  fascist.  The  ‘extreme 
right‐wing’  often  embraces  violence  in  order  to 
develop  an  ultra‐national  or  racial  revolutionary 




to  develop  a  clear  set  of  public  messages  that 
present  their  ideas  in  a  considered  manner. 
However, to fully understand a political organisation 
analysis  always  needs  to  penetrate  the  unguarded 
back stage. With all far right groups, this penetration 
into the back stage  is particularly crucial, as there  is 
an  inherent  tendency  for  the  far  right  to  hide 
underlying  core  motives,  which  may  veer  into 
criminality,  in  a  more  coded,  misleading  public 
language.  It  would  be  naive  to  take  the  public 




that has  taken a  strong  line on  the English Defence 
League,  and  is  strongly  linked  to  Searchlight 
magazine.  Led  by  Nick  Lowles,  it  combines 




the  English  Defence  League,  there  is  a  significant 
capacity  to  offer  refuge  to  more  extremist 
perspectives – even if the leadership dies not want to 
give  support  to  such  views.  Though  the  EDL  styles 
itself  as  opposed  to Nazism,  it  has  ‘hosted’  a wide 
range  of  extreme  right‐wing  groups.  This  has 
included the Aryan Strike Force, the neo‐Nazi Welsh 
Defence League and the Infidels splinter groups that 
are  developing  a more  clearly  neo‐Nazi  outlook,  as 
well  as  other,  individual  neo‐Nazi  supporters.  The 
EDL  has  even  developed  links  with  extreme  right‐
wing terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, again showing 








Muslim  communities.  Though  care  needs  to  be 
exercised when developing  considered  analysis,  the 
term  usefully  conveys  the  extreme  fear  and 





should  become  state  law,  and  that  all  Muslims 
should aspire to the creation of an Islamic state. 
 
Jihadism:  The  vehicle  that  Islamists  use  to  develop 
their political  ideology for creating an  Islamist state. 
By  politicising  the  ideal  of  jihad,  Islamists  promote 
violence to achieve their political revolution.   
 
March  and  Grow:  a  common  far  right  tactic  that 
develops  a  series of high profile demonstrations  to 
gain wider publicity. Successful demonstrations both 
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offer  supporters  a  morale  boosting  opportunity  to 
express  their  grievances,  and  will  garner  much‐
needed publicity that helps the movement expand. 
 
Nativism:  Linked  to  ‘cultural  racism’,  nativism  is  a 






this  potent  form  of  fascism  has  gravitated  around 
biological  racist  themes.  Key  figures  who  have 
‘reinvented’  Nazism  include  the  British  extremist 
Colin  Jordan,  the  founder  of  the  British  National 
Party,  John  Tyndall,  and  the  American  neo‐Nazi 
terrorist David  Lane. Unlike  the more populist  ‘new 
far  right’,  neo‐Nazis  tend  not  to  cultivate  a  large 




New  Far  Right:    A  more  recent  form  of  far  right 
activism  that  places  anti‐Muslim  sentiment  at  the 
core of  its extremist politics.  Its public messages are 
broadly  compatible  with  pro‐Zionist  and  pro‐LGBT 
themes,  and  can  even  embrace  a  selective  form of 
multiculturalism.  Aside  from  a  core  ideology  based 
on scapegoating social problems by developing anti‐
Muslim  messages,  it  is  marked  by  the  following 
qualities:  promotion  of  populist,  ultra‐patriotic 
values; development of an uncompromising critique 
of  the  political  establishment;  a  public  rejection  of 




Searchlight: A monthly magazine  that  is notable  for 
being  a  central  source  of  campaigning  and 




term  direction,  social movements will  develop  of  a 
central  organisation  that  tries  to  offer  a  sense  of 
coordination  to  the  grass‐roots  networks.  By 
formalising  the  social  movement  in  a  Social 
Movement Organisation,  it develops official posts, a 




established,  tends  to  be  coordinated  by  a  Social 
Movement Organisation,  and  is  held  together  by  a 
broad ideology (sometimes called an ‘issue frame’ or 
a  ‘master  frame’ by  academic  specialists). All  social 
movements  move  through  a  series  of  lifecycle 
stages:  initial  emergence;  coalescence  and 
stabilisation;  formalisation;  and  eventual  decline. 
Historically,  social  movements  have  sought  to 
achieve  progressive  ends,  such  as  the  Labour 
Movement,  or  the  Feminist  Movement.  In  recent 
times,  social  movements  have  developed  non‐
materialistic causes, such as the EDL’s core themes of 
promoting  an  ultra‐patriotic  identity,  opposing 









The  ‘Other’: A  term used  to  identify any  scapegoat 
figure  within  extremist  ideologies.  The  cultures  of 
such movements do not  seek  to understand people 
deemed  as  ‘other’,  but  rather  present  them  as  an 




new  far  right  seizes  on  caricatures  of  Muslim 





feed off each other’s messages  and  ideologies.  The 










aggressively  excludes  sections  of  the  wider 
community  from  a  selective  national  identity. 
Because of its selective attitude towards who can be 
considered  a  legitimate  part  of  the  national 
community,  especially  with  regard  to  faith  groups 
such as Muslims, it is a type of patriotism that tacitly 
undermines  truly  liberal  democratic  values.  In  its 
more  clearly political  forms,  it  can be  termed ultra‐
nationalism, a core quality of fascist ideology. 
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